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Abstract 
 
This study explicates the concept of governance by mainstream online digital 
intermediaries such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter over extreme user-generated 
content (UGC)—a.k.a. “content governance.” The study synthesizes First Amendment 
theory and jurisprudence, as well as theories about the interconnected power roles of 
individuals and digital intermediaries, to explicate how such content is governed in an 
environment of global networked communication. Two key questions guide this 
explication: How and why do digital communication intermediaries respond to extreme 
UGC? What are the potential implications of their responses for public discourse in a 
system of networked communication? This study also examines ethical duties that digital 
intermediaries may have to protect speech or prevent harm. This synthesis of theories is 
applied to an empirical case-study analysis of how Facebook has changed its community 
guidelines throughout the 11 years of its existence. This analysis will look at examples of 
Facebook removing or not removing extreme UGC from its platform. The purpose of this 
analysis is to assess how the norms of freedom of expression are being negotiated in a 
networked communication environment facilitated by digital intermediaries.
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Over the last two decades, Internet communication and globalization repeatedly 
have challenged legal and social limits of freedom of expression in the United States and 
around the world. In the mid-to-late 1990s, interest groups in the United States rallied 
around the cause of protecting children from accessing the vast amounts of pornography 
that were becoming readily available online.1 To this day, governments around the world 
continue to fight a Sisyphean battle to stanch the online trafficking of images of child 
sexual abuse.2 Incongruities in countries’ defamation laws have upset the balance 
between protecting speech and preserving reputations across borders, particularly 
between the United States and virtually every other country on the planet.3 The Internet’s 
                                                
1 See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn, 146 TIME 38 (July 3, 1995) (discussing a 
study that claimed that more than 80% of the Internet in 1995 was pornographic); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 
844 (1997) (striking down parts of the 1996 Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 223) for being 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in its attempt to restrict “indecent transmissions” on the Internet, 
and classifying the Internet as more akin to print media than to broadcast in terms of government’s ability 
to regulate it); the 1998 “Child Online Protection Act,” 47 U.S.C. 231, a law that attempted to force 
commercial providers of online pornography to restrict access to minors (ultimately struck down as 
unconstitutional in Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004)). 
2 See the 1996 “Child Pornography Protection Act,” 18 U.S.C. § 2251 et seq., which attempted to extend 
federal prohibitions on images of child sexual abuse (18 U.S.C. §§ 1460-1466) to images that seem to 
depict minors yet are not made using real children (i.e. young adult actors portraying minors or animations 
of minors in explicit sexual contexts) (struck down as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in Ashcroft 
v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002)); Sean O’Neill, Police Are “Failing to Halt Spread of 
Online Child Abuse,” THE TIMES (LONDON) (June 17, 2013) (quoting Michael Moran, head of Interpol’s 
Crimes Against Children unit, as saying that “no police force in the world” was properly combating the 
spread of child pornography online); Charles Arthur, Online Pornography: Cameron’s “War” Muddles 
Two Separate Issues, THE GUARDIAN (July 23, 2013) (arguing that people who view images of child 
sexual abuse do so through proxy servers or private networks, and “the only way to stop someone really 
determined to access [those] sites is to cut off the Internet”). 
3 See the 2010 “Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage 
(SPEECH) Act, 28 U.S.C. § 4010 et seq., stipulating that U.S. courts shall not recognize foreign 
defamation judgments against U.S. citizens unless “the defamation law applied in the foreign court’s 
adjudication provided at least as much protection for freedom of speech and press … as would be provided 
by the first amendment” (§ 4102(a)(1)(A)) or the U.S. defendant “would have been found liable for 
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facilitation of anonymous speech has lowered the social cost for speakers to inflict many 
types of harm through their online words.4 The ease of sharing digital files of copyrighted 
works has facilitated contributory and vicarious infringement of copyright.5 And speech 
that is legal (and even socially acceptable) in some parts of the world can infiltrate other 
corners of the world where the mere knowledge that it exists is so offensive that it can 
push people to the point of protest, civil unrest, violence or murder.6 
These issues and events have created a web of context that has pulled scholars of 
mass communication, law, ethics, political science, international studies, and science-
and-technology studies closer together in pursuit of answering several important 
questions: What does freedom of expression mean in our increasingly connected world? 
Can conflicting legal norms of freedom of expression be reconciled with each other as the 
Internet allows speech to penetrate borders? If so, how? If not, how can humanity best 
adapt to this new world? Are the widely publicized incidents of speech associated with 
                                                                                                                                            
defamation by a domestic court” (§ 4102(a)(1)(B)); Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. v. Handshoe, 729 F.3d 481 (5th 
Cir. 2013) (holding that a Canadian libel judgment against a U.S. citizen could not be successfully enrolled 
in a U.S. court because the Canadian plaintiffs could not meet either of the burdens of the SPEECH Act); cf 
Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, High Court of Australia [2002] HCA 56 (holding that “those who post 
information on the World Wide Web do so knowing that the information they make available is available to 
all and sundry without any geographic restriction,” and that “publication” for the purposes of Australian 
defamation law occurs wherever the alleged defamatory writing is downloaded). 
4 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 147 (2011); 
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2015); Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: 
Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224 (2011); Danielle Keats 
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 86 BOST. U. L. REV. 61 (2009); Yuval Karniel, Defamation on the Internet—A 
New Approach to Libel in Cyberspace, 2 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 215 (2008). 
5 See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
6 A prominent example of such speech is the controversy surrounding the cartoons of the Prophet 
Muhammad published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in September 2006. See, e.g., Adria 
Battaglia, A Fighting Creed: The Free Speech Narrative in the Danish Cartoon Controversy, 43 FREE 
SPEECH YEARBOOK 20 (2006); Stephanie Craft and Tayo Oyedeji, United States: Journalism as a Prism of 
Culture Clash, in READING THE MOHAMMED CARTOONS CONTROVERSY: AN INTERNATIONAL 
ANALYSIS OF PRESS DISCOURSES ON FREE SPEECH AND POLITICAL SPIN (Risto Kunelius, Elisabeth 
Eide, Oliver Hahn & Roland Schroeder eds., 2007). 
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harmful outcomes leading to a decrease in tolerance for liberal conceptions of freedom of 
expression, such as the regime of First Amendment jurisprudence in the United States? If 
so, to what extent? What are the implications for global democratic discourse of a world 
that has little or no tolerance for extreme and potentially harmful speech? Is such a world 
desirable or not? Why?  
This study does not pretend to fully answer all of these questions. They are part of 
a large and ongoing global debate, to which this study will lend its perspective. 
Therefore, these questions will guide the analyses herein as they focus on one particular 
aspect of our globalized and networked world: How mainstream7 digital intermediaries 
deal with extreme speech.  
Extreme Speech in a New Communicative (and Regulatory) Environment 
 
A Question of Balance 
 
This study revolves around the following concept: Mainstream digital 
intermediaries (such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube) engage in a constant balancing 
act between protecting their users’ ability to speak freely on their platforms and 
preventing harms that may arise from users’ speech. This balancing act is not easy.8 In 
fact, finding the ideal point at which the greatest amount of speech is protected relative to 
the least amount of harm caused may be an impossible task for digital intermediaries. 
Yet, as intermediaries struggle to find that ideal point, the speech of every individual who 
uses these intermediaries is implicated. The robustness of the public discourse that takes 
                                                
7 See infra note 17. 
8 Josh Braun and Tarleton Gillespie, Hosting the Public Discourse, Hosting the Public, 5 JOURNALISM 
PRACTICE 383, 392 (2011) 
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place on these intermediaries is implicated. Therefore, individuals must understand—and 
this study seeks to explicate—how digital intermediaries govern the content that 
individuals publish to their platforms, and what the various ramifications are for this 
process of governance. This explication will require the synthesis of multiple theories 
from several distinct fields of study, including mass communication, First Amendment 
jurisprudence, and media ethics. It also requires a strong foundation based on the 
definitions of the two key concepts used throughout this study: extreme speech, and 
digital intermediaries. 




Devoid of context, the term “extreme speech” is vague. It can “describe a wide 
variety of expression, such as [H]olocaust denial, extreme pornography, and speech 
inciting hatred or likely to provoke public disorder,”9 though it is arguably primarily used 
to describe “expression that is seen to be discriminatory or perpetuate[s] discriminatory 
attitudes.”10 Any of the examples cited in the opening paragraph above could constitute 
extreme speech, including defamatory speech or speech that violates copyright, 
depending on the context in which they arise. Indeed, because the definition of extreme 
speech depends so much on disparate and constantly evolving social norms,11 coming up 
with a clear definition that serves this study is no easy task. However, what this study can 
                                                
9 Jacob Rowbottom, Extreme Speech and the Democratic Functions of the Mass Media, in EXTREME 
SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009), 608. 
10 Id. 
11 Robert Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 
2009), 129. 
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do is place boundaries around broad categories of extreme speech, thereby finding a 
compromise between respecting the fluidity of their definition and identifying a 
recognizable focus for analysis. Therefore, this study focuses on extreme speech that 1) 
can reasonably be considered to carry a political or social message;12 2) is protected 
under the First Amendment; yet 3) could reasonably be considered to cause some type of 
harm. 
The analysis of extreme speech in this study is steeped in the tradition of the First 
Amendment. This tradition has a distinct set of assumptions and biases that must be made 
clear from the outset. First, this study takes the perspective that more speech is better than 
less, and therefore the practice of restricting speech must be based on strong interests that 
outweigh the interests of promoting as much speech as possible.13 Second, and in relation 
to the first point, this study takes the perspective that extralegal or social means of 
restricting speech are just as threatening as legal means to the values of promoting more 
speech.14 This perspective will color the bulk of the analysis in this study, and it ties into 
the second focus of the analysis: the role digital intermediaries play in governing the 
speech that gets published on their platforms. 
 
 
                                                
12 The requirement that speech have “political” or “social” significance is loosely borrowed from the third 
part of the test for obscenity from Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), whereby speech cannot be 
considered unprotected obscenity if it can reasonably be considered to have “serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.” Although obscenity is not the focus of this study, the same broad idea from 
Miller, that undesirable speech can and often does have political or social value, is at the center of this 
study. 
13 These competing interests will be the focus of chapters 3 and 4. 
14 See infra notes 45-48. 




Each of the harmful types of speech listed above has one thing in common: to 
reach the public, it requires an intermediary, or a “platform,”15 an online space devoted to 
facilitating communicative activity among individual users.16 The analyses in this study 
focus particular attention on what could be considered “mainstream” digital 
intermediaries: Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, which together connect at least 1.35 
billion users to each other and publish their various forms of content to the world.17 The 
roles that these intermediaries play in facilitating the networked communication 
environment complicate traditional legal means of defining what speech is and how it 
might be regulated. Intermediaries make it easy for anyone with Internet access to publish 
his or her speech before a potentially global audience. Speech of all flavors, created by 
individuals, can be published on platforms: harmful speech, pornographic speech, 
entertainment, social or political commentary, inane banter, and addicting content that 
causes readers to easily waste an hour on a Saturday afternoon. And, of course, these 
types of speech are not mutually exclusive.  
                                                
15 Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of Platforms, 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 347 (2010). 
16 Id. at 351. 
17 Caitlin Dewey, Almost as Many People Use Facebook as Live in the Entire Country of China, WASH. 
POST “THE INTERSECT” BLOG (Oct. 29, 2014) (citing Facebook’s claim in its 2014 Q3 earnings report that 
it had more than 1.35 billion monthly active users) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2014/10/29/almost-as-many-people-use-facebook-as-live-in-the-entire-country-of-china/; 
About, TWITTER (2015) (reporting that the company has more than 288 million monthly active users), 
available at https://about.twitter.com/company; Statistics, YOUTUBE (2015) (reporting that the platform 
has more than 1 billion users), available at https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html. See generally 
CITRON, supra note 4. Although she does not explicitly label the intermediaries she analyzes, Citron places 
platforms into five categories throughout the course of her book when discussing where abusive speech 
occurs online: 1) Sites specifically devoted to hate messages, such as white supremacist websites; 2) sites 
that encourage the posting of potentially abusive UGC, such as TheDirty.com; 3) sites devoted to gossip; 4) 
sites devoted to trolling (see the section of chapter 4 titled “Abuse, Trolling and Gamergate”); and 5) 
mainstream sites, such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. 
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Figure 1-1 presents a very basic model of networked communication. Individuals, 
who are simultaneously speakers and audience,18 publish their various forms of speech 
via a digital intermediary. The intermediary makes that speech available for other 
individuals, who then publish more speech, either in response to or completely unrelated 
to another individual’s message. The process is continuous. For the sake of clarity, only 
four individuals are shown in this model to represent the hundreds of millions of 
individuals who speak via intermediaries. Also (and again for the sake of clarity), only 
one digital intermediary is shown in this model; however, individuals are likely to use 
multiple intermediaries, and the speech they publish through one intermediary has the 
potential to influence speech published through others (e.g. a YouTube video may get 
shared via Twitter or discussed on Facebook). 
                                                
18 See, e.g., AXEL BRUNS, BLOGS, WIKIPEDIA, SECOND LIFE, AND BEYOND (2008); YOCHAI BENKLER, 
THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 
(2006). 
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Figure 1-1: Networked Communication 
What intermediaries giveth, they also taketh away. Just as they are the vehicles 
that propel speech across borders and into communities where it is not welcome, 
intermediaries often are agents of regulation of speech when that speech is so unwelcome 
that it becomes harmful. Intermediaries can move swifter than many state actors (at least 
in liberal democracies) to remove harmful speech from the public discourse, and, because 
they are not state actors, intermediaries can remove speech virtually without fear of 
consequences for violating an individual’s “right” to speak on the platform.19 
                                                
19 See Braun and Gillespie, supra note 8; LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE (2014); Colin M. Maclay, Protecting Privacy and Expression Online, in ACCESS 
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Digital intermediaries are not state actors. These intermediaries have a First 
Amendment right to govern the speech that they host on their platforms, while 
individuals have no constitutional claim against these intermediaries stemming from their 
acts of governance.20 However, from the perspective of champions of freedom of 
expression, private mediation of harmful content raises several issues. First, just like the 
definition of extreme speech discussed above, the definition of what constitutes 
“harmful” speech is fluid and heavily dependent on both the context within which it 
arises and the sensibilities of the individuals or groups that it implicates. Under such a 
fluid definition for harmfulness, extralegal actions to police user-generated content 
(UGC) essentially may end up following the subjective early 20th century “bad tendency 
test” for determining undesirable speech.21 Applying the broad guiding questions above 
                                                                                                                                            
CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULE IN CYBERSPACE (Ronald Deibert, John 
Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski and Jonathan Zittrain eds., 2012), at 90. 
20 Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that a Florida statute requiring newspapers to 
publish responses from individuals who believed they were attacked in the newspapers amounted to an 
unconstitutional prior restraint.) Adopting a negative approach to First Amendment jurisprudence, the 
Court determined that such a statute constituted government control over the editorial process of a free 
press. Although the Court acknowledged that an ideal press was a responsible press that provided a forum 
for diverse viewpoints, it nonetheless held that “press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution, 
and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated,” at 256. See also See Bruce W. Sanford and Jane E. 
Kirtley, The First Amendment Tradition and Its Critics, in THE PRESS (Geneva Overholser and Kathleen 
Hall Jamieson eds., 2005), at 268. But cf Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In Red 
Lion, a unanimous Supreme Court held that the now defunct Fairness Doctrine—which required 
broadcasters to allot equal time to discussion of competing issues—did not violate broadcasters’ First 
Amendment right to “use their allotted frequencies continuously to broadcast whatever they choose, and to 
exclude whomever they choose from ever using that frequency” (at 386). Rather, the Court held that the 
medium of broadcast (via TV or radio), with its unique situation of depending upon the scarce availability 
of the electromagnetic spectrum, required regulations such as the Fairness Doctrine to prevent a monopoly 
of viewpoints from controlling all access to broadcast channels. The Court matter-of-factly averred, “It is 
the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount” (at 390). 
Although such an audience-centric interpretation of the First Amendment may have found favor at the High 
Court, that interpretation strictly applied to broadcast rather than print, and the Court has stated that the 
Internet should be classified as more akin to the latter than the former (Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 
(1997). 
21 Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919); Debs v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
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to the specific focus of digital intermediaries, this study asks the following: How is 
extreme speech defined in an era of networked communication? How do digital 
intermediaries govern the extreme and potentially harmful speech that users publish to 
their platforms? What are the potential implications of content governance to global 
discourse on matters of social and political importance? Answering these questions will 
require a theoretical framework based on a synthesis of literature from several fields. 
This study is based on a somewhat radical idea: The fact that digital 
intermediaries are not state actors does not preclude an analysis of the social values of 
extreme or potentially harmful speech in a global and networked society, nor an appraisal 
of the social implications of the ways in which content governance may be affecting these 
values. This study is steeped in the tradition of the field of mass communication law, yet 
it is not a study about the law. Put differently, the focus is not an analysis of a specific 
new law or a proposal for a specific new law. Rather, this study uses the law as a lens to 
explicate the concept of content governance. The chapters outlined below will elaborate 
further on how this study plans to go about accomplishing this mission. 
Overview of Chapters 
 
Chapter 2: “Conceptualizing Private Governance in a Networked Society: A 
Review of Scholarship on Content Governance” 
 
The goal of chapter 2 is to explore the relationship between digital intermediaries 
and the individual users who communicate via these intermediaries. Beginning the study 
here is crucial for developing a framework with which to analyze content governance. 
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The focus of this chapter will be on the nature of the so-called “networked economy”22 
and the role that it plays in shaping the function of digital intermediaries as both 
facilitators and regulators of the speech that individuals publish on their platforms. This 
chapter will also examine the position of state actors in this new communicative system, 
coming to the conclusion that all three actors in the system (individuals, intermediaries 
and state actors) are interdependent of one another within this system. This 
interdependence is the defining characteristic of the current individual-driven and 
intermediary-facilitated speech environment. 
To explicate how regulation of speech operates within this system of 
interdependence, this chapter uses a theoretical framework that borrows from the field of 
Internet governance23 and law professor Lawrence Lessig’s concepts of legal and 
extralegal regulation.24 Using this framework, this chapter takes the approach that the 
interdependent regulatory relationship among individuals, intermediaries and state actors 
is one whose definition is in constant flux.25 
The second half of the chapter is devoted to incorporating affirmative First 
Amendment theories into the analysis of how intermediaries facilitate speech. Such 
                                                
22 See José van Dijck, Users like you? Theorizing agency in user-generated content, 31 MED. CULT. & 
SOC’Y 41 (2009); Ute Schaedel & Michel Clement, Managing the Online Crowd: Motivations for 
Engagement in User-Generated Content, 7 J. MED. BUS. STUD. 17 (2010); James G. Webster, User 
Information Regimes: How Social Media Shape Patterns of Consumption, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 593 (2010); 
Ramon Lobato, Julian Thomas & Dan Hunter, Histories of User-Generated Content: Between Formal and 
Informal Media Economies, 5 INT’L J. COMM. 899 (2011). 
23 See, e.g., DENARDIS, supra note 19; Malte Ziewitz and Christian Pentzold, In Search of Internet 
Governance: Performing Order in Digitally Networked Environments, 16 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 306, 307 
(2014); Michel JG van Eeten and Milton Mueller, Where Is the Governance in Internet Governance? 15 
NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 720, 723 (2013). 
24 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE, VER. 2.0 (2006). 
25 See, e.g., TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF DIGITAL CULTURE 
(2007). 
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theories are generally consequentialist in nature and conceive of freedom of expression as 
an affirmative right: a right to speak due to the benefit speech brings to society, rather 
than a right to not have the government restrict one’s speech.26 These theories are 
valuable to the analysis in this chapter for two reasons. First, their essential focus on the 
social values of freedom of expression provides an analytical lens that portrays the role of 
intermediaries as facilitators of these values. Second, several versions of these theories 
view private actors that have great control over channels of speech as equally threatening 
to the robustness of the public discourse as state actors with the censorial power of law.27 
Thus, affirmative First Amendment theories have the ability to critically argue that the 
essential democratic function of intermediaries should be seen as more valuable or as a 
more important concern than intermediaries’ own rights as private businesses (or, at the 
very least, that these concerns are equally important). 
Chapter 3: “The Value of Extreme Speech in a Networked Society: A Perspective 
from First Amendment Theory and Jurisprudence” 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze how key First Amendment theories and 
doctrines define the notions of extremeness and harmfulness in the context of freedom of 
expression, and ultimately apply these definitions to how freedom of expression is 
exercised in a global system of networked communication. This chapter begins with the 
foundational question posed by law professor Frederick Schauer: Why must speech be 
                                                
26 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF 
FREE SPEECH (1996). 
27 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 24; Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 
PEPP. L. REV. 438 (2009) [hereinafter Balkin, The Future of Free Expression]; Jack M. Balkin, Digital 
Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Speech for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture]. 
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special?28 In other words, why should this analysis pay so much attention to the potential 
effects of methods of Internet governance on speech (“content governance”) when 
methods of Internet governance affect many other phenomena and seek to uphold other 
important social values? Like Schauer, this chapter concludes that speech must be 
considered special because of the multiple values that come from the broad category of 
speech, values that require us to carefully analyze the potential harms that can be 
experienced at the expense of these values.29 I then proceed to an analysis of three of the 
most prominent First Amendment theories: marketplace of ideas theory, individual 
autonomy theory and tolerance theory.30 Each of these theories, in its own way, answers 
the following questions: What makes speech harmful? What makes it so harmful that it 
should be regulated? How should that speech be regulated? At what point does regulation 
damage deliberative democracy? Answering these questions will help clarify the social 
values of extreme and potentially harmful speech. 
Grasping clear definitions of harm is a task that calls for law professor Rodney 
Smolla’s three-part model of harmful speech, which identifies physical harm, relational 
harm, and reactive harm.31 These three classifications of harm are useful because they 
neatly categorize First Amendment doctrine. U.S. free speech jurisprudence considers 
physical harm the worst of the three types of harms, and certain tests have been devised 
to address this harm and to decide when the speech that causes it falls outside of 
                                                
28 Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special? 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284 (1983). 
29 Id. at 1304, 1306. 
30 Another important First Amendment theory, self-governance theory, is not discussed in this chapter 
because it is part of chapter 2’s discussion of affirmative First Amendment theories. However, versions of 
self-governance theory will make an appearance in chapter 3 as perspectives for criticizing the three 
theories focused on in chapter 3. 
31 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 48 (1992). 
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constitutional protection. These types of speech include fighting words,32 true threats,33 
and incitement to imminent lawless action.34 Relational harm involves speech that causes 
injury to social relationships (defamation), business relationships (fraud or false 
advertising), ownership interests (copyright) and confidentiality (leaking national security 
secrets).35 Courts have devised legal tests to determine if and how such speech should be 
legally sanctioned. Finally, reactive harms include intentional infliction of emotional 
distress of public officials,36 and tortious invasions of privacy, as well as any type of hate 
speech. Hate speech has been defined many ways by many different scholars,37 but a 
generic definition for the purposes of this study may categorize hate speech and any 
speech that attacks and attempts to subordinate any group or class of people, typically 
spoken by a group with a higher level of social power than the targets of the speech. The 
                                                
32 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-3 (1942) (defining unprotected fighting words as 
words said in another person’s face that “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace”). 
33 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (O’Connor, J., writing for the plurality) (defining 
unprotected true threats as speech that can be interpreted both objectively and subjectively as threatening). 
34 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (defining unprotected incitement as “advocacy of the use 
of force or of law violation [that] is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely 
to incite or produce such action”). 
35 SMOLLA, supra note 31. 
36 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
37 For various studies with various definitions of hate speech, see generally Clay Calvert, Hate Speech and 
Its Harms: A Communication Theory Perspective, 47 J. COMM. 4 (1997); Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and 
Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a Democracy. 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497 (2009); Richard 
Delgado and David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic 
Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 871 (1994); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court and 
the Problem of Hate Speech. 24 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 281 (1995); Stephanie Farrior, Molding the Matrix: 
The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of International Law Concerning Hate Speech. 14 BERKELEY 
J. INT’L L. 1 (1996); Jean-Marie Kamatali, The U.S. First Amendment Versus Freedom of Expression in 
Other Liberal Democracies and How Each Influenced the Development of International Law on Hate 
Speech. 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 721 (2010); Post, supra note 11; Tanya Katerí Hernández, Hate Speech and 
the Language of Racism in Latin America: A Lens for Reconsidering Global Hate Speech Restrictions and 
Legislation Models. 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 805 (2011). 
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targets of such speech typically include racial minorities, women, religious minorities, 
and homosexuals.  
According to Smolla, speech that leads to reactive harms deserves the highest 
level of constitutional protection due to its tendency to implicate public figures or 
officials, or its tendency to involve important social issues and matters of public concern: 
factors which greatly outweigh the potential harms of the speech. However, although 
these types of speech receive strong legal protection, their harms are no less real to the 
people who suffer them. Content governance has the potential to fill the role of mitigating 
these harms.  
In crafting a model of harmful speech that would trigger mechanisms of content 
governance, this study primarily focuses on speech with the potential to cause reactive 
harms and physical harms. It does not focus on speech that can cause relational harms, 
namely defamation. This decision was made for several reasons. First, except for certain 
torts of invasion of privacy, First Amendment jurisprudence has all but precluded private 
individuals from recovering damages for reactive harms caused by other individuals. This 
lack of legal options for mitigating reactive harms has created a vacuum that means of 
private governance are able to fill. Meanwhile, defamation remains a tort in which private 
individuals in the United States have viable options for recovery against their alleged 
defamers, thereby giving digital intermediaries little reason or incentive to mitigate 
defamatory claims on the behalf of individuals.  
Second, physical harms are given greater attention in this study because they 
remain the most grievous type of harm regardless of which set of rules—First 
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Amendment jurisprudences or digital intermediaries’ community standards—is doing the 
judging. However, the high standards that First Amendment jurisprudence places in front 
of state actors who wish to punish speech for its potential to cause physical harms can 
create a governance vacuum that digital intermediaries are able to fill. For example, posts 
on Facebook that advocate violent uprising may, in fact, lead some people to violently 
rise up against government officials. Chapter 3 will outline the reasons why the 
Brandenburg “imminent lawless action” standard likely would not find that such speech 
violated the law of incitement. However, the at-least perceived connection between the 
online speech and the physical harm caused could lead digital intermediaries to step in 
and remove the speech from its platforms in an attempt to prevent any further harm. 
The discussion in this section of chapter 3 is framed around the following 
argument: tolerance theory, put forth by legal scholar Lee Bollinger in 1986,38 should be 
revitalized as the preeminent theory of freedom of expression in a communication 
environment in which content governance has become a common tool for controlling free 
expression. Bollinger contends that by allowing extreme and hurtful views to be put forth 
into our public discourse, we are actively fighting our natural proclivity to want to be 
intolerant of these viewpoints—or any viewpoint we oppose, for that matter.39 Tolerance 
theory is the best fit for the analyses within this study for several reasons. First, while 
other theories engage in apologetics of extreme speech as a necessary side effect of the 
central values the theories place upon freedom of expression, the central focus of 
                                                
38 LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN 
AMERICA (1986). 
39 Id. at 109. 
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tolerance theory is extreme speech (Bollinger calls it “extremist speech”). Bollinger, 
himself, does not give an explicit definition for extreme speech, but he does leave clues 
on how a definition can be formed. Extreme speech, Bollinger says, is what “nearly all of 
us believe immoral and vicious.”40 It “tend[s] to attract attention,” and “is very often the 
product or the reflection of the intolerant mind at its worst and, as such, an illustration to 
us of what lies within ourselves.”41  
Second, tolerance theory posits that tolerance of extreme speech should end where 
significant harm begins.42 Understanding harm and its relation to freedom of expression 
is important because content governance is about commercial intermediaries finding a 
balance between upholding the values of freedom of expression and mitigating the 
potential harms that individuals can cause through UGC. Individuals’ ability to tolerate 
extreme speech represents the balancing point, and it is argued in this study that digital 
intermediaries play a crucial role in influencing individuals’ tolerance by how they 
govern extreme speech. Third, tolerance theory holds that not only is it a natural tendency 
of government to censor, as proponents of individual autonomy and marketplace of ideas 
theory proclaim;43 rather, it is the natural tendency of every human being to censor, and 
champions of freedom of expression must constantly be on guard against attempts from 
powerful non-state actors to censor speech.44 This concept matches the argument from 
                                                
40 Id. at 124. 
41 Id. at 126. 
42 Id. at 192. Bollinger does not answer the question “When is speech so harmful it should be banned?” He 
does argue that “social” harm caused by allowing speech that society generally disapproves of is not 
sufficient to warrant proscription. Id. However, the principle of harm being the boundary of tolerance is an 
important one that fits the analysis in this chapter. 
43 SMOLLA, supra note 31, at 51. 
44 BOLLINGER, supra note 38, at 86. 
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Internet governance that non-state actors have great power to control speech, and that this 
power is worrisome due to the relative lack of transparency and standards employed in 
the process of controlling the speech.  
Finally, tolerance theory is important because, at bottom, Bollinger’s claim is that 
the act of tolerating extreme speech is an act of mental growth. Bollinger urges reflection 
on how society tends to invoke community norms to silence extreme, potentially harmful 
or otherwise undesirable speech so that society may collectively strengthen itself. Global 
networked communication continues to put more and more examples of detestable speech 
in front of our eyes, meaning that there has never been a more important time for society 
to strengthen its resolve and support for extreme speech. 
The overall goal of this chapter is to distill the key values of freedom of 
expression from First Amendment theory and doctrine. This goal answers Lessig’s call 
for a discussion on our values of freedom of expression as we continue to understand the 
relationship between content governance and freedom of expression. Lessig and many 
other legal scholars argue that we should focus on “constitutional values”45 (others call 
them “goals,”46 “principles,”47 or “ideals”48). One such value, which Lessig argues is the 
preeminent value of the First Amendment, is to encourage mass participation in public 
discourse by individuals.49 Similarly, law professor Jack Balkin argues that “a theory of 
                                                
45 Supra note 24, at 269. 
46 Ruth Walden, A Government Action Approach to First Amendment Analysis, 69 JOURNALISM Q. 65, 81 
(1992). 
47 Adam Candeub, The First Amendment and Measuring Media Diversity: Constitutional Principles and 
Regulatory Challenges, 33 N. KY, L. REV. 373 (2006). 
48 Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 (Jack 
M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009), at 30. 
49 LESSIG, supra note 24, at 269. 
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freedom of speech justified in terms of its potential contributions to representative self-
government seems altogether too narrow in the age of the Internet.”50 The Internet, he 
argues, is proof that “the point of the free speech principle is to promote not merely 
democracy, but something larger: a democratic culture” defined by mass participation.51 
The argument of this chapter is that promoting a democratic culture through a 
commitment to facilitating individual speech on platforms and tolerating the extreme 
forms of speech that invariably come with such mass participation are the main values of 
freedom of expression by which the concept of content governance should be judged.  
Chapter 4: “Heckler’s Veto 2.0: Speakers’ Rights v. Audience Rights in a 
Networked Society” 
 
This chapter looks at the First Amendment doctrine of the “Heckler’s Veto.” A 
heckler’s veto is “the suppression of speech by the government[] because of the 
possibility of a violent reaction by hecklers.”52 A heckler’s veto occurs when “the state 
[hides] behind the unpleasant reaction of some portions of the public in order to silence a 
speaker” through the use of an instrument of law, such as a disorderly conduct statute.53 
The heckler’s veto offers an analytical lens through which to examine the phenomenon of 
digital intermediaries governing extreme UGC out of a concern that the UGC threatens to 
violate certain community norms in some way, shape or form. The heckler’s veto also 
offers an excellent analytical lens through which to address the conflict between 
                                                
50 Balkin, The Future of Free Expression, supra note 27. 
51 Id. (original emphasis). See also Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 27, at 2. 
52 Ronald B. Standler, HECKLER’S VETO, Dec. 4, 1999, available at http://www.rbs2.com/heckler.htm. 
53 Cheryl A. Leanza, Heckler’s Veto Case Law as a Resource for Democratic Discourse, 35 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1305, 1306 (2007). 
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speakers’ “rights” and audience “rights” in the context of networked communication.54 
These rights have distinct histories in First Amendment theory and jurisprudence, yet the 
heckler’s veto doctrine enshrines the principle that the rights of audiences end when 
members of an audience attempt to silence a speaker through an instrument of law.55 
Understanding the heckler’s veto is important because it illustrates the ways in which the 
First Amendment protects extreme speech from being silenced by individuals who would 
seek to use community norms to goad the law into restricting speech.56 Subsequently, 
understanding how extreme speech and community norms clash will be important to 
understanding forms of content governance, particularly the form that involves 
individuals putting pressure on intermediaries to remove or block speech that contravenes 
certain norms. 
Chapter 5: “Facebook’s Free Speech Growing Pains: A Case of Content 
Governance”  
 
Chapter 5 explores the content governance practices of arguably the most popular 
digital intermediary: Facebook. Facebook’s ubiquity in the global system of networked 
communication makes its content governance practices worthy of study; as of this 
                                                
54 “Rights,” of course, are in quotes here because neither speakers nor audiences have a “right” regarding 
speech against a digital intermediary. 
55 Essentially, the heckler’s veto doctrine straddles so-called negative First Amendment theories (such as 
the marketplace of ideas theory) that conceive of freedom of expression as a right against the government 
and so-called affirmative First Amendment theories (such as self-governance theory) that conceive of 
freedom of expression as a right that government can protect through proactive policies. See generally 
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26. 
56 See ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 144 (1995) (contending that the main goal of the First 
Amendment is to promote “critical interaction” among groups with conflicting opinions and values, and 
that the way it does so is by preventing the government from invoking community norms to silence extreme 
speech). 
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writing, the social network claims to have more than 1.35 billion active monthly users,57 
making it the second most popular site on the World Wide Web.58 Facebook is unique 
among digital intermediaries because it allows users to publish a broader array of content 
(including video, text and photos) with greater latitude as to the volume of that content 
(i.e. unlike Twitter, posts are not limited to 140 characters) compared to other mainstream 
intermediaries (namely Twitter and YouTube).59 Facebook is a general social network, 
appealing not to one niche population but rather to users from many different 
nationalities, language groups, races, ages, religions and ideological backgrounds. This 
diversity both in types of UGC and among Facebook’s users presents the company with a 
major challenge: to create a set of community standards that accounts for the nuances of 
diverse UGC and the dozens of norms of speech that its users from around the world 
bring to the network. 
This chapter tackles the following research questions: 
RQ1: How have Facebook’s community standards changed from the origins 
of the social network until the standards’ most recent update in March 
2015? 
 
RQ2: What instances have there been of Facebook controversially removing 
or not removing extreme UGC that seemed to contravene Facebook’s 
community standards? 
 
To answer these questions, this chapter will utilize the following methodological 
approaches. To answer the first research question, this chapter will analyze Facebook’s 
                                                
57 Dewey, supra note 17. 
58 The Top 500 Sites on the Web, ALEXA (Mar. 20, 2015), available at http://www.alexa.com/topsites 
(Google.com is the Web’s most popular site, according to Alexa). 
59 See Kate Crawford and Tarleton Gillespie, What is a flag for? Social media reporting tools and the 
vocabulary of complaint, NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1, 7 (2014) (discussing the policies of various digital 
intermediaries of allowing users to “flag” undesirable content, as well as the reasons why individuals flag 
content). 
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community standards or terms of service pages60 as cached snapshots from the Internet 
Archive’s “Wayback Machine.”61 These snapshots offer the ability to observe how the 
social network’s speech guidelines have changed over its 11-year existence. The 
Wayback Machine generally caches webpages at a frequency of once every few weeks to 
once every few months, depending on how well linked-to the page is.62 This chapter will 
examine every update of Facebook’s terms of use from 2004 until March 2015, and four 
examples of Facebook’s community standards from January 2011 to March 2015.63 Two 
criteria will guide the analysis of these pages. First, the analysis will look for changes in 
policies over the course of 11 years. This analysis will require tracking which items get 
added to newer versions of the standards and subtracted from older versions, as well as 
noting if/how definitions of certain key terms (such as “hate speech”) change over time. 
Second, several benchmarks will be used to assess how Facebook’s community standards 
balance protection of individuals’ speech with prevention of harm. These benchmarks 
include legal tests for distinguishing protected from unprotected speech (discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4), as well as Facebook’s interests within the networked economy 
                                                
60 According to the Internet Archive, Facebook did not create a separate page outlining community 
standards until 2011. Before then, all stipulations for what constituted allowable versus unallowable content 
was contained in Facebook’s “Terms of Service” page. 
61 Wayback Machine, INTERNET ARCHIVE, available at http://archive.org/web/. 
62 According to the Internet Archive’s website, the Wayback Machine’s “automated systems crawl the web 
every few months or so.” Also, “Much of our archived web data comes from our own crawls or from Alexa 
Internet’s crawls. Neither organization has a ‘crawl my site now!’ submission process. Internet Archive's 
crawls tend to find sites that are well linked from other sites. The best way to ensure that we find your web 
site is to make sure it is included in online directories and that similar/related sites link to you.” Frequently 
Asked Questions, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Mar. 20, 2015), available at 
http://archive.org/about/faqs.php#The_Wayback_Machine. 
63 The terms of service are clearly marked with the date on which they are updated, allowing for an analysis 
of each update. The community standards are not marked with such a date, and therefore the pages that are 
analyzed are the first edition, the most recent update (March 15, 2015), and two randomly selected pages in 
between. 
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(discussed in chapter 2). Obviously, Facebook’s community standards need not be as 
protective of speech as First Amendment jurisprudence, and the purpose of the analysis is 
not to make such an obvious argument. Rather, the goal of assessing Facebook’s 
standards vis-à-vis legal standards is to understand which areas of speech Facebook 
protects or restricts more than others. The objective is to understand what criteria 
Facebook uses to find the balance between promoting speech and preventing harm. 
To answer the second research question, I will compile news reports on 
Facebook’s actions toward extreme content that appears to contravene its community 
standards. I will analyze these reports inductively, coding the key themes that emerge 
from reading them.64 The theoretical framework guiding this analysis is Gillespie’s 
politics of technology theory.65 Together, the evolution of Facebook’s community 
standards and the way in which news media have covered incidents of removals or non-
removals of extreme UGC are part of an ongoing dialogue about how the norms of 
freedom of expression should be defined in a networked communication environment. In 
other words, Facebook is the technology, and the debate being analyzed in this study is 
                                                
64 The literature on qualitative textual analysis is fragmented and piecemeal (Elfriede Fürsich, In Defense of 
Textual Analysis, 10 JOURNALISM STUDIES 238 (2009). However, the method continues to be an important tool 
in mass communication research. It has been used to uncover polyvalent media messages, due especially to its 
essential focus on the context(s) in which media messages are both made and interpreted (NORMAN 
FAIRCLOUGH, DISCOURSE AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1992); Fürisch (2009); GIOVANNA DELL’ORTO, THE 
HIDDEN POWER OF THE AMERICAN DREAM: WHY EUROPE’S SHAKEN CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
THREATENS THE FUTURE OF U.S. INFLUENCE (2008)). The methodology of qualitative textual analysis 
commonly categorizes findings of media texts into key themes (DELL’ORTO (2008); THOMAS R. LINDLOF AND 
BRYAN C. TAYLOR, QUALITATIVE COMMUNICATION RESEARCH METHODS 246 (2011)). Often these themes 
are built from frames, which, in the qualitative literature, regularly take the form of “interpretative packages”: 
“central organizing idea[s]” that give meaning to an issue and “make sense of relevant events” (William A. 
Gamson and Andre Modigliani, Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist 
Approach, 95 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY, 1, 3 (1989)). 
65 GILLESPIE, supra note 25. 
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how that technology is being defined (by Facebook, itself, and by news media) in terms 
of that technology’s role in facilitating individuals’ expressive agency. 
This analysis has several broader implications. First, although this analysis (by 
definition) cannot be generalized to describe all forms of content governance, it can serve 
as an illustrative example of how norms of freedom of expression are being defined for 
networked communication via digital intermediaries. Second, this analysis can shed light 
on the potential extent to which tolerance for extreme speech is changing in a networked 
communication environment. The findings of this study can lead to two potential 
hypotheses that can be tested using social scientific methods:66 1) Facebook is its own 
communicative arena that has its own norms of communication; 2) the norms of freedom 
of expression on Facebook diffuse into greater society, affecting individuals’ tolerance 
for extreme speech outside of Facebook. Third, on a related note to the second broader 
implication just discussed, the examples from this case can serve as a proxy for assessing 
another of DeNardis’ concerns regarding Internet governance and freedom of expression: 
the public’s perception of what their civil liberties are in a networked communication 
environment where digital intermediaries have become the arbiters of expression.67  
Chapter 6: “A Duty to Freedom: Conceptualizing Platform Ethics” 
 
Law and ethics are ultimately related; “both [are] concerned with the 
advancement of some socially shared vision of the public good.”68 The difference 
between the two is that the “law sets a minimum standard below which our actions must 
                                                
66 See section on “Avenues for Future Research” in chapter 7, the concluding chapter of this dissertation. 
67 DENARDIS, supra note 19, at 157. 
68 Erik Ugland & Jennifer Henderson, Who Is a Journalist and Why Does it Matter? Disentangling the 
Legal and Ethical Arguments, 22 J. MASS MED. ETHICS 241, 242-3 (2007). 
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not fall,” while “ethics sets a higher standard to which we ought to aspire.”69 The values 
of freedom of expression in a networked society cannot be defined by legal theory and 
jurisprudence alone. Ethical theory must contribute to the debate. This chapter begins 
with the position that “[m]oral decision making is a complex and uncertain business,” and 
that “in any true moral dilemma, acting rightly necessarily involves overriding one or 
more prima facie duties—duties that would otherwise have moral force.”70 It is argued 
here that in content governance, intermediaries are faced with a “true moral dilemma”: 
mitigating harm versus upholding the value of mass participation in an environment 
where individuals can maximize their expressive agency. This chapter is devoted to 
analyzing the moral dimensions of these two competing social values. The chapter puts 
forth the argument that digital intermediaries should abide by a primary duty to 
promoting freedom and mass participation in the global networked public discourse. The 
duty to prevent harms associated with online speech should be a secondary (though not 
completely unimportant) duty, which intermediaries should honor by following clear 
criteria that govern the definition, identification and means for dealing with harmful 
speech. This chapter applies these principles to Facebook’s community standards 
discussed in chapter 5. 
This chapter also has a broader goal: pushing the boundaries of the field of mass 
communication ethics by moving the ethical analysis outside the traditional practice of 
applying ethical principles to journalistic contexts. Digital intermediaries are not 
                                                
69 Michael Perkins, International Law and the Search for Universal Principles in Journalism Ethics, 17 J. 
MASS MED. ETHICS 193, 195 (2002). 
70 Christopher Meyers, Reappreciating W. D. Ross: Naturalizing Prima Facie Duties and a Proposed 
Method, 26 J. MASS MED. ETHICS 316, 318 (2011). 
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journalistic institutions, and they should not be submitted to a journalism-ethics analysis 
as if they were such institutions. Rather, a new understanding must be developed and 
theorized surrounding the ethical dilemmas facing digital intermediaries in the context of 
content governance. I propose that this emerging field be called “platform ethics.” 
Chapter 7 will conclude the study with suggestions on avenues for future 
research, as well as a broad discussion of how this study fits into the tradition of blending 
legal and social scientific research in the field of mass communication law. 
 
The main goal of this study is to increase awareness about the values of freedom 
of expression, and to shed light on a trend (content governance) that has the potential to 
threaten those values. Thus, it is hoped that this study can provide some criteria upon 
which people can make sound judgments about issues involving content governance. If 
YouTube blocks a video from being shown in a certain part of the world, Facebook takes 
down a page based on popular demand, or Twitter deletes an account, the individuals 
who use these platforms need to be able to judge with confidence whether the move was 
desirable or not. Such criteria make up the new civic literacy necessary for deliberative 
democracy in a networked communication environment.
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Chapter 2: Conceptualizing private governance in a networked society: 




 The purpose of this study is to explicate the concept of content governance: the 
control that digital communication intermediaries exercise over user-generated content 
(UGC). The particular focus of this explication is the governance of extreme UGC. Two 
key questions guide this explication: How and why do digital communication 
intermediaries respond to extreme UGC? What are the potential implications of their 
responses for public discourse in a system of networked communication? 
Answering these questions requires a greater understanding of the structure and 
function of public discourse within networked communication. The emergence of the 
“networked public sphere”1 has afforded individuals enormous potential to 
simultaneously create and consume content that is at once political, cultural, social and 
commercial in nature.2 This system of networked communication has “produced a 
quantitative change in the number of entry points to the sphere of highly distributed 
expression such that … [t]he nation state has lost its complete control as the administrator 
of the freedom of expression.”3 Meanwhile, the power of the digital intermediaries that 
facilitate this networked communication environment has increased relative to 
individuals as the latter have become dependent on the former to exercise their creative 
                                                
1 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS 
AND FREEDOM (2006). 
2 AXEL BRUNS, BLOGS, WIKIPEDIA, SECOND LIFE, AND BEYOND 19 (2008). 
3 Ejvind Hansen, Freedom of Expression in Distributed Networks, 10 TRIPLEC 741, 743 (2012). 
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agency.4 Thus, although the right of individuals to freedom of expression is still defined 
vis-à-vis state actors, the functions of freedom of expression—distribution of content and 
access to information—depend on digital intermediaries in a networked environment.5 
Digital intermediaries allow more people to enjoy the functions of freedom of expression 
than perhaps at any time in history.6 Therefore, put simply, the sheer ability of 
intermediaries to control these functions threatens individuals’ ability to realize them. 
In this context, threats to freedom of expression primarily come from two sources: 
state actors leaning on private actors to restrict expression;7 and intermediaries restricting 
speech in reaction to complaints by users,8 likely out of a concern for their own business 
interests.9 According to law professor Yochai Benkler, if “constraint”—over any activity, 
but here referring to control over speech—is defined simply in terms of the effect entities 
have on reigning in the “relative capacity of individuals to be the authors of their lives,” 
then “whether the sources of constraint are private actors or public law is irrelevant.”10 
Within this framework of thinking, individuals have pride of place; any way in which 
individual communicative agency is unduly restricted is considered an undesirable 
outcome. 
                                                
4 See, e.g., ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULE IN CYBERSPACE 
(Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski and Jonathan Zittrain eds., 2012), at 7; JACK GOLDSMITH 
AND TIMOTHY WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 70 (2006); 
José van Dijck, Users like you? Theorizing agency in user-generated content, 31 MED. CULT. & SOC’Y 41, 
54 (2009). 
5 LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2014). 
6 See, e.g., ELIOT KING, FREE FOR ALL: THE INTERNET’S TRANSFORMATION OF JOURNALISM (2010); 
BENKLER, supra note 1; BRUNS, supra note 2. 
7 Hansen, supra note 3, at 742; DENARDIS, supra note 5, at 213. 
8 Kate Crawford and Tarleton Gillespie, What is a flag for? Social media reporting tools and the 
vocabulary of complaint, NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1 (2014). 
9 DENARDIS, supra note 5, at 158. 
10 BENKLER, supra note 1, at 141. 
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However, exactly what constitutes “undue” restrictions is a major point of 
contention. The networked communication environment has given individuals the 
potential to create content that is harmful and destructive, leading some scholars to call 
for greater action by both state actors and digital intermediaries to mitigate these harms.11 
Individuals, digital intermediaries and state actors are thus in the midst of a struggle over 
how to define the norms of the term “freedom of expression” in a networked 
communication environment.12 The concept of content governance is at the very center of 
this battle.  
Governance of UGC is not only about control of the technologies that facilitate 
individual agency, but also assigning meaning to those technologies.13 These 
technologies must be analyzed through a “techno-social lens,”14 which sees society and 
technology as co-determining15 and seeks to understand the human values programmed 
into technology.16 The purpose of this chapter is to review scholarship on individual 
agency and intermediary control in an era of networked communication, and synthesize 
this literature to better understand how the concepts of freedom of expression and control 
                                                
11 See, e.g., Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224 (2011); AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY 
AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN A FREE PRESS (2015); DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN 
CYBERSPACE (2015). 
12 Manuel Castells, Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network Society, 1 INT’L J. OF 
COMM. 238, 258 (2007). 
13 Ganaele Langlois, Participatory Culture and the New Governance of Communication: The Paradox of 
Participatory Media, 14 TELEVISION & NEW MEDIA 91, 100 (2013); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE, VER. 
2.0, 293 (2006). 
14 Hector Postigo, Cultural Production and the Digital Rights Movement, 15 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 1165, 
1171 (2012). 
15 Leah Lievrouw, New Media, Mediation, and Communication Study, 12 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 303, 310 
(2009). 
16 See, e.g., TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF DIGITAL CULTURE 
(2007); Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of Platforms, 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 347 (2010). 
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are being defined in this environment. The scope of this analysis is broad and focused at 
the institutional level, examining the potential that intermediaries and state actors have to 
control UGC and thereby shape norms of freedom of expression. Although content 
governance is primarily framed in terms of “private control over the flows of information 
and access to knowledge,”17 the same principles gleaned from this study can—and 
should—also apply to understanding how extreme UGC is governed within the 
networked communication environment. Indeed, greater attention should be paid to how 
extreme UGC is governed because such speech can implicate important social and 
political issues, and because its potentially harmful nature can trigger its removal from 
the public discourse all too easily.18 
The first section of this chapter reviews scholarship on individual agency and 
dependence in the context of networked communication. One goal of this analysis is to 
examine the debate over how power relationships among individuals, state actors and 
digital intermediaries have been “renegotiated” in today’s networked communication 
system.19 This process of renegotiation recasts the overarching theme of content 
governance as one of interdependence among these three stakeholders, while 
acknowledging that theoretical power imbalances appear to exist within certain contexts 
of this system. The second goal of this section is to highlight that such power imbalances 
reinforce the argument that the networked communication system is a contested space, 
                                                
17 Langlois, supra note 13, at 93; Arne Hintz, Challenging the Digital Gatekeepers: International Policy 
Initiatives for Free Expression, 2 J. OF INFO. POL’Y 128 (2012). 
18 Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski, Beyond Denial: Introducing Next-Generation Information Access 
Controls, in DEIBERT, ET AL, supra note 4, at 4. 
19 van Dijck, supra note 4, at 46. 
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and that content governance plays an important role in how state actors, digital 
intermediaries and individuals define the norms of networked communication.  
The second section of this chapter will place the concept of content governance of 
extreme UGC within the literature of so-called “affirmative” First Amendment theory, 
which considers the ultimate purpose of freedom of expression to be the maximization of 
individual participation within the public discourse.20 The importance of incorporating 
this literature into the discussion is to introduce the concept of content governance to the 
many ideals of freedom of expression that come from the diverse body of scholarship on 
First Amendment theory. Affirmative First Amendment theory is the ideal place to start 
because it recognizes the interdependence of state, corporate and individual stakeholders 
within systems of mass communication. Namely, this body of theory envisions the 
primary purpose of state actors as curbing corporate power over the mass communication 
system in an effort to enhance the agency and participation of a diverse group of 
individuals within the system. In other words, this body of theory fits well with a “private 
governance perspective” that undergirds the field of Internet governance, and thereby 
content governance. This perspective treats “distinctions between public and private 
spheres as doubtful rather than as given” when it comes to an analysis of the power each 
sphere has over the communicative agency of individuals.21  
                                                
20 See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); OWEN FISS, THE 
IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of 
Freedom of Speech for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
21 Stuart Macaulay, Private Government, in LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (Lipson, L & Wheeler, S eds., 
1986), 445-518, at 446. 
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A second important reason for incorporating this body of literature into the 
discussion of content governance is that it will aid the transition into the analysis in 
chapter three of the values of extreme speech as defined by so-called “negative” First 
Amendment theories. These theories conceive of freedom of expression as a negative 
right that individuals have against the government, thereby viewing state actors as 
categorical enemies to individual freedom of expression who must remain neutral when 
crafting any law or policy that would affect that freedom.22 Such laws or policies 
invariably include efforts to curb corporate control over individuals’ ability to enter into 
the public discourse championed by affirmative First Amendment theorists (such as 
through a right of access to broadcast media).23 Generally, negative First Amendment 
theories contend that something of value is lost when government—no matter how well 
intentioned and no matter how extreme the speech (save for several rare exceptions)—
attempts to dictate the norms of freedom of expression.24  
Overall, the purpose of this chapter is to construct a theoretical framework with 
which to analyze the concept of content governance. Therefore, some of the concepts will 
necessarily be discussed in the abstract. The goal is for this framework to aid the 
empirical analysis of Facebook’s community standards and practices of content 
governance in chapter 5. 
                                                
22 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative 
First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1987). 
23 See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press: A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 
1656 (1967). 
24 Cass, supra note 22. 
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Agency, Dependence and Contested Space in Networked Communication 
 
Conceptualizing Content Governance in an Age of Individual Agency 
 
The concept of content governance resides in a web of contexts and scholarly 
literatures.25 The primary objective of this chapter is to establish the location of, and 
place boundaries around, the study of content governance within the broader field of 
private governance of communication. The literature of this broader field is not new. 
Scholars, predominantly from the critical-cultural vein of the field of mass 
communication with roots in philosophers Karl Marx26 and Michel Foucault,27 have 
contended that powerful private media corporations make up a regime of hegemonic 
control over the ability of individuals to participate in public discourse.28 Meanwhile, 
scholars who hold a post-positivistic worldview readily criticize these theories for their 
relative lack of empirical proof regarding this claim.29 This paradigmatic battle persists in 
the study of private governance in Internet communication, to the detriment of studying 
the concept of content governance. The goal of this chapter is to answer the call by 
communication professor José van Dijck to carefully synthesize theories from a broad 
spectrum of literature, both within and outside the field of mass communication, to 
                                                
25 van Dijck, supra note 4, at 42. 
26 See, e.g., Karl Marx, On Freedom of the Press: Censorship, REINISCHE ZEITUNG, (May 15, 1842) (Brian 
Baggins and Sally Ryan, translators), available at <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1842/free-
press/ch05.htm>. 
27 See, e.g., Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 777 (1982). 
28 See ROBERT M. ENTMAN, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT CITIZENS: MEDIA AND THE DECAY OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS (1989); BEN BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY (2004); Daniel C. Hallin, Hegemony: The 
American News Media from Vietnam to El Salvador, A Study of Ideological Change and its Limits, in 
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: APPROACHES, STUDIES, ASSESSMENTS, (David L. Paletz ed., 1986). 
29 See, e.g., Melvin DeFleur, Where Have All the Milestones Gone? The Decline of Significant Research on 
the Process and Effects of Mass Communication, 1 MASS COMM. & SOC’Y 85 (1998); Annie Lang, 
Discipline in Crisis? The Shifting Paradigm of Mass Communication Research, 23 COMM. THEORY 10 
(2013). 
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explicate the concept of content governance and lead scholars to a better understanding of 
the implications surrounding the concept.30   
Content governance is nested within a relatively recent conception of the field of 
private governance of communication: Internet governance.31 Internet governance is a 
broad field that encompasses issues such as data privacy, net neutrality, deep packet 
inspection, policing of child abuse images and any other issue involving how 
governmental or non-governmental actors constrain or regulate certain aspects of the 
Internet.32 The object of study that connects these disparate topics is “the design and 
administration of the technologies necessary to keep the Internet operational[,] and the 
enactment of substantive policy around these technologies.”33 Broadly, the field of 
Internet governance recognizes a trend toward “privatization of authority” regarding key 
features of Internet technology,34 and a big debate in the field revolves around the 
definition of that private authority. Much scholarly focus has been on international 
institutions involved in the global governance of the Internet, such as the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the Internet Governance 
Forum (IGF) and the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).35 However, 
                                                
30 van Dijck, supra note 4. 
31 DENARDIS, supra note 5. 
32 Id.; Malte Ziewitz and Christian Pentzold, In Search of Internet Governance: Performing Order in 
Digitally Networked Environments, 16 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 306, 307 (2014); Michel JG van Eeten and 
Milton Mueller, Where Is the Governance in Internet Governance? 15 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 720, 723 
(2013). 
33 DENARDIS, supra note 5, at 6. 
34 Deibert and Rohozinski, supra note 18, at 12; see also REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE 
NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM (2012), at xxii. 
35 Laura DeNardis, The Social Media Challenge to Internet Governance, in SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET: 
HOW INFORMATION AND SOCIAL NETWORKS ARE CHANGING OUR LIVES (William Dutton and Mark 
Graham eds., 2014); Dawn C. Nunziato, Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms, and Internet 
Governance, 52 EMORY L. J. 187 (2003). 
   
35 
some scholars have called for the label “Internet governance” to be applied more broadly 
to include studies on the “many real-world activities that actually shape and regulate the 
way the Internet works.”36  
This call by Internet governance scholars Michel JG van Eeten and Milton 
Mueller to expand the field of Internet governance is important because it opens the field 
up to studying the central role that digital intermediaries play in governing how 
individuals use networked communication to participate in a global public discourse.37 In 
particular, the digital intermediaries that are the focus of this analysis are “single-firm 
industry platforms” that facilitate networked communication activities.38 The metaphor of 
the platform is appropriate for describing these intermediaries. They prop up individual 
users, facilitating their agency;39 yet the UGC that is published on those platforms 
ultimately is compiled in relation to a proprietary message set by the intermediary.40 The 
companies that own these platforms determine the design and norms of the 
communicative activities that take place on them. However, companies do not create 
these norms in a vacuum. They also will respond to “pressures from … users that they 
choose to respect” when creating their terms of use—including their speech policies or 
“community standards.”41 Therefore, the process of creating norms that govern speech on 
                                                
36 van Eeten and Mueller, supra note 32, at 721. 
37 Langlois, supra note 13, at 93. 
38 K.C. Claffy and David D. Clark, Platform Models for Sustainable Internet Regulation, 4 J. OF INFO. 
POL’Y 463 (2014). 
39 Langlois, supra note 13, at 94. 
40 Joseph B. Walther and Jeong-woo Jang, Communication Processes in Participatory Websites, 18 J. OF 
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 2, 4 (2012). 
41 Claffy and Clark, supra note 38, at 466. 
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these platforms is somewhat dialogical in nature, though the exact extent to which 
individuals have a say over how these norms are created remains an open question. 
These two concepts—agency and its facilitation—are the poles that bracket the 
battle for the meaning of freedom of expression in a networked society. Today’s 
networked system of communication empowers individuals on an unprecedented scale.42 
Scholars have identified several factors that account for such unprecedented 
empowerment. First, the networked structure of the system increases agency by 
exponentially increasing the size of the audience that individuals are able to reach. For 
example, this networked structure has the potential to quickly turn individual agency into 
collective action, thereby affording enormous power to social movements.43 Second, 
platforms offer user-friendly design, ensuring that more individuals with relatively low 
levels of technical literacy have the ability to contribute to online discourse.44 In other 
words, the days of needing coding skills as a ticket to simply enter the online public 
discourse are long gone. The networked public sphere thereby has expanded. Third, the 
informal nature of production and consumption of content has become normalized.45 The 
key characteristic of the system is that small-scale, amateur cultural production is 
                                                
42 Deibert and Rohozinski, supra note 18, at 3. 
43 Taso G. Lagos, Ted M. Coopman and Jonathan Tomhave, ‘Parallel Poleis’: Towards a Theoretical 
Framework of the Modern Public Sphere, Civic Engagement and the Structural Advantages of the Internet 
to Foster and Maintain Parallel Socio-Political Institutions, 16 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 398, 409 (2014); 
Andrew J. Flanagin, Craig Flanagin and Jon Flanagin, Technical Code and the Social Construction of the 
Internet, 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 179, 182 (2010). 
44 Flanagin, Flanagin and Flanagin, supra, at 184; see also Ganaele Langlois, Fenwick McKelvey, Greg 
Elmer and Kenneth Werbin, Mapping Commercial Web 2.0 Worlds: Towards a New Critical Ontogenesis, 
14 THE FIBRECULTURE J. 1, 3 (2009). 
45 Ramon Lobato, Julian Thomas & Dan Hunter, Histories of User-Generated Content: Between Formal 
and Informal Media Economies, 5 INT’L J. COMM. 899, 909 (2011). 
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becoming more visible and more institutional.46 Therefore, individuals are asserting their 
position as key players in this communicative environment. Fourth, networked 
communication harnesses the “necessarily participatory” nature of this creation of 
culture.47 For Benkler, “[h]ow culture is produced is … an essential ingredient in 
structuring how freedom and justice are perceived, conceived, and pursued.”48 Thus, 
freedom of expression, democratic participation and the creation of culture are all 
interdependent of one another, and all are activated in a system of networked 
communication. 
 However, some scholars remain skeptical of the extent to which individuals 
actually have communicative agency, and—even if they do have greater agency—the 
extent to which that agency actually makes a difference in public discourse. These 
scholars talk of a psychological rather than a real or empirically observable 
empowerment among individuals who participate in the system of networked 
communication.49 Individuals have a “sense of agency” or a “sense of empowerment,” 
they argue, rather than any actual ability to alter public policy through their participation 
in the public discourse.50 Communication scholar Matthew Hindman argues that one 
must study how the Internet has redistributed power to multiple stakeholders, not simply 
(or specially) to individuals.51 He laments the “popular enthusiasm” for the 
revolutionizing potential of technology, which he argues “has made a sober appraisal of 
                                                
46 Id. at 900. 
47 Postigo, supra note 14, at 1688. 
48 BENKLER, supra note 1, at 274. 
49 Louis Leung, User-Generated Content on the Internet: An Examination of Gratifications, Civic 
Engagement and Psychological Empowerment, 11 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1327, 1329 (2009). 
50 Flanagin, Flanagin and Flanagin, supra note 43, at 186. 
51 MATT HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (2009). 
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the Internet’s complicated political effects more difficult.”52 In the context of journalism, 
mass communication professor Brendan Watson has documented that Twitter users did 
not provide any alternative perspectives to mainstream news media’s coverage of the 
2010 Deep Water Horizon oil spill that ravaged the U.S. Gulf Coast.53 This finding 
questions the notion that individuals categorically will create new meaning within the 
public discourse when afforded the tools of networked communication. All told, the 
message of these scholars is that the extent to which networked communication affects 
individual communicative agency or individuals’ capacity to shape or alter public 
discourse should not be thought of in extremes: networked communications are neither 
revolutionary nor are they undergoing a process of normalizing the status quo.54 Rather, 




 Individuals around the world are becoming increasingly reliant on cyberspace as 
their main source of consuming and sharing information,56 and digital intermediaries are 
playing an increasingly indispensible role in facilitating the communicative agency of 
individuals.57 Within this context of dependency, scholars seek to understand the role that 
                                                
52 Id. at 5. 
53 Brendan R. Watson, Is Twitter an Alternative Medium? Comparing Gulf Coast Twitter and Newspaper 
Coverage of the 2010 BP Oil Spill, 42 COMM. RESEARCH n.p. (2015). 
54 Scott Wright, Politics as Usual? Revolution, Normalization and a New Agenda for Online Deliberation, 
14 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 244 (2012). 
55 van Dijck, supra note 4, at 42. 
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platforms play in “steering” or “channeling” the agency of their users.58 This process of 
channeling agency is the primary locus for the battle over the meaning of agency and 
freedom of expression in a networked communication environment, pitting powerful 
media against powerful speakers/audiences.59 How these concepts—agency and freedom 
of expression—are defined within this environment could have great effect on the nature 
of democratic discourse. Communication scholar Ganaele Langlois  sees the “agency-
dependency” trade-off as having the potential to “pervert the very democratic ideals of 
free and unfettered communication on which the Internet is based.”60 Other scholars 
agree, contending that “the very technical features that currently appear to engender 
relative freedom can also be employed to exert strict control.”61  
Especially germane to this study is the part of Internet governance that deals with 
“the evolution of the technical and transactional infrastructures concealed beneath content 
and how these infrastructures potentially constrain the future of individual civil liberties” 
such as freedom of expression.62 Communication professor Laura DeNardis contends that 
“individual freedom of expression [is] dependent on online infrastructures and the 
policies enacted to preserve both liberty and infrastructure reliability.”63 Specifically, 
individual expression has found itself in an environment where its ability to enter and 
make an impact on global public discourse is dependent on digital intermediaries, which 
                                                
58 van Dijck, supra note 4, at 43; Langlois, supra note 13, at 102. 
59 Lievrouw, supra note 15, at 307. 
60 Langlois, supra note 13, at 95. 
61 Flanagin, Flanagin and Flanagin, supra note 43, at 188. 
62 DeNardis, supra note 35, at 348. 
63 DENARDIS, supra note 5, at 17. 
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“have become the front lines of … governance issues in cyberspace.”64 Studying these 
intermediaries is essential to understanding their role in shaping norms of freedom of 
expression, as they “have increasingly become the arbiters of online expressive liberty.”65 
This trend, DeNardis contends, “is highly controversial, contextually dependent, and … 
evolving.”66 She argues that such private mediation is ultimately a major concern: it 
“constrains what individuals can express because it requires permission and 
administration by an information intermediary.”67 DeNardis posits that governance of 




First, commercial intermediaries may voluntarily exclude or remove from its 
platforms certain types of extreme speech. DeNardis calls this action “discretionary” 
governance.68 This type of governance is rare, as intermediaries typically remove content 
in response to some form of direct pressure (from individuals or governments, see 
below).69 However, Google notably followed this type of governance after the YouTube 
video “Innocence of Muslims” sparked violent protests throughout the Muslim world in 
                                                
64 Id. at 156. 
65 Id. at 157. 
66 Id. at 172. 
67 DeNardis, supra note 35, at 355. 
68 DENARDIS, supra note 5, at 158. DeNardis uses the term “discretionary censorship,” but this study 
chooses to replace “censorship” with “governance” for two reasons. The first reason comes from a desire to 
highlight the central place of the term “governance” in this analysis, as well as its connection to scholarship 
on private governance. Second, the term censorship is problematic because censorship typically denotes 
state control over speech. 
69 See Crawford and Gillespie, supra note 8. 
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September 2012.70 Despite its rarity, this type of governance is important to understand 
because it illustrates the unbridled potential that intermediaries have to restrict 
individuals’ speech on their own volition, as well as the lack of a means to hold 
intermediaries accountable for potential abuses of this power. 
The control that intermediaries have over online speech on their own may not be 
as insidious or anti-democratic as the control that state actors have in collusion with 
intermediaries.71 Nevertheless, following Benkler’s broad definition of power and 
constraint discussed above,72 intermediary control over speech has the potential to 
threaten online public discourse.73 Therefore, it needs to be better understood. Some 
scholars have adopted the metaphor of gatekeeping—once reserved most prominently for 
the editorial and information selection process of journalism74—to describe the function 
of intermediaries as the ultimate deciders of not only what information individuals can 
access, but also what UGC gets into the public discourse.75 This metaphor is helpful 
because, at bottom, gatekeeping is an example of a “regime of control.”76 Indeed, the 
challenge facing journalists of how to sift through and “curate”77 the abundance of 
information and UGC created in a networked environment provides a direct analogy for 
studying the same challenge faced by digital intermediaries. Journalism professor Jane 
Singer talks of the “secondary gatekeeping” function that online news sites play to judge 
                                                
70 DENARDIS, supra note 5, at 158. 
71 Deibert and Rohozinski, supra note 18. 
72 BENKLER, supra note 1. 
73 Ethan Zuckerman, Intermediary Censorship, in DEIBERT, ET AL, supra note 4, at 71. 
74 See, e.g., PAMELA J. SHOEMAKER AND TIMOTHY VOS, GATEKEEPING THEORY (2009). 
75 Hindman, supra note 51, at 12. 
76 Jane B. Singer, User-Generated Visibility: Secondary Gatekeeping in a Shared Media Space, 16 NEW 
MEDIA & SOC’Y 55, 56 (2014). 
77 See, e.g., Gillespie, supra note 16. 
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the value and quality of UGC in terms of its merit for redistribution.78 The factors that 
weigh into this decision-making process include the appropriateness of the UGC and the 
effect that redistributing it will have on the news organization’s bottom line.  
 Similarly, communication professors Josh Braun and Tarleton Gillespie study the 
gatekeeping function of online news sites in controlling user comments, which are often 
“unpolished, wide-ranging, and unpredictable.”79 In “imposing and justifying policies for 
managing what is sometimes an unruly dialogue,” these news sites must ensure that their 
policies “not only be practical and enforceable, but also balance the economic, 
professional, and ideological aspirations of the news organization.”80 Importantly, “[t]he 
content policies and their enforcement must toe the line between avoiding legal liability, 
keeping an eye on the economic bottom line, and some kind of commitment to protecting 
their users’ freedom of speech and the vibrancy of the public discourse they produce.”81 
With all of these factors to consider, “[d]iscerning between valuable and invaluable 
speech, the political from the profane, measuring degrees of hatefulness and harmfulness 
is hard” for these organizations.82 These conclusions from the study of news 
organizations managing readers’ comments can be projected onto the broader issue of 
content governance. Digital intermediaries such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter face 
potentially even more difficult decisions in governing UGC, given that the boundaries 
they are seeking to protect through content governance are broader and less well defined 
                                                
78 Singer, supra note 76, at 56. 
79 Josh Braun and Tarleton Gillespie, Hosting the Public Discourse, Hosting the Public, 5 JOURNALISM 
PRACTICE 383, 383 (2011). 
80 Id. at 384. 
81 Id. at 385. 
82 Id. at 392. 
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compared to the boundaries that journalistic institutions seek to protect. Digital 
intermediaries have their own message and image that they seek to project, yet that 
message and image must compete with the millions of other messages that individuals 
publish via these intermediaries every day. 
Separating the concepts of intermediary control over UGC and the joint control 
intermediaries and state actors can impose on UGC—done here solely for the purposes of 
the present analysis—does not necessarily mean that these are, in fact, two separate 
concepts that deserve separate fields of study, nor that one type of control is worse than 
the other. In fact, the opposite is true: studying the control that intermediaries have over 
UGC will contribute to a greater understanding of their potential to work with state actors 
to control UGC. The important conclusion to note here is that economic concerns are 




Second, the efficiency with which commercial intermediaries can restrict speech 
offers governments a “back door” to state-sponsored censorship. Public officials, who 
could never successfully pass a law to ban a certain type of extreme speech, can pressure 
intermediaries to remove that same type of speech. DeNardis calls this action “delegated” 
governance over expression.83 Other scholars have viewed this form of governance as 
potentially the most worrisome, due to the lack of transparency that exists (at least on the 
                                                
83 DENARDIS, supra note 5, at 213. As with the term “discretionary censorship,” supra note 68, DeNardis 
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part of governments)84 to inform individuals about the nature and extent of this practice. 
In their 2012 collection of essays titled Access Controlled,85 political science professor 
Ronald Deibert and colleagues warn that the threat to free speech today comes not from 
efforts by governments to directly censor or filter content that its citizens (or subjects) 
create (which was the subject of their 2008 collection Access Denied86). Rather, the main 
threat comes from the insidious nature with which governments and commercial 
platforms have teamed up to manage such content, such as through both parties entering 
into an agreement whereby the commercial platforms actively seek out and eliminate 
content at the behest of the government.87 Deibert and his co-authors argue that such 
hybrid private-public governance of content is becoming the new norm in discussions of 
control over public discourse.88 They argue that state actors “no longer fear pariah status 
by openly declaring their intent to regulate and control cyberspace” because they couch 
their reasons for such control in terms of protecting citizens from harm.89 Meanwhile 
intermediaries are likely to heed the pressure from governments to ensure they can turn 
                                                
84 Intermediaries, for their part, have been more willing to be transparent about the requests they receive 
from governments to remove content. See e.g. Requests to Remove Content from Governments, GOOGLE 
TRANSPARENCY REPORT, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/?hl=en; 
Removal Requests, TWITTER TRANSPARENCY REPORT, https://transparency.twitter.com/removal-
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86 ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING (Ronald Deibert, John 
Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski and Jonathan Zittrain eds., 2008). 
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Cameron’s government and major Internet service providers (ISPs) in the United Kingdom to filter by 
default all content that the government considers “pornographic.” See The Internet and Pornography: The 
Prime Minister Calls for Action, GOV.UK (July 22, 2013), available at 
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88 Deibert and Rohozinski, supra note 4, at 11-12. 
89 Id. at 4. 
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an operating profit in the countries in question.90 Rebecca MacKinnon, a former 
journalist and current project director at the Open Technology Institute, sees this ability 
of state actors and intermediaries to work together to remove, filter and monitor UGC as 
having the potential to threaten the ability of individuals to sustain democratic discourse 
through participation via platforms.91 
Figure 2-1 presents a model of delegated content governance in the system of 
networked communication modeled in Figure 1-1 from Chapter 1 (the lines representing 
continuous communication have been lightened for the sake of clarity). Individuals 
continue to simultaneously publish and consume speech via an intermediary. However, 
once an individual publishes a message deemed out-of-bounds by a state actor, the latter 
will notify the intermediary about the allegedly infringing speech by “flagging” it.92 
Employees of the intermediary will review the speech to determine whether it does, in 
fact, need to be removed due to its violating a law or its potential disruption of business 
interests in the polity governed by the state actor. If the intermediary chooses to remove 
the speech, that speech (represented by the dashed lines), which was once visible to other 
individuals, will now become invisible via that particular intermediary. 
                                                
90 Zuckerman, supra note 73, at 80. 
91 MACKINNON, supra note 34, at 13-14. 
92 Crawford and Gillespie, supra note 8. 
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Figure 2-1: Delegated Content Governance 
Governance	  through	  Legal	  Compliance	  
 
Third, violation of laws can trigger governance over UGC. For example, in the 
United States, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) governs illegal use of 
copyrighted material in UGC.93 Under the DMCA’s “notice-and-takedown” regime, 
rights-holders can give intermediaries a good-faith notification that their copyrighted 
works are allegedly being published on their platforms without the rights-holders’ 
permission. The intermediary must remove the allegedly infringing material within 10 
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business days to avoid liability for vicarious or contributory infringement.94 Governments 
also can notify intermediaries when content that they are hosting is in violation of their 
nation’s laws by sending the intermediaries official letters requesting the removal of 
allegedly illicit content from a platform.95 This form of governance is very similar in 
theory to DeNardis’s concept of “delegated” governance from the preceding paragraph. 
However, in practice, this third form of triggering content governance is distinct because 
1) it is (generally speaking) transparent, and 2) it is relatively clear that content is, indeed, 
in violation of a country’s laws. Certainly, this form of governance can be considered less 
a matter of private governance than simply a matter of intermediaries following the law 
in the countries in which they do business. However, understanding this form of 
governance is important because it highlights not only the legal but also the potential 
market incentive that intermediaries have to remove or block unlawful content in certain 
countries.  
Governance	  by	  Crowd	  
 
Lastly—and this is the form of governance that this study adds to DeNardis’s 
list—a “crowd” of individuals online may have the ability to force digital intermediaries 
to exclude or remove extreme or unpopular messages, which is something that legally 
                                                
94 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(B). The intermediary must notify the alleged rights violators of the takedown (§ 
512(g)(2)(C)), and these authors can file a counter notice with the intermediary claiming that their use of 
the original work was not infringing, (§ 512(g)(3)).  
95 An example of the first type of arrangement is the power of the Brazilian judiciary to send takedown 
notices to foreign platforms (such as Google’s YouTube) requesting the removal of content that is allegedly 
defamatory or racist. See Raphael Spuldar, On the Ground: São Paulo, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP (Mar. 20, 
2013), available at http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2013/03/on-the-ground-sao-paulo/. 
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they could not do in a traditional public forum such as a town square.96 This form of 
governance is arguably the most important of the four to understand because mainstream 
digital intermediaries (Twitter, Facebook and YouTube) rely on users’ “flagging” of 
undesirable content to be made aware of the content and choose whether to take action 
against it.97 Individuals can also pressure intermediaries by publicizing their grievances 
over the undesirable content. For example, Facebook removed pages with misogynistic 
titles such as “Dropkicking sluts in the teeth” after a group of feminist activists ran a 
grassroots campaign pressuring companies to remove advertisements from Facebook if 
the social networking site did not remove the pages.98 Figure 2-2 presents a model of this 
form of content governance. Flagging by individuals follows essentially the same process 
as flagging by state actors (see Figure 2-1). The obvious difference between the two 
models is the fact that in the former model, the flagging comes from within the 
community of speakers/audience served by the intermediary rather than from outside the 
community. Also, rather than having to make a decision on whether the flagged speech 
violates a particular law, intermediaries in the scenario modeled in Figure 2-2 must 
decide whether the flagged speech violates its own set of standards governing speech 
within the community it serves. This form of governance is important to understand 
because it involves certain groups pressuring intermediaries into following a particular 
                                                
96 See e.g. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); 
Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South 
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992). 
97 Crawford and Gillespie, supra note 8. 
98 See Facebook Agreement Statement, WOMEN, ACTION, & THE MEDIA (May 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.womenactionmedia.org/fbagreement/. For more on the subject of how individuals can leverage 
platforms to remove controversial UGC by “flagging” the content, see Crawford and Gillespie, supra note 
8. 
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set of community norms, which may exclude certain forms of extreme or potentially 
harmful speech.99 Reaching a normative conclusion on whether such pressure to follow 
community norms is desirable will require a greater understanding of the competing 
values at stake in this form of governance: protecting extreme speech and preventing 
some form of harm. 
 
Figure 2-2: Flagging Communication 
                                                
99 See ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 144 (1995) (contending that the main goal of the First 
Amendment is to promote “critical interaction” among groups with conflicting opinions and values, and 
that the way it does so is by preventing the government from invoking community norms to silence extreme 
speech). 




Understanding the economic pressures that intermediaries face is important for 
conceiving of a system in which individuals, intermediaries and state actors are 
interdependent upon one another, rather than one in which individuals are completely 
dependent on intermediaries. In the context of the networked economy, neither 
stakeholder can function very well without the other.100 Individuals and intermediaries 
alike have a demand for participatory culture.101 Motivating production is an important 
goal for platforms because “giving users more power over content … add[s] business 
value.”102 Namely, the creation of UGC often generates valuable information as a 
byproduct.103  
Intermediaries that facilitate UGC sell the ideal of potential, promise, opportunity 
and the allure of fame,104 as well as the prospects of entertainment and play, in exchange 
for commoditizing users’ personal data and their content.105 Scholars have been critical of 
this “Faustian trade-off.”106 Langlois and colleagues see it as evidence that “the power 
dynamics in commercial Web 2.0 [are] both repressive and productive.”107 They decry 
the proposition that “the ease of communication, connection and exploration of one’s 
                                                
100 James G. Webster, User Information Regimes: How Social Media Shape Patterns of Consumption, 104 
NW. U. L. REV. 593, 596 (2010). 
101 van Dijck, supra note 4, at 42. 
102 Id. at 46; see also Ute Schaedel and Michel Clement, Managing the Online Crowd: Motivations for 
Engagement in User-Generated Content, 7 J. MED. BUS. STUD. 17, 19 (2010). 
103 Greg Lastowka, User-Generated Content and Virtual Worlds, 10 VAND. J. ENT’MT & TECH. L. 893, 
895 (2008). 
104 Schaedel and Clement, supra note 102, at 22-23. 
105 van Dijck, supra note 4, at 50. 
106 Michael Zimmer, The Externalities of Search 2.0: The Emerging Privacy Threats when the Drive for the 
Perfect Search Engine Meets Web 2.0, 13 FIRST MONDAY n.p. (2008). 
107 Langlois, et al, supra note 44, at 11. 
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interests can only take place through agreeing to terms of service and terms of use that 
allow for [surveillance of personal data] and the commercialization of user-generated 
content through advertising.”108 Within this system, digital intermediaries that host UGC 
likely will have a propensity to view offensive UGC as risky due to its potential to 
alienate users and lead to lost subscriptions, while UGC that infringes on copyright poses 
the risk of legal liability.109  
 
Figure 2-3: Interdependence in Networked Communication 
Figure 2-3 presents a model of interdependence in a system of networked 
communication. The arrows represent pressure that each actor puts on the others. 
                                                
108 Id. at 2. 
109 Lobato, Thomas and Hunter, supra note 45, at 912. 
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Individuals can act as a checking agent against the government through their speech.110 
However, individuals are dependent on digital intermediaries to be able to realize this 
checking function, as these intermediaries facilitate individuals’ speech. However, 
individuals provide intermediaries with a source of revenue through the commoditization 
of their UGC, meaning that intermediaries risk shutting down if the limits they put on 
individuals’ ability to speak are too stringent. Governments can check the checking 
power of individuals through their ability to set legal boundaries around individuals’ 
ability to speak. This power varies from polity to polity, with state actors in the United 
States having relatively little power (compared to many other countries) over individuals’ 
speech due to the First Amendment. Governments can attempt to indirectly place 
restrictions on individuals’ speech by putting legal pressure on digital intermediaries to 
restrict certain types of individuals’ speech that gets published on their platforms. 
Examples of such legal pressure are the various laws around the world that define the 
parameters of the liability intermediaries face for third-party content. In the United States, 
Section 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act (CDA)111 gives a relatively high 
degree of immunity to intermediaries for legal actions arising from third-party content. 
This high degree of immunity reflects the power that intermediaries exert over 
governments: intermediaries are economic engines that purportedly function best when 
unfettered by legal regulations. Congress recognized this power when it passed the CDA, 
writing in the preamble to the law that its intent was “to preserve the vibrant and 
                                                
110 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 
521 (1977). 
111 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996). 
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competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”112 
Within this interdependent system, the power of speech is only as strong as its 
counterpowers allow it to be. In the United States, the First Amendment keeps the power 
of the government to regulate speech at a relatively constant (and low) level. Therefore, 
in a system of networked communication in the United States, the entities with the 
highest potential ability to check the power of individuals’ speech are digital 
intermediaries. Unlike the power of government over individuals, the power of 
intermediaries is not necessarily constant. Multiple factors may make it wax and wane at 
any given time, including economic factors, the legal regime determining intermediary 
liability, and social norms on the acceptability of extreme speech.113 Just as legal scholars 
seek to understand the parameters that First Amendment jurisprudence puts on 
government’s ability to restrict speech, mass communication scholars must explore what 
parameters these extralegal factors place on digital intermediaries’ ability to restrict 
speech. The best place to begin such exploration is within the body of so-called 
affirmative First Amendment theory. 
Agency, Control and Affirmative First Amendment Theory 
 
 Content governance, as a subfield of Internet governance, must be discussed and 
debated among scholars of mass communication law and policy. Such a proposition is not 
controversial. Rather, it answers a broad call from law professor Enrique Armijo that the 
issues of networked communication should “now establish the frame within which all of 
                                                
112 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). 
113 LESSIG, supra note 13. 
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our public policy and academic debates concerning communications law and policy take 
place.”114 However, connecting content governance and mass communication law and 
policy is a tricky endeavor, and several guidelines must be established from the outset for 
how to properly synthesize these fields of study.  
Although the traditional practice of mass communication law research is often to 
draw normative conclusions about an issue of freedom of expression based on one 
theoretical framework,115 the proposal of this chapter is that one must abstain from 
drawing normative conclusions about content governance until the concept can be 
assessed from the perspective of multiple theories of freedom of expression. Scholars 
should follow such a cautious approach to avoid the pitfalls of adopting normative 
conclusions that are not based on solid reasoning of First Amendment jurisprudence. For 
example, some scholars have argued that state actor status should be ascribed to digital 
intermediaries.116 The motives of these scholars are to make the actions taken by digital 
intermediaries to remove users’ speech subject to the First Amendment, thereby 
strengthening the rights of individuals who use these platforms to speak and stripping the 
rights these intermediaries would otherwise have had to manage their networks. 
However, such a perspective amounts to reductionism,117 thereby running the risk of 
alienating more traditionalist First Amendment scholars. This is no small risk. These 
                                                
114 Enrique Armijo, Communication Law, Technological Change, and the New Normal, 19 COMM. L. & 
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116 Nunziato, supra note 35; Sandra Braman & Stephanie Roberts, Advantage ISP: Terms of Service as 
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scholars have arguably the greatest understanding of the benefits that extreme speech 
brings to society, benefits that can come under threat from extreme speech being 
restrained by private actors as much as state actors. These scholars must be made more 
aware of the issues of content governance.  
 Therefore, the proposal put forth here is that scholars should embrace the fact that 
digital intermediaries are not state actors, but rather powerful media institutions that have 
the ability to control the speech that individuals publish on their platforms. Such a 
perspective allows legal scholars to do two things. First, it allows issues of content 
governance to be assessed using so-called “affirmative” theories of freedom of 
expression, such as First Amendment scholar Alexander Meiklejohn’s self-governance 
theory,118 the “new realist” theories of the 1990s,119 and emerging theories of freedom of 
expression that are centered on maximizing individual participation in an environment of 
networked communication.120 The common threads running through these theories are 
that they all recognize the control that powerful non-governmental institutions (media 
corporations) have over individuals’ ability to participate in public discourse, and they all 
recognize the legal potential that state actors have to increase the power of the latter in 
relation to the former. These theories propose various policies that state actors can follow 
to realize this goal, most of which are heavily criticized by proponents of so-called 
“negative” First Amendment theory (discussed in chapter 3). Although the validity and 
legal soundness of these proposed policies may be questionable, one can still accept the 
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premise that media institutions have a great deal of power to control public discourse. 
This premise is the starting place for understanding the interdependent nature of content 
governance from the perspective of legal theory. Second, by focusing on digital 
intermediaries as powerful institutions rather than state actors, legal scholars can use the 
values of freedom of expression distilled from First Amendment theory to assess the 
potential effects that these intermediaries have over the public discourse without having 
to subscribe to the faulty doctrinal issues involved in claiming that intermediaries should 
be considered state actors.  
Affirmative Theory 
 
 Meiklejohn argues that the First Amendment’s ultimate purpose is found “not the 
words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers.”121 The government has no control 
over what people say, but government intervention can ensure that, as Meiklejohn puts it, 
“everything worth saying shall be said.”122 In other words, freedom of expression is 
valued for its essential contribution to deliberative democracy. Under this theory, not 
only do other First Amendment values—such as facilitating individual autonomy123—
take a back seat to this primary value, these other values can be perceived as threats to the 
self-governance value. When this is the case, affirmative theorists argue that state actors 
are best equipped to deal with the threat. Even economics professor Ronald Coase, the 
free-market champion and founder of the field of law and economics, contends that “the 
case for government intervention in the market for ideas is much stronger than it is, in 
                                                
121 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 118, at 25. 
122 Id. at 22. 
123 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 
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general, in the market for goods.”124 Put differently, these theorists contend that media 
corporations have a duty to maintain a diverse and robust public discourse, and if they 
fail to perform that duty, government not only can but must step in to force them to do so. 
Not only are affirmative theorists ready to propose state action to remedy threats to 
democratic participation from private power, they are also apt to diagnose problematic 
laws that improvidently grant power to private actors. Law professor Cass Sunstein, for 
example, argues that owners of shopping malls have the ability to exclude certain 
viewpoints from entering through their doors only because the laws of private property 
say they do, not because they have an incontrovertible First Amendment right to that 
ability.125 
 Both of these perspectives are in play when it comes to theorizing the values of 
and controls over freedom of expression in a networked society. Scholars in the field of 
“Cyberlaw” have argued about the question of whether the Internet is subject to the laws 
of the brick-and-mortar world since the Internet first went public.126 The general 
consensus today is that laws can and should apply to the Internet in certain situations, but 
the bigger concern is how non-legal forms of regulation affect the workings of the 
Internet.127 Lessig famously argued that social norms, the workings of the market, and the 
technological design of Internet infrastructure all have the power to regulate Internet 
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activities with potentially greater effect than law.128 This shift of focus to the “law-like 
effects”129 of these factors “systematically treat[s] technical decision-making as a source 
of Internet policy that, in its effects if not its source, now interpenetrates legal policy-
making to create the communicative and informational environment in which we live.”130  
 An example of this interpretation is Section 230 of the CDA, which has increased 
the salience among scholars of the “law-like effects” of intermediaries’ ability to control 
UGC.131 The statute stipulates that digital intermediaries that host content created by third 
parties shall not be treated as the publisher or speaker in regards to that content, and it 
grants such intermediaries immunity from civil liability if they voluntarily restrict access 
to or remove UGC, regardless of whether the UGC is constitutionally protected. The 
intent of Section 230 was to foster free speech, not stifle it by incentivizing intermediary 
control. However, the ability to choose whether to take action over UGC, without fear of 
legal liability in either instance, is a very powerful legal subsidy that digital 
intermediaries enjoy. Law professor Rebecca Tushnet, following the philosophy of law 
professor Jerome Barron132 and Sunstein,133 sees Section 230 as providing “dominant 
providers [that have] substantial market control”134 with “substantial concentrations of 
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power over public discourse.”135 Because intermediaries “do not generally compete to 
protect user rights,”136 Tushnet argues that limiting intermediaries’ legal liability over 
UGC should require a concomitant limiting of their power to control speech.137 
 Exactly how such power should be limited has been the subject of much debate 
among scholars of Internet law. One approach argues that digital intermediaries should be 
treated as public forums.138 The theory behind this approach is that digital intermediaries 
perform a service like that of a public park or square; in both environments, people use 
the service to publicly express their views. The implication of this approach is that any 
kind of regulation of speech on these platforms would become subject to First 
Amendment analysis. However, this approach has not been victorious in court. In Cyber 
Promotions v. AOL,139 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
held that AOL’s email service was not the “functional equivalent” to a public forum. In 
other words, AOL was not acting as an agent supplying a forum for communication that 
state actors would normally make available. The court also held that AOL, unlike cable 
systems, did not control the “critical pathway” of communication, and thus the 
government could not regulate it140—unlike what the U.S. Supreme Court said 
government could do in 1994 with mandating “must-carry” provisions on cable 
providers.141 Rather, the court held that AOL was one of multiple pathways to publishing 
information online. Some scholars extol this holding. Law professor Eric Goldman warns 
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that one should not “instinctively react negatively and emotionally to the specter of 
censorship,” a term he uses to refer to the ability of companies that facilitate so-called 
virtual worlds (such as “Second Life”) to remove or restrict the creations of individuals 
within those worlds.142 “Converting private … providers into state actors could, 
paradoxically, limit speech rather than increase it,” he writes.143 “The enemy is not a 
vendor’s private censorship of a customer, however irrational or short-sighted that may 
be. The real enemy is an emotional response to private censorship that trumps sound 
policy judgments.”144  
 Other scholars suggest that the similarity between digital intermediaries and 
public forums should be embraced in the conventional sense, and that such a perspective 
should guide the formation of free-speech values vis-à-vis these intermediaries. Balkin 
argues that intermediaries are “public in the sense that their value as networks arises from 
public participation that produces network effects.”145 Law professor James 
Grimmelmann argues that the value of the Internet comes from its nature as a 
“semicommons.”146 “Without the private aspects, the Internet would collapse from 
overuse and abuse; without the common ones, it would be pointlessly barren,” he writes. 
“But the two together are magical; their combination makes the Internet hum.”147 Balkin 
argues that “digital technologies change the social conditions in which people speak, … 
bring[ing] to light features of freedom of speech that have always existed in the 
                                                
142 Eric Goldman, Speech Showdowns at the Virtual Corral, 21 S. CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L. J. 845, 
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background but now become foregrounded.”148 Such technologies, he argues, facilitate 
the purpose of freedom of speech, which “is to promote democratic culture” by affording 
individuals “a fair opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning making that 
constitute them as individuals.”149  
Synthesis 
 
At their core, affirmative First Amendment theories put forth two arguments. 
First, they contend that the most important value of freedom of expression is mass 
participation by individuals in a self-governing democracy. Second, they contend that this 
ultimate value faces threats not only from state actors, but also from powerful private 
actors (namely large media conglomerates) that would seek to curb individuals’ 
participation within public discourse due to its potential to compete with their own 
messages. Although some of the affirmative theorists discussed above take the additional 
step of proposing policies whereby state actors use laws to reign in the power of these 
private actors, this study does not take that step with them. Rather, this study seeks to use 
affirmative First Amendment theories to present a framework for understanding the 
potential threats that mainstream digital intermediaries pose to public discourse through 
content governance. Connecting the concepts from Internet governance with Lessig’s 
theory of regulation helps bring the study of content governance into the ambit of legal 
scholarship and First Amendment theory.150  
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Lessig,	  Regulation	  and	  Affirmative	  Theory	  
 
Lessig calls for an analysis of regulation of speech through the lens of key First 
Amendment values. He proposes a model that involves four “modalities” of regulation: 
law, social norms, the marketplace, and the design of technologies that facilitate the 
activity being regulated.151 Law regulates an activity either through threatening to punish 
the activity or codifying incentives that may lead people to engage in an alternative 
activity. Norms, often defined by a society’s moral values, regulate an activity through 
either social stigmatization or encouragement. Markets regulate an activity by making it 
costly or by incentivizing an alternative activity. Finally, the design (Lessig calls it 
“architecture”) of a technology that facilitates an activity will end up regulating the 
activity by only allowing it to be performed in the way permitted by the technology.152 
Importantly, all of these modalities are interdependent of one another.153 All four interact 
with one another in the context of content governance:  
Law: Section 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act gives commercial 
intermediaries immunity from tort liability over content created by third parties that 
others may consider “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
                                                
151 Id. at 124. 
152 Lessig gives the example of smoking to illustrate his four-part model. Id. at 122-3. Laws can make it 
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otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”154 
Not only are intermediaries immune from liability as a result of the material being 
published on their platforms, they are also immune from liability for removing the 
content—essentially, from assuming control of it.155 In other words, § 230 encourages 
content governance by promising that intermediaries will not be punished for it. 
Meanwhile, case law leads us to a fairly solid understanding that commercial 
intermediaries have a First Amendment right to manage content on their platforms.156 
Norms: This modality is perhaps the most important to this study. Because law 
gives intermediaries so much latitude to manage UGC, these intermediaries must devise 
and enact their own policies to manage the content that gets published on their platforms. 
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Norms in content governance are constructed through a process of negotiation.157 
Sometimes, employees of digital intermediaries decide what kinds of content are subject 
to private governance. Other times, individual users define what constitutes undesirable 
content by pressuring intermediaries into following a set of certain community values.158  
Market: As discussed above, the structure of the networked economy gives 
intermediaries an incentive to make their platforms a welcome experience for users.159 
The goal is to attract as many users as possible while scaring as few away as possible. 
This modality, then, is tightly connected to the norms modality: what sells will be what 
the community of users considers desirable. Thus, if community norms dictate that 
certain forms of extreme or potentially harmful speech “do not sell” (i.e. their presence 
may deter individuals from using a platform), that speech is not likely to survive due to 
market pressure. 
Design: Whatever norms commercial intermediaries choose to implement and 
follow to govern content, they will be inscribed into the design (which, in this context, 
Lessig refers to as “code”) of the platforms. For example, platforms may give users the 
ability to “flag” offensive content (i.e., notify the intermediary about the content).160 The 
very act of removing content, or of “excommunicating” an individual who created 
objectionable content, is a function of the design of platforms. 
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160 Crawford and Gillespie, supra note 8. 
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Content	  Governance	  and	  Politics	  of	  Technology	  Theory	  
 
Technological design must be conceived as a product of social norms. 
Technology policy, according to communication professor Tarleton Gillespie, “is the 
construction and the legal authorization of sociotechnical systems designed to select out 
those activities we want to render impossible (and the converse, those we hope to 
encourage).”161 Technologies “are the product of political choices and have political 
consequences that must be recognized and acknowledged.”162 Political choices and 
consequences imply an inherent conflict in the design and implementation of technology. 
Builders of technology “also build them in the rhetorical sense, drawing linguistic 
boundaries around them to indicate what is part of the [technology] and what is not, 
shaping how the relationship between elements can and will be characterized.”163 This 
rhetoric, the “interpretive flexibility” of technology, is always in flux.164 Persuasion and 
technology go hand-in-hand because technology is, itself, an argument: an interpretation 
of how it should be used.  
Answering the questions that guide this study is an act of interpreting and 
defining what the technology of communicative platforms should be and how they should 
function. This study synthesizes Internet governance with theories of content 
management and normative theories about the social value and limits of extreme 
expression. The aim of this synthesis is to explicate the concept of how digital 
intermediaries govern the extreme speech that gets published on their platforms. Key to 
                                                
161 GILLESPIE, supra note 16, at 10. 
162 Id. at 66. 
163 Id. at 75. 
164 Id. at 85. 
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this goal is an understanding of extreme speech. First Amendment theory and 
jurisprudence recognizes that extreme speech falls outside the “mainstream” of public 
discourse, yet it contends that the robustness of that discourse as a whole depends on the 
presence of extreme speech.165 Extreme speech is the vanguard of all speech; by 
protecting extreme speech (but for a few exceptions), the law gives “breathing space”166 
for individuals to participate in a public discourse robust enough to test the boundaries of 
convention and decency. 
Following	  the	  Trajectory	  of	  Broadcast	  
 
Another reason that this study calls upon affirmative theory is to connect the 
concept of content governance with the arguments of new realist scholars that once saw 
broadcast media as a threat to individual participation in public discourse. Barron, for 
example, argued that U.S. broadcasters wielded enormous power over the public 
discourse by exercising their First Amendment right to manage their programming.167 
This power imbalance came from the pervasiveness of the medium, the ability of 
broadcasters to reach large (potentially national) audiences, and the fact that the limited 
number of broadcasting channels were (and are even more so today) concentrated in the 
hands of a few large corporations. Famously, Barron contended this power was so great 
that U.S. courts should recognize a First Amendment right of giving individuals access to 
                                                
165 See e.g. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 
(1989); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 09 (2011). 
166 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
167 Barron, supra note 23. 
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these otherwise closed channels of communication, lest the public discourse grow 
normalized and stagnant.168  
Internet communications were seen as the antidote to this power imbalance, as 
individuals would have greater ability to communicate messages that could compete with 
those of large media conglomerates.169 More than a decade before the invention of the 
World Wide Web, sociologist and technologist Ithiel de Sola Pool recognized the 
potential of electronic communication to be “expanders of human culture”170 that could 
topple the monopolistic reign of large broadcast corporations.171 However, Barron argues 
that networked communication has not vanquished the threat of corporate control over 
mass individual participation.172 He concludes that the Internet, like broadcast, is a 
medium in which a few major players dominate traffic, thereby crowding out alternative 
perspectives.173 Thus, following Barron’s argument, if and when mainstream 
intermediaries scrub their platforms of extreme speech, access to such speech through 
fringe platforms becomes merely nominal. 
Conclusion 
 
The implications that content governance poses for mass participation in Internet 
communication should be framed in the context of this debate. For scholars like Pool and 
Barron, the issues presented by content governance are a step backward to the days of 
corporate power over public discourse through control of broadcast media. The only 
                                                
168 Id. 
169 See, e.g., ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM: ON FREE SPEECH IN AN ELECTRONIC 
AGE (1983); Jerome Barron, Access Reconsidered, 76 G. W. L. REV. 826 (2008). 
170 POOL, supra, at 226. 
171 Id. at 246-7. 
172 Barron, supra note 169. 
173 Id. at 843. 
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question that remains is how far backward this step is. Answering that question is the task 
of future research. In the meantime, this chapter calls for two things. First, it calls for 
greater awareness about the social values of extreme speech that face a potential threat 
from content governance. Scholars of mass communication law must vigorously defend 
and disseminate theories of freedom of expression that promote tolerance of extreme 
speech.174 Second, it calls for greater transparency on the part of digital intermediaries on 
how UGC is governed on their platforms. Intermediaries, through their community 
standards,175 do notify users what general categories of speech are permitted and what are 
not, but they do not open a window onto the process of determining one from the other. 
Intermediaries have a duty to open that window to maintain the robustness of the public 
discourse they facilitate. 
 
                                                
174 See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH 
IN AMERICA (1986). 
175 Crawford and Gillespie, supra note 8. 
   
69 
Chapter 3: The value and limits of extreme speech in a networked 
society: A perspective from First Amendment theory and jurisprudence 
 
 The purpose of this study is to explicate the concept of content governance: the 
control that digital communication intermediaries exercise over user-generated content 
(UGC). The particular focus of this explication is the governance of extreme UGC. Two 
key questions guide this explication: How and why do digital communication 
intermediaries respond to extreme UGC? What are the potential implications of their 
responses for public discourse in a system of networked communication? 
Chapter 2 analyzed content governance using so-called “affirmative” theories of 
the First Amendment. These theories generally promote the maximization of participation 
among individuals within public discourse, and propose that state actors have the ability 
to facilitate such participation through public policy measures aimed at limiting the 
power of corporate media to control that discourse.1 Indeed, these theories conceive of 
corporate media of all stripes as powerful institutions that have a strong ability to limit 
individuals’ participation in public discourse. However, from the perspective of 
affirmative theory, extreme speech still presents a quandary for issues of content 
governance. Some scholars2 and politicians3 have called for digital intermediaries to play 
a larger role in managing extreme or harmful speech on their platforms. The idea behind 
                                                
1 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); 
CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF 
FREE SPEECH (1996); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Speech for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
2 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2015); Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: 
Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224 (2011). 
3 Nick Wingfield and Eric Lipton, Google’s Detractors Take Their Fight to the States, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
16, 2014). 
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these calls is that the law is either too slow or is faced with too many constitutional 
barriers to police extreme or harmful speech on its own, and therefore extralegal matters 
must be taken. Yet these calls essentially empower intermediaries to take on a greater 
role in governing UGC, something that the affirmative theorists discussed in the last 
chapter generally would be leery of. Thus, this chapter picks up where chapter two left 
off by posing the following question: at what point does the power of intermediaries to 
control extreme UGC become too great? And, at what point does society lose out from 
having an online public discourse cleansed of extreme and potentially harmful speech? 
The analysis in this chapter will consider the answers that three First Amendment 
theories—marketplace of ideas theory, individual autonomy theory and tolerance 
theory—have to the following questions: What makes speech extreme? What makes it so 
extreme that it should be regulated? What is the ultimate benefit of speech—especially 
extreme speech—to democracy? The purpose of analyzing these theoretical questions is 
to distill the values of extreme speech and understand the limits (framed in terms of state 
action) of such speech—namely, at what point does protected extreme speech become 
harmful speech that could be prohibited? The main reason for defining the values and 
limits of extreme speech is that digital intermediaries and state actors often use the 
prevention of some sort of “harm” as a pretext for content governance. This one factor in 
common between these two distinct actors can allow a parallel analysis to take shape, 
whereby the concept to be explored is the balance between the social values of preventing 
harm and promoting extreme forms of speech. Thus, this chapter approaches the core 
focus of this study—the balancing act that digital intermediaries perform to promote 
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speech and prevent harm—from the perspective of traditional First Amendment theory 
and jurisprudence. 
Digital intermediaries are not—nor should they be considered—state actors 
subject to the purview of the First Amendment. The First Amendment clearly states: 
“Congress shall make no law … abridging freedom of speech, or of the press,”4 whereby 
Congress has been interpreted to refer to all government entities (and only government 
entities) throughout the United States through the doctrine of incorporation instilled in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.5 Indeed, the entire U.S. Constitution is a treatise on the 
relationship between government and its citizens, not on the relationship between private 
parties (except, of course, for the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits the 
enslavement of one human being by another).6 Therefore, but for this exception, a private 
actor can only be considered in violation of another’s rights if the private actor is acting 
as an instrument of the state.7 Digital intermediaries, for all the control they may harbor 
over public discourse, do not make the public discourse available as an agent of the 
state.8 
                                                
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
5 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (“For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of 
speech and of the press — which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress — 
are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”). 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject 
to their jurisdiction.”). See Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic 
Choice, 34 HOF. L. REV. 1379, 1388 (2006). 
7 See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982) (holding, for example, that a private 
party’s joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize 
that party as a ‘state actor’ for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
8 See, e.g., Cyber Promotions v. AOL, 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that AOL’s email service 
did not provide the “functional equivalent” to a public forum, nor did it amount to a “critical pathway” of 
communication, and thus the government could not regulate it). 
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However, such a distinction does not preclude the possibility of using negative 
First Amendment theory—theory that conceives of freedom of expression as a right 
against the government—to guide an analysis of the social values at stake and the limits 
that should be considered when intermediaries govern extreme UGC. Such a proposition 
is neither heretical nor novel. Smolla has argued that First Amendment jurisprudence can 
“serve as a model for private institutions and organizations” so that they “may choose to 
embrace freedom of speech as a preferred organizational value.”9 The private institutions 
that Smolla had in mind were private universities tasked with developing speech codes 
for their students and faculty,10 with Smolla implying that private universities share the 
same function as their public counterparts (preparing young adults to be citizens), which 
would necessitate equal treatment of speech. However, unlike in Smolla’s example, the 
degree to which private institutions resemble or function like public institutions should 
not matter in the type of “guiding” analysis found in this chapter. What matters is that 
digital intermediaries have power to control individuals’ participation in public discourse, 
and therefore they merit an analysis of the values and limits that they employ to control 
that participation as if they were state actors. Negative First Amendment theories are a 
valuable tool in conducting such an analysis because of their binary structure: the rights 
of individuals to freedom of expression—and the values that justify such freedom, even 
to extreme lengths—are pitted against the power of another actor. With First Amendment 
theory, of course, that other actor is the government. The present analysis requires that 
digital intermediaries be transposed into the place of state actors.  
                                                
9 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 45 (1992). 
10 Id. 
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This chapter will begin with a discussion of the value of speech, broadly 
conceived. It will then move into a discussion of the limits of extreme speech, also 
broadly conceived. Guiding these discussions will be an analysis of First Amendment 
doctrine as established by major court cases regarding the values and limits of extreme 
speech in specific situations. 
The chapter will then proceed to an analysis of arguably the two most commonly 
cited negative theories: marketplace of ideas theory and individual autonomy theory.11 In 
this first section, the general precepts of these theories as well as the main criticisms 
against them will be discussed. In particular, as noted in the overarching goal of this 
chapter, these theories will be analyzed in terms of how they conceive of the values and 
limits of extreme speech. The limits will be framed in terms of how each theory 
conceives of the potential harmfulness of speech.  
The second half of this section will analyze tolerance theory, including its general 
precepts, its conceptions of the values and limits of extreme speech, and its main 
criticisms. The argument put forth in this chapter is that tolerance theory should be 
revitalized to further the understanding of the values and limits of extreme speech in an 
era of networked communication, for several reasons. First, the central focus of tolerance 
theory is extreme speech.12 Second, tolerance theory expands upon John Stuart Mill’s 
idea that tolerance of extreme speech is a societal issue, not simply a legal one.13 Third, 
                                                
11 MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
INTERDISCIPLINARITY 2, 11 (2001). 
12 LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN 
AMERICA 4 (1986). 
13 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 8 (1859/2001); BOLLINGER, supra, at 13. 
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the notion of tolerance is something that has been and can be empirically measured.14 
Therefore, even though tolerance theory—like all First Amendment theories—is 
normative in nature, its primary focus can become the foundation for future research on 
attitudes toward extreme speech and content governance in a networked communication 
system. Finally, tolerance theory is an important theory in the context of content 
governance because, at bottom, it argues that showing tolerance for extreme speech is a 
mental civic exercise. Therefore, once the social values of extreme speech have been 
established, the only way they will survive in an arena of public discourse where the 
threat of regulation is high is through a collective civic faith in those values.  
Major criticisms of each of these three theories will also be presented. The goal of 
doing so is to separate the valuable core concepts of these theories from the major pitfalls 
that doom each theory from being able to stand on its own. These core concepts will be 
the main ingredients for a grand synthesis of a theory of freedom of expression for an era 
of networked communication in which private regulation of speech has become more and 
more common. 
This chapter will conclude with a synthesis of the theories discussed in this 
chapter, and a proposal for a theory of the values and limits of extreme speech in the 
context of content governance. This theory will combine elements of Bollinger’s 
tolerance theory and Baker’s liberty model to create a theory that encourages tolerance 
                                                
14 See generally JULIE L. ANDSAGER, ROBERT O. WYATT, & EARNEST L. MARTIN, FREE EXPRESSION IN 
5 DEMOCRATIC PUBLICS: SUPPORT FOR INDIVIDUAL AND MEDIA RIGHTS (2004); Dennis Chong, How 
People Think, Reason, and Feel about Rights and Liberties, 37 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 867 (1993); James L. 
Gibson & Richard D. Bingham, On the Conceptualization and Measurement of Political Tolerance, 76 
AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 603 (1982); Jennifer L. Lambe, Dimensions of Censorship: Reconceptualizing 
Public Willingness to Censor, 7 COMM. L. POL’Y 187 (2002). 
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among both individuals and digital intermediaries, and that extolls the values of honoring 
individual autonomy in a system that empowers individuals’ communicative potential 
like no other time in history. This theoretical analysis thus places content governance in 
the context of the broader discussion of how extreme speech has been regarded in First 
Amendment theory and jurisprudence for at least the last century.  




Before getting into the discussion of negative First Amendment theory, the 
analysis must first ask a fundamental question: why speech?15 What gives the act of 
speaking greater protection in U.S. law than other actions? Answering this question is 
important because it helps get past the so-called “argument from coincidence,”16 the idea 
that freedom of speech must be revered simply because the First Amendment has 
conferred such a strong negative right. Answering this question is also important because 
certain harms caused by speech can be as harmful as—if not more harmful than—certain 
harms caused by conduct, yet “we are unwilling to disable ourselves from dealing with 
harmful, offensive, obnoxious, dangerous behavior in general in the way that we are with 
reference to speech.”17 Champions of freedom of expression must answer for these harms 
and give as strong a reason as possible for why “the [F]irst [A]mendment requires a 
likelihood of harm much higher than we otherwise require.”18 Beginning the analysis 
with this question does two things. First, it sets a tone that any theoretical analysis of 
                                                
15 Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special? 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284 (1983). 
16 Id. at 1298. 
17 Id. at 1303. 
18 Id. 
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freedom of expression should follow a high degree of rigor.19 It gets beyond the 
“accepted assumptions, traditional metaphors, and standard platitudes” about the values 
of free speech, which Schauer argues are “clearly inadequate to confront the questions we 
must ask when trying to determine the extent to which … the [F]irst [A]mendment 
[should] encompass a wide range of activities seemingly so far from the comprehension 
of the classical free speech theorists that the relevance of classical theory has become 
attenuated.”20 Second, this question allows us to incorporate the perspectives of multiple 
First Amendment theories into the analysis. Schauer contends that “there need not be 
anything wrong with a multi-valued theory,”21 as “it is unlikely that any one theory can 
explain the concept of free speech, and no reason necessarily exists to suppose that it 
could.”22 Or should. We would be wise to recognize that freedom of expression is made 
up of a “bundle of interrelated principles sharing no common set of necessary and 
sufficient defining characteristics.”23 This bundle includes a “unique mix of self-
expression, self-realization, [and] capacity for influencing political change” as justifying 
the special protection for speech.24 Law professors Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey 
                                                
19 Id. (“As we reject many of the classical platitudes about freedom of speech and engage in somewhat 
more rigorous analysis, trying to discover why speech—potentially harmful and dangerous, often offensive, 
and the instrument of evil as often as of good—should be treated as it is, our intuitions about the value of 
free speech, solid as they may be, are difficult to reconcile with this analysis.”) 
20 Id. at 1288. 
21 Id. at 1303. 
22 Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 
277 (1981). 
23 Id. See also SMOLLA, supra note 9, at 2 (“There is no logical reason … why the preferred position of 
freedom of speech might not be buttressed by multiple rationales.”) 
24 Schauer, supra note 15, at 1304. 
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agree, seeing free speech as “a powerful idea precisely because it appeals to so many 
diverse values.”25  
Therefore, speech is special because of its potential to be a great equalizing force 
in society. To be certain, social divisions by race, gender, class and access to 
communication resources mean that not everyone has the ability to speak—or be heard—
with equal power.26 Yet speech gives everyone the opportunity to exercise his or her 
autonomy by not only contributing a message to society, but also determining which 
messages are most valuable for society. Reverence for freedom of speech places society’s 
faith in that autonomy, trusting it over any power (governmental or private) that would 
seek to manage the public discourse in a way that would negate that autonomy. Put 
differently, speech is special (especially in the United States) because it is the area of 
individual activity that involves a low amount of government involvement relative to 
individuals’ potential to bring about social change. The theories analyzed herein will 
present their own interpretations about how freedom of expression can bring about such 
potential social change. 
Extremeness and Harm 
 
 The next step in this analysis is to address the types of “extreme” speech that 
populate the borders of both social and legal acceptance. Truly, “[d]rawing constitutional 
                                                
25 Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 
1615, 1643 (1987). 
26 See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Hate Speech and Its Harms: A Communication Theory Perspective, 47 J. COMM. 
4 (1997); Catherine MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. 
REV. 1 (1985); Cass Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L. J. 589 (1986); 
Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 
343 (1991); Katharine Gelber, “Speaking Back”: The Likely Fate of Hate Speech Policy in the United 
States and Australia, in SPEECH & HARM: CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH (Ishani Maitra and Mary 
Kate McGowan eds., 2012). 
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lines of inclusion and exclusion is vastly complicated by the multiple purposes and 
effects particular communications can have.”27 Defining extreme speech in terms of its 
potential to cause harm can help make these lines—if not brighter—at least less 
complicated to draw. However, setting these boundaries requires solid criteria as to what 
makes speech harmful. The criteria that this analysis will use come from Smolla’s three-
part model of harms that speech can cause: physical harm, relational harm, and reactive 
harm.28 Each of these three harms has its own body of case law that sets the boundaries of 
the possible legal actions that can be taken against the speech. The following subsections 
will review those bodies of case law. 
Physical	  Harm	  
 
U.S. free speech jurisprudence considers physical harm the worst of the three 
types of harms that could potentially be caused by speech, making it one area where clear 
exceptions have been devised to address this harm and to decide when the speech that 
falls outside of constitutional protection.29 These types of speech include fighting words, 
true threats, and incitement to imminent lawless action. The fighting words doctrine 
comes from the 1942 case Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.30 In that case, Chaplinsky, a 
Jehovah’s Witness, was convicted under a state breach of peace statute for calling a city 
marshal “a God damned racketeer and a damned Fascist.”31 The high court upheld 
Chaplinsky’s conviction, and in so doing crafted the First Amendment exception for 
                                                
27 Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645, 784 (1980). 
28 SMOLLA, supra note 9, at 48. 
29 Id. 
30 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
31 Id. at 569. 
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fighting words, which the Court defined as words said in another person’s face that “by 
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”32 
Courts have seldom used the fighting words doctrine since Chaplinsky.33 
The incitement standard was refined in the 1969 case Brandenburg v. Ohio.34 
That case involved a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group (Brandenburg) being convicted 
under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law for speaking racist messages to a frenzied crowd. 
The law prohibited “advocat[ing] … the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, 
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or 
political reform.”35 In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court reversed Brandenburg’s 
conviction, holding that “the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do 
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation 
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action 
and is likely to incite or produce such action.”36 The imminent lawless action standard 
narrowed the definition of unlawful incitement from the “bad tendency”37 and “clear and 
present danger”38 standards cited by the Court earlier in the twentieth century. 
Concurring in Brandenburg, Justice Douglas lamented “how easily [the] ‘clear and 
present danger’ [standard] is manipulated to crush what Brandeis called [t]he 
                                                
32 Id. at 572-3. 
33 Though for an interesting analysis of how the fighting words doctrine could apply in Internet 
communication, see Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMs and E-Mails: Can a Disparaged 
Doctrine Be Resuscitated to Punish Cyber-Bullies?, 21 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L 1 (2010). 
34 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
35 Id. at 445. 
36 Id. at 447. 
37 Schenck v. U.S. 249 U.S. 39 (1919); Debs v. U.S., 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616 
(1919); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
38 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
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fundamental right of free men to strive for better conditions through new legislation and 
new institutions by argument and discourse.”39 He decried that the standard had been 
“manipulated,”40 and “twisted and perverted” for political ends.41 The test was applied 
and further refined soon after Brandenburg in Hess v. Indiana,42 in which the Court held 
that a vague command shouted to protestors to “take the fucking streets later” did not 
amount to an incitement to imminent lawless action. In a per curiam opinion, the Court 
held that Hess’ speech was not directed toward any specific individual or group, nor did it 
exhibit an intent to commit any imminent lawless action.43 
Law professor Kent Greenawalt identifies four parts to the incitement standard: 
the extent of the lawlessness of the action the speech is advocating; who the speech is 
being directed at; the likelihood of the action occurring; and the imminence of the action 
occurring.44 Each of these elements provides a layer of protection to speech that has the 
potential to lead to physical harm. Some scholars have argued that networked 
communication allows extreme speech to surpass each of these protective layers. For 
example, the requirement that the communication be directed immediately at an angry 
audience may no longer be a sufficient condition for the incited lawless action to be 
imminent. Law professor Lyrissa Lidsky argues that an inflammatory message posted on 
social media can target multiple audiences (both intended and unintended) who may be 
                                                
39 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 452 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
40 Id. at 453. 
41 Id. at 454. 
42 414 U.S. 105 (1973). 
43 Id. at 108-9. 
44 Greenawalt, supra note 27. 
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more likely than even a restive mob to imminently commit a violent illegal act.45 Others, 
however, urge greater restraint.46 It is true that a message that did not directly advocate 
for a specific lawless action to imminently occur could still unwittingly spur an 
unintended audience to commit such an action. However, the fact that such a result may 
be highly likely should not be reason enough to suppress speech. The very idea that any 
message—especially a political one—could incite someone to violence should galvanize 
society to maintain its standard of only outlawing the rare case of directly inciting 
imminent lawless action, online or off.47 
The extent of the “true threat” exception to the First Amendment is currently (as 
of this writing) under scrutiny at the U.S. Supreme Court. The contention stems from 
how courts should interpret the standard enunciated in Virginia v. Black, in which the 
Supreme Court held that a Virginia statute criminalizing cross burning was 
unconstitutionally overbroad.48 Justice O’Connor wrote that to convict a person of 
threatening another by burning a cross, the state of Virginia must consider whether a 
reasonable person would have found the burning to be threatening, as well as whether the 
accused intended for the burning to be threatening.49 The latter half of the two-prong test 
is the more difficult: the government must prove that the “speaker means to communicate 
                                                
45 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 147, 149 (2011). 
46 Lynn Adelman and Jon Deitrich, Extremist Speech and the Internet: The Continuing Importance of 
Brandenberg, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361 (2010). See also L. A. Powe, Jr., Brandenburg: Then and 
Now, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 69 (2011). 
47 Id. 
48 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
49 Id. at 360 (O’Connor, J., writing for the plurality). 
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a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular 
individual or group of individuals.”50  
Since Black, courts have given competing interpretations of how the true threat 
standard should be applied in networked communication. In U.S. v. Bagdasarian, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that vague references to assassinating 
President Obama posted on an online message board could not reasonably be interpreted 
to be threatening speech.51 However, in Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, 
Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists—decided a year before Black—a divided 
Ninth Circuit sitting en banc held that online “wanted posters” that glorified the deaths of 
and encouraged violent attacks on doctors who performed abortions amounted to an 
unconstitutional true threat.52   
On December 1, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case 
of Elonis v. United States,53 thereby revisiting the role of the subjective standard to the 
true threat exception. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the 
subjective standard was unique to the facts in Black, and that O’Connor’s plurality 
opinion could not be read to require a subjective standard across all circuits.54 Appellant 
Anthony Elonis was convicted of “transmitting in interstate commerce communications 
containing a threat to injure the person of another” under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).55 He had 
posted comments on his Facebook page alluding to a desire to savagely murder his 
                                                
50 Id. 
51 652 F. 3d 1113 (9th Cir., 2011). 
52 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. en banc, 2002). 
53 134 S. Ct. 2819 (cert. granted 2014). 
54 United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
55 Id. at 326. 
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estranged wife and cause bodily harm to kindergarten students, law enforcement officers 
and former coworkers.56 Elonis contended that his speech was protected because Black 
required proof of the subjective intent of the accused speaker to deliver a threat, and he 
argued his speech was a mimicking of rap lyrics that gave him catharsis after his wife left 
him.57  
However, the Third Circuit held that Black did not afford Elonis’ speech the 
protection of a subjective intent standard. The court distinguished Elonis’s Facebook 
posts from the cross burning in Black, holding that the symbolic nature of the cross-
burning required the state to prove that the intent behind it was threatening rather than, 
for example, a political expression of solidarity among Klansmen.58 Meanwhile, the 
meaning behind Elonis’s Facebook posts was not nearly as ambiguous.59 The Third 
Circuit also pointed out that in Black, the Virginia statute being challenged already 
contained a requirement that the subjective intent of a threat be proven. Therefore, the 
test for true threats enunciated in Black only applied to the Virginia statute, and it does 
not force other statutes that do not have a subject intent requirement (such as Section 
875) to suddenly adopt such a requirement.60 Moreover, the Third Circuit held that the 
spirit of Section 875(c) was sufficiently met using only an objective standard. The court 
wrote, “Limiting the definition of true threats to only those statements where the speaker 
subjectively intended to threaten would fail to protect individuals from ‘the fear of 
                                                
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 327. 
58 Id. at 330. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 329. 
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violence’ and the ‘disruption that fear engenders,’” which is the chief goal of the federal 
statute.61 
In sum, these three standards (fighting words, incitement and true threats) 
separate the worst of speech-related harms from the body of protected speech in the 
United States. They are a recognition that speech can cause significant harm and that the 
First Amendment is not an absolute, while simultaneously establishing incredibly high 
standards that are lauded for how strongly they protect extreme speech. Although recent 
cases have shown that networked communication is changing the ways in which extreme 
speech can lead to physical harm, these standards have yet to be substantially weakened. 
Relational	  Harm	  
 
Relational harm, according to Smolla, involves speech that causes injury to social 
relationships (defamation), business relationships (fraud or false advertising), ownership 
interests (copyright) and confidentiality (leaking national security secrets).62 This section 
will focus only on jurisprudence regarding harms caused by defamation due to 1) the 
tradition of strong First Amendment protection afforded to allegedly defamatory speech, 
and 2) the close relationship between defamation and Smolla’s third category: reactive 
harms.63 
The U.S. Supreme Court constitutionalized defamation law in New York Times v. 
Sullivan by requiring public-official plaintiffs to prove that libelous statements about 
them were made with “actual malice”: the “knowledge that it [the statement] was false or 
                                                
61 Id. at 330. 
62 SMOLLA, supra note 9, at 48. 
63 See infra, notes 78-85. 
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[made] with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”64 Justice Brennan gave the 
following reasoning for the Court’s unanimous decision in Sullivan: “if newspapers, 
publishing advertisements dealing with public issues, … risk liability [upon a jury’s 
evaluation of the speaker’s state of mind], there can also be little doubt that the ability of 
minority groups to secure publication of their views on public affairs and to seek support 
for their causes will be greatly diminished.”65 That same philosophy extends to public 
figures: those “who are not public officials, but [are] involved in issues in which the 
public has a justified and important interest,”66 thereby making them subject to public 
scrutiny. Private individuals, however, generally are afforded greater leeway in pursuing 
defamation suits; depending on the law of the state where they bring the suit, private 
individuals may not have to prove actual malice to win their case.67 
A litany of other statutory68 and common law69 protections—too numerous and 
nuanced to list here—exist to further buttress the protection afforded to defamation 
                                                
64 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). 
65 Id. at 300.  
66 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 132 (1967). 
67 Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
68 These primarily include state laws that seek to prevent so-called “strategic lawsuits against public 
participation” or “SLAPPs.” Generally, these laws allow would-be defendants the ability to move to 
dismiss a defamation lawsuit against them at early stages of legal action, thereby placing upon plaintiffs the 
burden of proving that their suit likely would prevail on the merits if the case were to go to trial. The 
purpose of these laws is to eliminate the potential silencing of speech out of fear of the potentially high 
costs of defending a defamation suit that the defendant would most likely win anyway. For more on the 
state of anti-SLAPP laws in the United States, see Anti-SLAPP Laws, Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
the Press, available at http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/digital-journalists-legal-guide/anti-
slapp-laws-0. 
69 These primarily include state law privileges that predate the Sullivan actual malice standard and protect 
the press from liability for defamation. For example, the fair comment privilege protects speakers who 
publish criticism of artistic works from liability for defamation as long as the critical comments are 
accurate, see Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 606-607. Another example is the privilege of neutral 
reportage, whereby “[l]iteral accuracy [in reporting] is not a prerequisite,” and journalists should enjoy 
“immunity from defamation suits where the journalist believes, reasonably and in good faith, that his report 
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defendants. One such statute, section 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act70—
discussed in the previous chapter—extends that protection to the digital intermediaries 
that host potentially defamatory speech by granting them immunity from civil liability if 
they voluntarily restrict access to or remove UGC.71 The law has been a boon for harmful 
speech online, which can proliferate due to speakers’ ability to cloak themselves in 
anonymity and intermediaries’ potential disincentive to remove the allegedly infringing 
speech.72 At the same time, the law has the potential to indirectly lead to the restriction of 
speech by intermediaries who will remove extreme speech out of a concern for its bottom 
line without the fear of being held liable for its removal.73 
Smolla categorizes defamation as a relational harm due to its close similarity with 
other business-related harms such as copyright infringement; essentially, it is a harm 
against property rights. Constitutional scholar Robert Post argues that defamation law in 
the United States is built on the metaphor that “reputation is capital.”74 Reputation is the 
fruit “of one’s own endeavors.”75 Reputation works hand-in-hand with American 
                                                                                                                                            
accurately conveys the charges made,” Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2nd 
Cir. 1977). 
70 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
71 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). However, immunity does not extend to third-party content that violates criminal 
law, such as obscenity or child pornography (§ 230(e)(1)), or that violates intellectual property laws (§ 
230(e)(2)). 
72 See generally David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of 
Intermediary Immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373 
(2010). See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998) 
(holding that AOL did not materially contribute to hosting allegedly defamatory statements posted by an 
anonymous user to AOL’s message board service claiming that Zeran was selling apparel that disparaged 
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing). 
73 See Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 G.W. 
L. REV. 986, 1011 (2008). 
74 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. 
REV. 691, 693 (1986). 
75 Id. at 694 (internal quotations omitted). 
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capitalism; it can be spent or invested to build up one’s fortune, which, in turn, can be 
invested back into one’s good reputation. Post argues that in the United States, the 
“purpose of the law of defamation is to protect individuals within the market by ensuring 
that their reputation is not wrongfully deprived of its proper market value.”76 Prior to 
New York Times v. Sullivan, Post’s theory was corroborated at common law.77 However, 
despite its close connection to property harms, defamation in several ways straddles the 
line between relational harm and reactive harm. The analysis in the following section will 
illustrate how, thereby connecting defamation with the murky implications for networked 
communication that are associated with reactive harms. 
Reactive	  Harm	  
 
Smolla’s third category, reactive harm, includes intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, tortious invasions of privacy, and any type of hate speech. The Supreme Court 
has raised the standards for plaintiffs suing under the first two categories by imputing the 
actual malice standard from Sullivan into many of these torts, due in large part to their 
similarity to the tort of defamation.78 Hate speech has been defined many different ways 
by many different scholars, but a generic definition for the purposes of this study 
categorizes hate speech as any speech that attacks and attempts to subordinate any group 
or class of people, typically spoken by a group with a higher level of social power than 
                                                
76 Id. at 695. 
77 SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 39. 
78 Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing, 419 U.S. 245 (1975) (holding that plaintiffs must prove actual malice 
to successfully recover for the tort of false light invasion of privacy); Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 
(1988) (holding that a public figure plaintiff must prove actual malice to successfully recover for the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
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the targets of the speech.79 The targets of such speech typically include racial minorities, 
women, religious minorities, and homosexuals. Generally, hate speech is only punishable 
if it contravenes one of the few First Amendment exceptions listed above.80 According to 
Smolla, speech that leads to reactive harms deserves the highest level of constitutional 
protection due to its tendency to implicate public figures or officials, or its tendency to 
involve important social issues and matters of public concern: factors which greatly 
outweigh the potential harms of the speech.81  
Reactive harms are likely considered the least worrisome of harms caused by 
speech because generally they are considered less tangible than physical or relational 
harms.82 These latter two categories implicate life and property, while reactive harms can 
be reduced to “hurt feelings.”83 Certainly, harm to one’s mental wellbeing is nothing 
                                                
79 For various studies with various definitions of hate speech, see generally Calvert, supra note 26; 
Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a Democracy. 44 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 497 (2009); Richard Delgado and David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An 
Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 871 (1994); Owen M. 
Fiss, The Supreme Court and the Problem of Hate Speech. 24 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 281 (1995); Stephanie 
Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of International Law Concerning 
Hate Speech. 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 (1996); Jean-Marie Kamatali, The U.S. First Amendment Versus 
Freedom of Expression in Other Liberal Democracies and How Each Influenced the Development of 
International Law on Hate Speech. 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 721 (2010); Robert Post, Hate Speech, in 
EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY (Ivan Hare and James Weinstein eds., 2009); Tanya Katerí Hernández, 
Hate Speech and the Language of Racism in Latin America: A Lens for Reconsidering Global Hate Speech 
Restrictions and Legislation Models. 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 805 (2011). 
80 See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that a St. Paul, Minn. ordinance banning symbolic 
speech (such as cross-burning) that is hateful “on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender”—a 
content-based restriction of speech—was unconstitutionally under-inclusive); National Socialist Party of 
America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1997) (holding that delays in issuing parade permits to Nazis 
were, in and of themselves, a content-based restriction on the Nazi Party’s speech); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 
U.S. 09 (2011) (holding that allowing an individual, even a private citizen such as Mr. Snyder, to sue for 
civil damages from emotional distress intentionally inflicted by lawful social speech would lead to a 
chilling effect on such speech). 
81 SMOLLA, supra note 9, at 48. 
82 C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 998 (1978) 
(hereinafter Baker, Scope of the First Amendment). 
83 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) (“in the world of debate about public affairs, 
many things done with motives that are less than admirable are protected by the First Amendment”); at 55 
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trivial. Many scholars who crusade for greater regulations (particularly in the United 
States) against hate speech point out that the damage such speech causes to the wellbeing 
of minorities leads to physical (hence, more important) ailments such as anxiety and 
depression, which in turn may make minorities retreat from participating in society.84 
However, the inability to conceive of a legal test that would show a “direct causal link”85 
between speech and mental harms (like with true threats, incitement, or actual malice), 
weighed against Smolla’s argument that speech associated with reactive harms often 
implicates public officials, makes speech that causes reactive harms the least deserving of 
an exception from First Amendment protection. 
Harms v. Value 
 
It is important that society understands the harms of speech because these harms 
must be juxtaposed with the societal value of expansive free speech rights. “The evils 
posed by ‘harmful’ speech are likely to appear real to the political branches,” Smolla 
writes, but “[t]he interests served by allowing such speech to remain free … will often 
appear unreal.”86 To increase the realness of the value of speech in the face of the 
realness of its potential harms, one must identify and appreciate the ideational value of 
                                                                                                                                            
(“‘Outrageousness’ in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it 
which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the 
basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An ‘outrageousness’ standard thus runs afoul of our 
longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse 
emotional impact on the audience” (emphasis added)). Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j 
(1965): “some degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living among 
people.” 
84 Calvert, supra note 26; Caroline West, Words the Silence? Freedom of Expression and Racist Hate 
Speech, in SPEECH & HARM: CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH (Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate 
McGowan eds., 2012). 
85 Clay Calvert, Kara Carnley, Brittany Link and Linda Riedmann, Conversion Therapy and Free Speech: 
A Doctrinal and Theoretical First Amendment Analysis, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 525 (2014). 
86 SMOLLA, supra note 9, at 41. 
   
90 
the speech. For physical harms, that task is relatively easy: unprotected speech must 
involve a “confluence of lack of ideational content, [physical] harm to a targeted 
recipient, and likelihood of ensuing physical violence.”87 For reactive harms, the task 
becomes more difficult. Here, Smolla puts forth his “emotion principle,” which claims 
that speech has both emotional and intellectual effects. Under the emotion principle, 
speech cannot be banned due to its emotional component alone; the intellectual 
component must be factored in, and even the slightest intellectual value will tip the scale 
in favor of protecting the speech.88 Thus, banning speech to prevent harm “may not be 
satisfied by the outrage or moral opprobrium that a majority of the populace attaches to 
the activity. Crimes must have victims, … and the victimization must be palpable, 
something beyond generalized disgust or disquiet over another’s conduct.”89 
 At the same time, the question should be asked: how broadly should one define 
the social value of speech? To propose a potential limit to protected speech, Smolla gives 
the example of a racial slur written on a bathroom stall: “It states no fact, offers no 
opinion, proposes no transaction, attempts no persuasion. It contains no humorous punch 
line, no melodic rhythm, no color or shape or texture that might pass as art or 
entertainment. It offers only hate for hate’s sake, with no mental gloss other than the 
feeble minimum intellectual current necessary to power the use of words.”90 However, 
should exceptions be defined so narrowly? Is there any point outside of the well-
                                                
87 Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 
SUP. CT. REV. 197, 205 (2003). 
88 SMOLLA, supra note 9, at 46. 
89 Id. at 10. 
90 Id. at 167-8. 
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established legal tests discussed above at which the cost of the harm outweighs the 
benefit of the speech to an intolerable degree? Or is harm only legally recognized when 
speech has no value? 
 Sunstein concedes that “the line is sometimes thin between restrictions based on 
‘harm’ and restrictions based on viewpoint of content.”91 However, he holds that the 
primary factor that should determine whether speech is protected “is whether the speech 
is a contribution to social deliberation, not whether it has political effects or sources.”92 
Thus, Sunstein distinguishes a misogynist tract from pornographic movies, a racist 
speech to a crowd from face-to-face racial harassment, and a tract in favor of white 
supremacy from a racial epithet.93 However, Sunstein points out that even within each of 
these categories, not all hateful words are equal in their potential to cause reactive harm. 
He writes, “It is obtuseness—a failure of perception or empathetic identification—that 
would enable someone to say that the word ‘fascist’ or ‘pig’ or even ‘honky’ produces 
the same feelings as the word ‘nigger.’”94 A deeper, simpler point can be made from 
Sunstein’s argument: although the many examples of extreme speech listed above receive 
strong legal protection due to their theoretical social value, their harms are no less real to 
the people who suffer them. 
The networked communication environment has mutated the relationship between 
speech and harm. The Internet’s facilitation of anonymous speech has lowered the social 
                                                
91 SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 174. 
92 Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 309 (1992). 
93 Id. 
94 SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 186. 
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cost for speakers of inflicting all sorts of harm through their online words.95 Networked 
communication has seen the generation of new categories of harmful speech, such as 
“revenge porn” (which involves posting nude images online of an ex-romantic partner to 
spite her or him) and “cyber-harassment” (which involves persistently inflicting 
substantial emotional distress against an individual through online communications).96 
The reach, permanence and anonymity of Internet communication have the potential to 
amplify the harms of both traditional hate speech and these new breeds of speech.97 In 
Internet communication, the reactive harms associated with hate speech have the 
potential to morph into physical harms when they take the form of cyber-harassment or 
abuse of an individual. In other words, Smolla’s clean lines distinguishing harms are 
becoming strained. 
It sounds callous to say that any of the harms discussed above—physical, 
relational or reactive—no matter how real and severe the harm may seem to the victim of 
the harm, will most likely not outweigh the nebulous, theory-based social values of that 
speech. It is no less callous to point out that this outcome is the result of the subjectivity 
of the harms felt and the lack of (or difficulty in successfully meeting the requirements 
of) a legal test connecting speech directly with harm. Nevertheless, in this battle between 
the values and harms of speech, deference must always be given to speech. Deference 
does not mean absolute protection, but rather the presumption that extreme speech is 
                                                
95 See Barnett Lidsky, supra note 45; KEATS CITRON, supra note 2; Franks, supra note 2; Danielle Keats 
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 86 BOST. U. L. REV. 61 (2009); Yuval Karniel, Defamation on the Internet—A 
New Approach to Libel in Cyberspace, 2 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENTMT L. 215 (2008). 
96 KEATS CITRON, supra note 2. 
97 Id. See also Franks, supra note 2, at 228. 
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protected until a legal test can show that the speech has caused significant harm. In the 
sections below, three theoretical justifications for this position will be discussed: 
marketplace of ideas theory, individual autonomy theory, and tolerance theory. The 
purpose of doing so is to make the theoretical justifications for not punishing those who 
speak harmfully a little less nebulous. These justifications also will reiterate how 
important it is to give deference to extreme speech when the potential to silence it 
through extra-legal means (such as through content governance) exists. 
Negative Theory 
 
With a general notion of the doctrinal parameters highlighting the limits of 
extreme speech, the analysis now proceeds to a discussion of how negative theories of 
freedom of expression regard these values and limits. This analysis is just the beginning 
of a discussion that must be had over how digital intermediaries can practice content 
governance in a way that protects the values of individuals’ expression of extreme speech 
while mitigating the harms of extreme speech that cross well-established limits. The 
binary nature of negative theories—pitting speakers against state actors—makes them 
useful tools for analyzing the regulation of freedom of expression, even when the 
regulators are not state actors. Obviously, these theories are deeply rooted in the state 
action doctrine,98 and the goal of this analysis is not to brazenly disregard that storied 
doctrine by concluding that First Amendment jurisprudence should be applied to digital 
intermediaries. Rather, the present analysis is based on the following argument: if state 
actors are substituted in these theories for any institution that has the power to regulate 
                                                
98 Supra notes 4-8. 
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speech, the values of extreme speech that the theories purport to be lost from regulation 
do not change.  
Marketplace of Ideas 
 
The first brand of negative First Amendment theory that will be discussed here, 
the marketplace of ideas theory, holds that freedom of speech principally acts as a means 
to attaining truth. The roots of the theory date back to English author John Milton’s 
Areopagitica, in which the English author and philosopher wrote, “And though all the 
winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do 
injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood 
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?”99 Two 
centuries later, English philosopher John Stuart Mill expressed his own take on Milton’s 
philosophy, writing, “if [an opinion] is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it 
will be held as a dead dogma, not living truth.”100 The Millian conception of free speech 
is preoccupied with the notion that truth always requires falsity.101 According to Mill, 
“[a]ll silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility.”102 Truth without 
competing falsity “is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words 
which enunciate a truth.”103 
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Thus, the general conclusion from Mill is that the strength of accepted truth 
comes from two distinct yet related sources: the truth’s ability to withstand challenges 
from alternative ideas, and the truth’s steadfastness in not assuming its infallibility. The 
value of extreme speech is found in the latter half of the model. Extreme ideas may not be 
the best alternatives to displace an accepted truth; rather, they are a test of the accepted 
truth’s denial of infallibility. In other words, Mill contends that there is a social value in 
acknowledging the potential of “heretical” opinions to become truth, and a concomitant 
detriment in denying that potential.104 However, Mill is not a triumphalist. He writes that 
“the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution is one of those pleasant 
falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but 
which all experience refutes. History teems with instances of truth put down by 
persecution.”105 
Under Mill’s perspective, extreme speech can be conceived as a necessary foil for 
society to accept a certain truth. However, it is important that the kind of “extreme” 
speech Mill was referring to be put into context. Mill’s focus is on challenges to political 
and religious truths: Catholicism versus Protestantism, good taxes versus bad taxes, just 
wars versus unjust.106 Former law professor Jeremy Ofseyer argues that scholars today 
anachronistically and irresponsibly use Mill’s conception of heretical speech to justify 
categorical protection for all speech, including harmful speech such as incitement to 
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riot.107 Part of the problem, Ofseyer argues, is that scholars have misinterpreted Mill’s 
famous “harm principle.”108 Mill does propose that “[t]he only freedom which deserves 
the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt 
to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.”109 Consequently, “the only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”110 However, although Ofseyer 
concedes that Mill “does not discuss in detail the proper limits on harmful speech,”111 he 
interprets the harms that the harm principles seeks to avoid as harms to other rights that 
individuals possess.112 For example, he interprets Mill to argue that speech used to 
commit fraud or conspiracy—and even, in certain circumstances, sedition—should be 
banned in the name of protecting individuals’ autonomous rights.113 Although this 
interpretation may seem no less confusing than any other, Ofseyer argues that it fits with 
Mill’s view that individual autonomy is the greatest source of individual rights.114 
 Part of the problem in understanding the harm principle comes from the tricky 
question of whether freedom of speech is an outward right or an inward right. Mill 
concludes it is the latter: “The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to 
… belong[] to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, 
being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great 
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110 Id. at 13. 
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part of the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it.”115 Thus, Mill conceives of 
speech as being more strongly connected to the thoughts from which the speech was 
formed than to the public to which the speech will be addressed. This conception is 
important because it connects speech closely (though not absolutely) with the autonomy 
of the speaker. Therefore, any “harm principle” argument that would prohibit speech that 
causes harm to another must be framed in terms of autonomy. Not only must the harm be 
to the autonomy of another, but it must be greater than the harm caused to the autonomy 
of the speaker by being prohibited from speaking. 
 The marketplace of ideas metaphor has become a powerful theory that fits well 
with the general laissez-faire philosophy of the U.S. political, legal and economic 
system.116 However, scholars continue to criticize several of the theory’s most central 
tenets. Particularly criticized is the lack of a causal link connecting free speech to both 
greater knowledge among individuals and the ultimate outcome of the realization of 
truth.117 Schauer points out that a justification for why truth will always win out over 
falsity “is noticeably absent from all versions of the argument from truth.”118 He blames 
this flaw on the naïveté of the Enlightenment philosophy of continuous social 
progression.119 Although Schauer does concede that the marketplace model may be more 
valid in the long run, he posits that the predominant risk of the model is that in the short 
run “false views may, despite their falsity, be accepted by the public, who will then act in 
                                                
115 MILL, supra note 13, at 15-16. But cf MILL, supra note 13, at 17: “it is impossible to separate the 
cognate liberty of speaking and of writing.” 
116 See Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
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accordance with those false views.”120 Ultimately, Schauer considers “the tired metaphors 
of the marketplace of ideas and the search for truth … as stage props” for a broader and 
more difficult issue: the “debate over how much the values of free speech would have to 
yield in the face of exigent public concerns.”121  
Meanwhile, the late law professor C. Edwin Baker takes issue with the idea that 
Mill’s conception of truth is a subjective one (i.e. one that society accepts); he argues that 
the marketplace theory only works if truth is conceived of in a Miltonian sense: as 
objective.122 In finding problems with each conception of truth, Baker attacks the whole 
of marketplace theory. Subjective truth, Baker argues, requires justification as to why it is 
the “best” possible truth.123 Since all of the criteria required to assess which truth is the 
best would be relative to one another, it would be impossible to know which truth to 
accept as the best. But objective truth has its own problems. It assumes that all people 
value the same thing, which is erroneous according to the argument from social 
constructivism that all human beings are products of their perceptions of their social 
surroundings.124 This conclusion leads back to truth being subjective, at which point 
Baker closes the circle of his argument. Even if one were to accept that the model works 
with a relative conception of truth, Baker argues that the marketplace theory fails because 
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it assumes that members of society actually want the truth.125 Individuals may value 
entertainment or expedience, if not outright falsity, rather than the truth.  
Finally, the marketplace model is criticized for the means by which society would 
attain truth: the assumption that all people are rational and have perfect knowledge of 
every possible idea to choose from.126 Baker argues that there are simply too many 
choices of ideas to choose from, let alone to digest with the proper rational faculties to 
determine whether it is worthy of being considered true.127 On a related note, as discussed 
above, many affirmative First Amendment theorists and critical legal theorists argue that 
social cleavages along the lines of race,128 gender129 and access to means of 
communication130 preclude the marketplace of ideas from ever being a place where all 
ideas can be accessed, processed and judged equally, no matter how rational human 
beings may be. Despite these serious criticisms, marketplace of ideas theory retains great 
purchase and utility among U.S. jurists131 and legal scholars.132 One reason may be the 
fact that the theory gives individuals pride of place, thereby connecting it with another 
theory that complements it: individual autonomy theory. 
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 One alternative to the marketplace of ideas model is to abandon its essential 
consequentialist perspective. Individual autonomy theory—also referred to as the “liberty 
model” by Baker133—does exactly that. Like the marketplace of ideas model, individual 
autonomy theory has its roots in the Enlightenment ideal of entrusting good governance 
to individuals and their ability to think, act and make important decisions as autonomous, 
rational beings.134 Law professor Martin Redish contends that the purpose of government 
is to facilitate self-fulfillment among individuals.135 Similarly, Baker argues that the 
“fundamental purpose” of the First Amendment is to facilitate individual self-fulfillment, 
thereby allowing individuals to participate in social and political change.136 Individual 
autonomy theory is not completely free from of consequentialism, but its consequentialist 
bent is located at the micro level (changes in the individual) rather than the macro level 
(societal changes). Unlike the truth-centric perspective of the marketplace of ideas, 
Baker’s liberty model does not focus on the ideal outcomes of freedom of expression. He 
argues that his liberty model “manifests a deep, democratic faith in people by providing 
for a more realistic method of [social and political] change from ‘the bottom up.’”137 
Similarly, Redish holds that freedom of expression has both an intrinsic value in its 
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allowing individuals to be in control of their own destinies, and it has an instrumental 
value in facilitating the development of individuals’ human faculties.138 
 For Baker, the liberty model is so fundamentally focused on the individual that he 
contends that “freedom of speech is a right of individuals, not market-oriented 
institutions or corporations.”139 To a certain extent, this perspective allies Baker with 
some of the affirmative theorists discussed in Chapter Two. Baker goes so far as to argue 
that “the government can engage in structural regulation to reduce … private censorship,” 
so long as the “response to the private threat must not abridge individuals’ freedom of 
speech.”140 Baker maintains that this fundamental distinction between individual and 
institutional speakers extends to his conception of the press as being a means to serve 
individuals. “The individual’s constitutionally protected speech interest is not in the press 
as a profit-making unit, as a means of production,” Baker writes, “but as a consumption 
good, that is, as a means to communicate what the individual chooses.”141 Although this 
interpretation may not be doctrinally sound according to the jurisprudence of today’s 
Supreme Court,142 Baker’s interpretation of media as a means to serving individual self-
fulfillment could be extended to the function of digital intermediaries as facilitators of 
mass participation in public discourse. In other words, in certain circumstances content 
governance could be conceived (under Baker’s interpretation) as an affront to individual 
self-fulfillment, to the extent that such disregard for individual autonomy could 
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necessitate, at most, state action preventing intermediaries from such action, or, at least, 
an ethical duty on the part of intermediaries to uphold the value of individual autonomy. 
(The construction of this ethical duty will be the subject of chapter 5.) 
Baker’s liberty model is skeptical of the use of state action in the name of 
mitigating harm. For him, the “key aspect distinguishing harms caused by protected 
speech acts from most other methods of causing harms is that speech harms occur only to 
the extent people ‘mentally’ adopt perceptions or attitudes.”143 This conception follows 
Smolla’s hierarchy of harms, with reactive (or mental) harms being considered the least 
problematic compared to physical or relational harms.144 This fact does not necessarily 
mean the reactive harms are less important or do less damage than a physical harm, but 
rather that it is impossible for anyone—let alone a lawmaker—to know the extent of the 
harm taking place within an individual’s mind.  
For Baker, speech is most harmful when it causes harm to the very thing that his 
theory seeks to honor: autonomy. However, he distinguishes between formal autonomy 
and substantive autonomy: formal autonomy refers to an individual’s sheer ability to 
make choices for him or herself;145 substantive autonomy refers to an individual’s “actual 
capacity and opportunities to lead the best, most meaningful, self-directed life 
possible.”146 For example, he writes, “hate speech does not interfere with or contradict 
anyone else’s formal autonomy even if [it] does cause injuries that sometimes include 
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undermining others’ substantive autonomy.”147 In fact, Baker transfers that notion of 
formal autonomy to the listener in an attempt to argue that policing harmful speech does 
greater harm to individual autonomy than the speech ever could. He argues that 
“outlawing acts of the speaker in order to protect people from harms that result because 
the listener adopts certain preconceptions or attitudes disrespects the responsibility and 
freedom of the listener.”148 Echoing Baker, law professor John Garvey argues that such 
“[p]aternalistic restrictions [on speech] can be justified only on the assumption that the 
state is best able to choose on the individual’s behalf, that is to say, only on the 
assumption that the individual’s choice in the matter in question is not entitled to the 
same respect, and to the same constitutional protection, as the preference that the 
majority establishes for him.”149 
 The main criticism against individual autonomy theory is its propensity to border 
on hedonism.150 As stated above,151 Baker’s assumption is that any social benefits that 
come from speech will come as externalities to a system of freedom of expression that 
focuses solely on the role of and benefits for individual speakers. This assumption suffers 
from the same flaw as the assumption from marketplace of ideas theory that a regime of 
free speech will lead society to truth: its incompleteness belies its fundamental 
conclusion. Individual autonomy theory will play a key role in developing a theory of 
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freedom of expression in an era of networked communication, but it must be 
supplemented. Tolerance theory is that supplement. 
Tolerance Theory 
 
Unlike the marketplace of ideas and individual autonomy theories analyzed 
above, tolerance theory, proposed by Bollinger,152 does not focus directly on an ideal 
outcome of speech nor on the nature of the speakers and their relation to government 
actors. Rather, Bollinger’s focus is on the speech itself, and namely its potentially 
extreme manifestations. The purpose of his theory, Bollinger argues, is to show that 
“defining what appears, at least, to be the periphery is to gravitate toward considering the 
most fundamental issues about the principle [of freedom of expression] itself.”153 He 
contends that it is partly due to the fact that extreme speech is protected “that the free 
speech idea holds such a peculiar and powerful fascination for us.”154 Bollinger’s central 
argument is that “society adds something important to its identity, [and] is significantly 
strengthened, by … acts of extraordinary tolerance.”155 Law professor Steven Smith 
holds that this “something important” can be found in both the prudential and intrinsic 
values of tolerance.156 The prudential value of tolerance can be found in the (admittedly 
somewhat naïve) notion that as networked and mass communication shrink our world, the 
ability to tolerate the most extreme types of speech will allow human beings to tolerate 
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virtually everyone else on the planet.157 The intrinsic value of tolerance (and this is the 
value on which Bollinger focuses most heavily) amounts to a quasi-religious experience, 
an ascetic quality of denying an impulse to be intolerant toward an extreme viewpoint.158 
Bollinger, himself, does not give an explicit definition for extreme (or, as he calls 
it, “extremist”) speech, but he does leave clues on how a definition can be formed. 
Extreme speech, Bollinger says, is what “nearly all of us believe immoral and vicious.”159 
It “tend[s] to attract attention,”160 and “is very often the product or the reflection of the 
intolerant mind at its worst and, as such, an illustration to us of what lies within 
ourselves.”161 Bollinger wrestles with escaping a tautological cycle of defining extreme 
speech: that it is extreme because it falls outside the general values of society, and it falls 
outside those values because it is extreme. This tautology can be broken if extreme 
speech is defined in terms of its harmfulness, or at the very least the reasonable 
perception of its being harmful. Bollinger is not naïve when it comes to acknowledging 
the real harms that speech can cause, as he argues that legal scholars have a tendency to 
“understate the risks and harms of speech and … overstate its benefits.”162 Yet he urges 
caution in taking this acknowledgement too far, writing: 
Whatever verbal formulation is ultimately used as a starting point for free 
speech analysis, it must be flexible enough to permit, and perhaps even 
invite, consideration of the wide variety of social harm speech can cause, 
while also strong enough to reflect the important institutional role of free 
speech, that the central purpose of the enterprise is to push the boundary of 
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toleration beyond what would be considered normal by the usual standards 
of the society.163  
 
Thus, although he does not give a specific standard to measure when speech 
becomes too harmful to be tolerated, he seems to imply that the harms must do real 
physical damage to an individual, rather than merely upset society’s standard of decency. 
Indeed, it is society’s intolerant nature underlying that very standard of decency that 
Bollinger seeks to soften through his theory. This theory of harm puts Bollinger in the 
same camp as both Smolla and Baker, giving credence to the notion that only speech with 
a propensity to cause physical harm should be considered worthy of proscription.  
 In expounding tolerance theory, Bollinger attempts to answer Schauer’s call for 
more rigorous analysis on why speech is given such a revered place in society that its 
extreme and often socially harmful nature is given a high level of protection.164 “Why is 
it,” Bollinger asks, “that one form of coercion or punishment—legal restraints—has 
essentially been removed from our general armory of possible responses to speech we 
hate and fear and believe dangerous to the values we cherish?”165 The “threat of 
government abuse” of power to restrain speech “is an argument that is seriously 
overplayed in twentieth century life,” he argues.166 Instead, the “real threat to liberty of 
speech … rests within the general population of citizens instead of officialdom alone.”167 
Government is but one “means by which this impulse [to censor] is executed, but the 
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impulse rests elsewhere in the recesses of human nature.”168 Human beings, Bollinger 
contends, have a “deep and profound difficulty in controlling a desire to censor or 
suppress any difference of belief, opinion, or way of thinking.”169 Bollinger is not the 
first legal theorist to put forward this argument. Law professor Thomas Emerson writes, 
“Any society, and any institution in society, naturally tends toward rigidity.”170 Smolla 
has called censorship “a social instinct.”171 Affirmative First Amendment theorists such 
as Sunstein decry an “artificial distinction” between intrusion on a speaker by 
government and by private actors.172 The roots of this philosophy lie in Mill, who calls 
for precautions being needed as much against the tyranny of the majority in society as 
against any abuse of government power.173 “[S]o natural to mankind is intolerance in 
whatever they really care about,” Mill writes.174 
 For Bollinger, government is not necessarily a threat to free speech. Quite the 
opposite, in fact: by following an ethic of tolerance, government can act as a guide for its 
citizens on how to uphold and protect the values of extreme speech. Because “the power 
of social intolerance exceeds that of legal intolerance,”175 the law must set an example for 
society by tolerating extreme speech to an extreme degree. Bollinger writes, “If it is a 
tendency of human nature to overreact in the use of legal restraints against speech 
activity, we must expect that tendency to manifest itself in the form of nonlegal coercion 
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as well.”176 He then argues that the converse to this statement is true: if the law reduces 
the tendency to restrain extreme speech, society will follow suit.177 
 Tolerance theory suffers from two major criticisms. The first is its proposed 
causal relationship between tolerating speech and tolerating other activity. Law professor 
David Strauss writes, “It is not at all clear that people who are forced to tolerate speech 
they abhor will become more tolerant in other contexts; they might easily become less 
tolerant. … Indeed [Bollinger’s theory] would become an argument for suppression.”178 
In other words, like marketplace of ideas theory and individual autonomy theory, 
tolerance theory is criticized for lacking the ability to empirically prove that the ultimate 
goal that the theory propounds will actually happen. The second criticism attacks the 
elitist nature of tolerance theory. Strauss calls the theory an “imposition of a regime … on 
the ignorant, intolerant masses by an elite that alone understands both the virtues of 
tolerance and the way to manipulate institutions in order to achieve it.”179  
Despite these knocks against it, tolerance theory remains appealing due to its 
simplicity, and due to its addressing of the relationship between social and legal 
constraints upon speech. Figure 3-1 models this relationship. The first set of concentric 
circles represents a state of low legal tolerance for extreme speech relative to social 
tolerance. In the second set of circles, legal tolerance for extreme speech increases (for 
example, to a level consistent with First Amendment jurisprudence). This increase leads 
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to the outcome postulated by tolerance theory: social tolerance for extreme speech will 
concomitantly increase with legal tolerance. The catalyzing agent that makes this process 
work is knowledge, spread among society, of the benefits of extreme speech. As society 
understands more and more why legal tolerance exists to such a great extent, social 
tolerance will expand to achieve the same goals as legal tolerance. Social tolerance is 
fluid, and it has the potential to attain the same level as legal tolerance. However, given 
the many types of speech that many diverse sectors of society will find harmful or 
offensive, it is unlikely that social tolerance will ever quite match the expansive nature of 
legal tolerance under a regime of First Amendment jurisprudence. 
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Synthesis: A Theory of Free Speech for Networked Communication 
 
Schauer is correct: no one theory can explain or justify the exceptional protection 
of free speech under the First Amendment.180 This position is especially true in a system 
of networked communication, where digital technologies facilitate the potential for 
speech of all sorts from individuals and institutions, including the uplifting, the 
entertaining, the revolutionary, the offensive, and the harmful. This section will 
synthesize the theories analyzed and discussed to this point to arrive at a theory of 
freedom of expression for an era of networked communication.  
Foundation in Tolerance 
 
For several reasons, Bollinger’s tolerance theory offers the ideal foundation for a 
networked-communication theory of free speech. First, the Internet has the potential to 
bring people closer to all types of speech, including speech that they may disagree with or 
find offensive. Although some may choose to ignore such speech, others have the ability 
to utilize tools that platforms make available to them to try to remove the speech from the 
platforms. Of particular concern and relevance is the ability of individuals to flag speech 
as inappropriate according to the community guidelines of the platforms181 (see Figure 
2-2 from chapter 1). Second, digital intermediaries have the legal authority to govern 
speech on their platforms. As discussed in the previous chapter, these intermediaries have 
an incentive in the networked economy to remove speech that would offend users so 
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much that the users would leave the platforms.182 These two elements combined—
intermediaries’ incentive to remove extreme speech and individuals’ ability to activate 
this incentive—pose a threat to speech in an online public discourse controlled by 
intermediaries. The third reason tolerance theory should form the foundation for a theory 
of freedom of expression in an era of networked communication is that it focuses on this 
very threat: individuals’ ability to force extreme or unpopular speech out of public 
discourse.183 The fact that digital intermediaries can be willing accomplices for intolerant 
individuals makes tolerance theory all the more important in an era of networked 
communication.  
The goal of tolerance theory is not for extreme viewpoints to be accepted as truth 
in society, but simply that society allows them into the public discourse. What happens 
next is up to other theories to sort out. A revised version of the marketplace of ideas 
theory is the next best step in the blend of First Amendment theories proposed for 
networked communication: a marketplace of ideas model that is not concerned with an 
ultimate goal of truth, but rather with pure competition among all types of speech. 
Tolerance would make individuals more likely to engage in such a model, encouraging 
them to counter extreme speech with more speech rather than flagging it or pressuring 
intermediaries to remove it. Indeed, a fine line separates outcompeting extreme speech 
with more speech and using means made available by private institutions (essentially, a 
form of speech) to eradicate the speech from public discourse. For example, Mill writes, 
“There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual 
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independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as 
indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political 
despotism.”184 This passage highlights one of the key principles of Mill’s essay: to 
understand the “dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and 
control,” one must recognize the equal power of “physical force in the form of legal 
penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion” to limit individual liberty.185 
The difference between the marketplace of ideas model and Mill’s fear of a 
“moral coercion of public opinion” is, simply put, more speech. More speech can lead to 
a greater diversity of voices in the public discourse. More speech can breed greater 
awareness among individuals of what ideas will be accepted in society and what will not. 
More speech can create a system in which extreme speech seems less scary and 
threatening to society. For example, despite its gross offensiveness and potential to cause 
serious reactive harm, a hypothetical video posted to Facebook of someone shouting 
racist epithets should stay on Facebook to allow society the opportunity to observe and 
identify the racist vitriol that still exists within our midst. It should be a phenomenon 
around which people rally with more speech denouncing racism.186 It should not be 
something to fear and sweep under the rug by having Facebook remove it. Thus, if 
                                                
184 MILL, supra note 13, at 9. 
185 Id. at 13. 
186 In March 2015, the Oklahoma University chapter of the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity was closed 
down after a video appeared online depicting several of its members using racial slurs to express their 
desire that an African American would never become a member of their fraternity. See Two Oklahoma 
Students Expelled Over Racist Chant Video, BBC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2015), available at 
http://m.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-31821397. The video sparked further debate about the issues of 
race and white privilege at U.S. colleges and universities. A witness to the event filmed the video, not the 
members of the fraternity. However, had the members of the fraternity been the ones to publish the video, 
the resulting public outcry certainly would have been no different. Thus, such a video would of necessity 
need to be publicly aired, not removed from view. 
   
113 
tolerance theory works—and, admittedly, that is no small if—then greater tolerance of 
speech will lead to a more robust online public discourse because it will break the chain 
of private governance of extreme speech on digital platforms.  
What About Harm? 
 
Digital intermediaries have several goals in their operations, but two stick out: 
promoting speech and minimizing harm.187 Indeed, as pointed out in chapter 2, 
intermediaries have an incentive to do both in the context of the networked economy. 
Because speech on platforms can be commoditized through the tracking of the personal 
data of both individual speakers and audience members, more speech is better 
economically speaking.188 However, extreme and potentially harmful speech can lead 
individual users to stop using the platforms, which in turn can lead intermediaries to lose 
revenue.189 Therefore, it makes no sense from an economic perspective for intermediaries 
to be tolerant, because they appear to have a greater incentive to police harmful speech 
than to tolerate all speech, including the harmful.  
However, tolerance can be a prudent policy for digital intermediaries. Digital 
intermediaries have not been successful in creating an environment in which speech is 
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overly restricted in the name of preventing harm. Rather, online public discourse is an 
environment in which intermediaries remove some speech for being extreme or 
harmful,190 while failing to act on reported instances of personal abuse.191 In other words, 
the objectives of protecting extreme political or social speech and preventing harm are 
moving in the opposite direction from their ideal outcomes. Following a policy of 
tolerating extreme speech while policing abuse can help to reverse this trend. 
Intermediaries would show the world a clear distinction between these types of speech, 
highlighting how the former is often very valuable for public discourse, while the latter 
harms its specific targets as well as the general health of the public discourse.192 
Conclusion 
 
All of the First Amendment theories discussed above envision a link between 
speech and utopia. Marketplace of ideas theory sees speech as leading society to truth. 
Individual autonomy theory sees speech as the means by which all individuals can truly 
realize their natural ability to autonomously reason. Tolerance theory argues that 
accepting extreme speech will lead individuals to become more enlightened. For each of 
these theories, greater protection for speech is a step closer to utopia, and more restriction 
is a step away from it.  
Utopia is impossible. But that not mean these theories are invalid. At best, they 
are imperfect. At worst, misguided. Instead of thinking of these theories in terms of 
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impossible utopian outcomes, one should view them in the simplest of terms: as reasons 
for why more speech is better than less. They are reasons why more control over speech 
(whether by state or private actors) is worse than less control. They are reasons why 
encouraging mass participation of individuals in public discourse is the most desirable 
outcome, and banishing individuals and their ideas from that discourse should be 
avoided. As digital intermediaries provide individuals with greater tools than ever before 
with which to participate in public discourse, while simultaneously presenting more 
opportunities to control individuals’ speech, these theories have become more important 
than ever. 
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The purpose of this study is to explicate the concept of content governance: the 
control that digital communication intermediaries exercise over user-generated content 
(UGC). The particular focus of this explication is the governance of extreme UGC. Two 
key questions guide this explication: How and why do digital communication 
intermediaries respond to extreme UGC? What are the potential implications of their 
responses for public discourse in a system of networked communication? 
Chapter 4 now focuses on the conflicting concepts of speakers’ rights and 
audiences’ rights in First Amendment theory and jurisprudence. The extent to which 
audiences have a right to hear or avoid certain speech depends greatly on context, as this 
chapter will show. Arguably, the conflict between speaker rights and audience rights is 
best conceptualized within the context of so-called “hostile audience cases,”1 in which 
the threat of a “heckler’s veto” by a hostile audience against a speaker is present. A 
heckler’s veto is “the suppression of speech by the government[] because of the 
possibility of a violent reaction by hecklers.”2 A heckler’s veto occurs when “the state 
[hides] behind the unpleasant reaction of some portions of the public in order to silence a 
speaker” through the use of an instrument of law, such as a disorderly conduct statute.3 
                                                
1 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L. J. 978, 1011 (2011).  
2 Ronald B. Standler, HECKLER’S VETO (Dec. 4, 1999), available at http://www.rbs2.com/heckler.htm. See 
also Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1001 (4th Cir. 1985) (defining the heckler’s veto as “the successful 
importuning of government to curtail ‘offensive’ speech at peril of suffering disruptions of public order.” 
3 Cheryl A. Leanza, Heckler’s Veto Case Law as a Resource for Democratic Discourse, 35 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1305, 1306 (2007).  
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This chapter argues that understanding the conflict between speakers and audiences at a 
broad level—and especially understanding the doctrine of the heckler’s veto—is crucial 
to understanding how crowds can suppress unpopular speech in networked 
communications.  
The central argument of this chapter is that the legal principle of the heckler’s 
veto is an essential analogy for understanding the dynamics of content governance—
particularly the decisions of digital intermediaries to remove extreme or allegedly 
harmful content from their platforms due to popular pressure. This chapter will follow the 
same “comparative” argumentative structure as chapter 3: legal theory and doctrine will 
be discussed within its original context (vis-à-vis state actors), with key concepts then 
being transposed onto a system in which digital intermediaries play a powerful role in 
governing individual expression. Like in chapter 3, the purpose of this argumentative 
structure is not to argue that a functional equivalence between digital intermediaries and 
state actors should be established with regard to control over speech.4 Rather, the purpose 
is to identify the principal values that shape the doctrine in its original context and apply 
those values to a discussion of content governance. The ultimate question that gets asked 
is thus: what mechanisms and inherent values are missing in a system of communication 
governance where the heckler’s veto is likely (and perhaps incentivized) to take place?  
                                                
4 Such a line of analysis is interesting, but ultimately fruitless for the purpose of establishing any kind of 
legal force prohibiting digital intermediaries from discriminating against content as if it were the publicly 
appointed manager of a public forum. See, e.g., Cyber Promotions v. AOL, 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 
1996) (holding that AOL’s email service did not provide the “functional equivalent” to a public forum, nor 
did it amount to a “critical pathway” of communication, and thus the government could not regulate it). 
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The central argument in this chapter is based on the premise that the heckler’s 
veto is a crucial concept within tolerance theory.5 Hostile audience cases are the supreme 
test of tolerance by state actors toward extreme speech. Faced with the potential for 
popular disapproval of a message to turn violent, state actors must refrain from 
acquiescing to the popular will and protect the rights of speakers to share their unpopular 
message rather than punish them for angering the audience. This doctrine reflects a deep 
respect for the value of unpopular messages within American democracy. It removes the 
ability of audiences to take matters into their own hands and, through violent reaction, 
compel state action to silence speech with which they disagree or find offensive. 
However, audiences can and do take their disdain for offensive or harmful 
messages into their own hands within networked communication. In a system of content 
governance, individuals can activate intermediary controls to remove extreme speech 
from mainstream platforms through several means. First, individuals can “flag” content 
published on platforms for allegedly violating one or more of the community guidelines 
of the platform.6 Second, individuals can mobilize mass online protests against the 
intermediaries for allowing such extreme speech on their platforms, often in a way that 
                                                
5 LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN 
AMERICA (1986). 
6 See, e.g., Kate Crawford and Tarleton Gillespie, What is a flag for? Social media reporting tools and the 
vocabulary of complaint, NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1 (2014). This method is the exclusive means by which 
YouTube and Twitter manage extreme content on their respective platforms. Facebook relies on flagging 
by users to alert it to extreme content, yet it also proactively monitors pages for extreme content that may 
violate its community standards. Crawford and Gillespie argue that Facebook’s more “conservative” 
approach (as they refer to it) to governing content is due to its hosting a variety of types of content, 
including photo, video and text, at 7. 
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financially affects the intermediaries.7 Third, individuals can manifest their discontent 
toward the extreme speech in the physical world by protesting (sometimes violently) 
against the speech, potentially forcing intermediaries to remove the controversial UGC to 
prevent further harm.8 Each of these scenarios presents digital intermediaries with a set of 
conflicting interests not unlike those facing police in heckler’s veto situations. Again, the 
comparison is not perfectly symmetric—no one has a right to prevent a digital 
intermediary from removing his or her message (unpopular, offensive, harmful or 
otherwise) from the intermediary’s platform. The comparison being made here is not one 
of strict functional equivalence, whereby intermediaries are acting under color of law.9 
Rather, two different systems of governance over speech are being compared as if they 
were systems from two countries. Under such an analytical framework, “functional 
equivalence” refers to the similar challenges that each system of governance faces.10 
Understanding these challenges and how each system responds to them can reveal how 
each system values offensive, harmful or unpopular speech. 
This chapter begins by broadly discussing the concept of the competition between 
audience rights and freedom of expression. This section builds on the analysis in chapter 
                                                
7 An example of this scenario is the pressure put on Facebook by activists to remove sexist and misogynist 
pages from the social networking site. See Open Letter to Facebook, WOMEN, ACTION, & THE MEDIA 
(May 21, 2013), available at http://www.womenactionmedia.org/facebookaction/open-letter-to-facebook/. 
See infra notes 241-242. 
8 The worldwide violence surrounding the “Innocence of Muslims” video on YouTube is an example 
of such a scenario. See Eva Galperin, YouTube Blocks Access to Controversial Video in Egypt and 
Libya, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Sept. 12, 2013), available at 
 https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/09/youtube-blocks-access-controversial-video-egypt-and-libya.  
9 Supra note 4. 
10 See, e.g., John C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617 (1998); Ralf Michaels, 
The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias 
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). 
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3, focusing on the issue of harm and offensiveness of speech, but from the perspective of 
the audience. The section contains an analysis of the various ways in which issues of 
audience rights can be conceived within First Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on 
case law that deals with speech that deeply offends audiences, and protection of minors 
from sexual or indecent speech within certain contexts. It will then look at Joel 
Feinberg’s theory of “profound offense” and how it squares with jurisprudence regarding 
offensive speech. This section has two goals: 1) identifying the benefits of freedom of 
expression from an audience’s perspective; and 2) understanding the theory and 
jurisprudence of offensive speech from an audience’s perspective. Both will aid in 
understanding the development of heckler’s veto case law. 
The chapter turns next to an analysis of the jurisprudence of the heckler’s veto. 
This section begins with an analysis of the foundational U.S. Supreme Court decisions in 
which the heckler’s veto principle took shape. These cases span from 1940 to 1969, a 
period of political and social foment that was the crucible for the Civil Rights Movement 
and for an expansion in free speech rights.11 The purpose of this analysis is to show how 
the Court dealt with the competing issues of protecting unpopular speech, preventing 
incitement to riot, and expounding upon police the duty to uphold the former while 
ensuring the latter. Next, the section will analyze federal cases involving hostile 
audiences from the last decade to highlight some of the major challenges facing heckler’s 
veto jurisprudence, particularly challenges relating to the application of content-neutral 
laws to quell speech in hostile-audience situations. The section then looks at examples of 
                                                
11 See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965); GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2008). 
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state disorderly conduct and breach of the peace statutes. The purpose of this analysis is 
to highlight that neither the case law nor the statutory law that set the parameters of the 
heckler’s veto doctrine are crystal clear. Such lack of clarity is an important challenge 
found in heckler’s veto scenarios both on street corners and in online content governance. 
Section four will briefly review several First Amendment theories discussed in 
chapter 3, focusing on how they can be applied to understanding the concept of the 
heckler’s veto. The goal of this section is to highlight a unique tension within the 
heckler’s veto principle between negative and affirmative theories of the First 
Amendment. Section five will apply the values that shape the heckler’s veto principle to 
the concept of content governance, focusing on scholarship analyzed in chapter 2. The 
goal of this section is to use the heckler’s veto principle to illustrate how digital 
intermediaries respond to pressure from individuals to remove certain types of offensive 
or unpopular speech that enters the public discourse that they facilitate. As with the rest 
of this study, the goal of this analysis is to understand the values that the system of online 
content governance places on speech. In this particular analysis, the focus is on the 
competing values of speakers’ ability to express unpopular and offensive speech and 
audiences’ ability to utilize their own agentive powers to restrict such speech. 
Audience Rights: Broadly Conceived 
 
The concept of audience rights generally deals with the issue of which types of 
speech should or should not be allowed, within specific contexts, from an audience-
centric rather than speaker-centric perspective. The principal criterion for settling these 
issues is the effect the speech will have on a particular audience, positive or negative 
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though primarily the latter. Using such a criterion places the discussion of audience rights 
within the context of issues of harmful speech. However, within First Amendment 
jurisprudence on issues related to harmful speech,12 such an audience-centric perspective 
takes a back seat to traditional speaker-centric jurisprudence in all but a few contexts. 
Therefore, literature that advocates placing primacy on audience rights when it comes to 
adjudicating harmful speech tends to fall outside the mainstream of First Amendment 
theory, and doctrine only recognizes audiences’ rights against harmful speech in a narrow 
set of circumstances (discussed below). This section reviews common themes in issues of 
audience rights theory and doctrine. 
Issues of audience rights can be conceived in three ways. First, audience rights 
include the extent to which individuals have the right to receive certain information from 
government. Second, audience rights include the extent to which individuals have the 
right to hear the speech of other individuals or private entities. Third, audience rights 
involve the extent to which individuals have the right to avoid the speech of other 
individuals or private entities, and enforce that right either through prior restraints or 
after-the-fact punishment. These three conceptions of audience rights are connected in 
two ways. First, they all involve the receipt of information, the ability of audiences to use 
that information to function as engaged citizens within democratic society, and the 
determination of what types of information are integral to this function. Second (and 
related to the first point), they all involve the audience’s own speech as much as an 
audience’s receipt of speech. The receipt of information from government or private 
                                                
12 See generally Chapter 3. 
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sources is a crucial step for audiences to develop messages of their own to speak.13 Also, 
when an audience is able to restrict the speech of others due to its right not to hear that 
speech, exercising that right is, at its core, a message spoken by the audience.14 
The focus of this section—and certainly this entire chapter—is the third 
conception of audience rights: the extent to which audiences have (or at least perceive to 
have15) a right to have restrictions placed on speech so that they may not have to 
encounter it. This conception often conflicts with the rights of individuals to hear speech, 
the rights of individuals to receive information from government, and the rights of 
speakers to deliver the speech. Because of its focus on the harm or offense caused by 
speech, this third conception of audience rights intersects the discussion of harmful 
speech.16 However, this analysis differs from the analysis in chapter 3 because it is 
looking at two competing rights: a speaker’s right “both to seek out an audience and to be 
annoying, provocative, and offensive in public places”;17 and the extent to which an 
audience has the right to restrict the speaker’s right. 
The Right (Not) to Hear Speech 
 
 Meanwhile, in issues of audiences’ rights to either hear or not hear information 
from individuals or other private entities, the factors that determine the extent of those 
rights are relatively less neatly defined. Firstly, the dominant strands of First Amendment 
theory discussed in chapter 3 give far greater deference to audiences’ rights to hear 
                                                
13 Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 2 (1976). 
14 Id. 
15 Audiences may lack a constitutional right to have speech restricted in most circumstances, but they may 
have many interests in restricting speech. 
16 See generally Chapter 3. 
17 Emerson, supra note 13, at 23. 
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speech rather than avoid it, due to the fact that the former is more compatible with these 
strands’ primary focus on the rights of speakers.18 Another one of the difficulties in 
neatly categorizing this context of audience rights issues is that the central factor (the 
conflict between the benefits and harms of a given message) is not only subjectively 
defined, but it also is coextensive with the definitions of the audiences in question. For 
example, any benefit of a message by the Ku Klux Klan is likely only best appreciated by 
other white supremacists, while the harm of the message is likely only best appreciated 
by non-whites. Other factors that can be difficult to untangle include the medium through 
which the message is delivered, whether the audience includes minors, and whether the 
rights of adult members of the audience to receive speech outweigh the interests of other 
audience members to prevent the purported harm to minors that certain speech may 
cause. 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has held in several major cases that audiences have no 
legal protection against the offensive messages of others in public places. In Cohen v. 
California,19 a divided20 Court held that California could not punish Paul Robert Cohen 
for walking through a Los Angeles courthouse wearing a jacket bearing the words “Fuck 
the Draft.” Justice Harlan wrote that “the mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners 
or viewers does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving 
offense.”21 If such a regime against offensive speech were to exist, Harlan wrote, it 
                                                
18 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989). 
19 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
20 The division in the 5-4 decision was over the issue of whether Cohen’s wearing of the jacket was speech 
or conduct, the latter being punishable under the California statute in question, CAL. PEN. CODE § 415. 
21 Cohen, at 21. 
   
125 
“would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of 
personal predilections.”22 Harlan advised that “[t]hose in the Los Angeles courthouse 
could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their 
eyes.”23 This “avert-your-eyes” line of reasoning reflects the dominant jurisprudence 
toward offensive messages delivered in public places. It acknowledges that the offense it 
may cause is very real to some, but it maintains that the legal response to such speech is 
to respect the social value of its message over any offense it may cause. 
 Similarly, in Texas v. Johnson,24 a divided Court held that a Texas law punishing 
“severe acts of physical abuse” of the American flag in a manner “intentionally designed 
to seriously offend other individuals”25 was inconsistent with the First Amendment.26 
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan posited, “If there is a bedrock principle underlying 
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”27 However, in a 
rather confusing dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued the Texas law did not violate the 
First Amendment because it did not punish Gregory Lee Johnson for his viewpoint 
(disgust with America) but rather the manner in which he expressed it (burning the flag). 
Rehnquist wrote: 
[I]n no way can it be said that Texas is punishing him because his 
hearers—or any other group of people—were profoundly opposed to the 
message that he sought to convey. Such opposition is no proper basis for 
                                                
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
25 Id. at 411. 
26 Id. at 399. 
27 Id. at 414. 
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restricting speech or expression under the First Amendment. It was 
Johnson’s use of this particular symbol, and not the idea that he sought to 
convey by it or by his many other expressions, for which he was 
punished.28 
 
 Rehnquist then ponders the question of why matters of deeply offensive 
expression should be left to courts to rule on, rather than legislatures: “Surely one of the 
high purposes of a democratic society is to legislate against conduct that is regarded as 
evil and profoundly offensive to the majority of people—whether it be murder, 
embezzlement, pollution, or flag burning.”29 Rehnquist’s argument presupposes a second 
argument: that flag burning is conduct, not speech, and is therefore subject to regulation. 
This argument begs the question: at what point does the context of expressing the 
message—which may be the primary harmful factor in the overall expression of the 
message—become unprotected conduct rather than speech? At least with flag burning, 
the majority in Johnson holds that this activity does not cross this line. 
 But what about instances in which speech offends not simply conventional 
decency, but the very identity of minority communities? Legal theorist Joel Feinberg 
argues that the Nazis’ use of the swastika in Skokie would have been “gratuitous,” and 
“in no obvious way necessary to the content of the advocacy” of racial superiority.30 Just 
as Johnson could have expressed his anti-American message by, say, shouting through a 
bullhorn rather than burning the flag, the Nazis could have simply handed out leaflets 
while wearing normal clothing. Only, to Feinberg, the context of the swastika is so 
offensive to Jews whose ancestors were killed under its banner that its use crosses the 
                                                
28 Id. at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
29 Id. at 435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
30 Id. at 88. 
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line from expression to harassment, i.e. regulable conduct.31 However, in striking down a 
city ordinance invoked to prevent the National Socialist Party of America from marching 
in Skokie, Illinois (a town populated with numerous Holocaust survivors) due to its 
overbreadth, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit quoted the following 
passage from the U.S. Supreme Court case Street v. New York:32 
[A]ny shock effect . . . must be attributed to the content of the ideas 
expressed. It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public 
expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are 
themselves offensive to some of their hearers.33 
 
When they are the targets of such hateful speech, audiences are only able to 
invoke clearly established exceptions to First Amendment rights to freedom of expression 
to restrict the speech or punish the speaker. These exceptions, enumerated in chapter 3, 
include: fighting words,34 true threats,35 and incitement to imminent lawless action.36 
Audiences also have the right to invoke tort law to punish speech that is allegedly 
harmful to them, such as defamation or invasion of privacy. Protection from the harms of 
obscenity37 and false advertising38 are also available to audiences. 
Meanwhile, laws that restrict speech prior to its being spoken in the name of 
preventing harm to an audience are very rare, confined almost exclusively to the interest 
in protecting minors. Indecency standards for broadcasting make up one such area of law, 
                                                
31 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985). See infra 
note 63. 
32 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969). 
33 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir. 1978). 
34 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
35 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
36 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
37 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
38 Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 776 (1976) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
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if not the chief area. In the landmark case FCC v. Pacifica,39 a divided Supreme Court 
held that the FCC’s regime for restricting indecent speech40 from broadcast from 6 a.m. 
to 10 p.m. did not violate the First Amendment rights of broadcasters. Distinguishing 
Cohen, Justice Stevens wrote that “broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even 
those too young to read. Although Cohen’s written message might have been 
incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica’s broadcast could have enlarged a child’s 
vocabulary in an instant.”41 Although the general prohibitions of Pacifica remain intact, 
the FCC is presently (as of this writing) revisiting its policy on whether so-called 
“fleeting expletives” should be subject to sanctions following the 2012 FCC v. Fox 
case.42 
Indecency standards are unique in that they make up a relatively well-defined area 
of law that is specific to a particular medium: broadcasting. Government enjoys a 
significant interest in regulating broadcast due to the scarce nature of the electromagnetic 
spectrum (a public good) upon which broadcasting relies.43 Courts have thwarted 
attempts to protect minors from exposure to “indecent” material by legislation that seeks 
to transpose indecency standards to other media (namely the Internet), because they have 
found not found a similar significant government interesting in regulating these media.44 
Minus this interest, courts follow the standard that a law that bans speech for the sake of 
protecting minors from it, yet in doing so prevents adults from accessing such otherwise 
                                                
39 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
40 Defined as “language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community 
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs.” Id. at 772, FN 7. 
41 Id. at 749. 
42 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012). 
43 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969). 
44 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 878 (1997). 
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lawful speech, is unconstitutional.45 As Justice Felix Frankfurter famously put it, such 
laws are akin to “burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.”46 
One final audience-rights issue to consider is whether Frankfurter’s famous line 
applies to multiple adult audiences who are affected in drastically distinct ways by 
offensive speech. In Snyder v. Phelps, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Albert Snyder, 
the father of a Marine killed in Iraq, could not bring an action of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (IIED) against the Topeka, KS-based Westboro Baptist Church for 
picketing near his son’s funeral with signs containing such hateful messages as “Thank 
God for Dead Soldiers” and “You’re Going to Hell.”47 Writing for the 8-1 majority, Chief 
Justice John Roberts held that the Church’s fundamentally social and political message 
was a matter of public concern and therefore entitled to First Amendment protection.48 
Snyder had contended that the context of the Church’s message—using his son’s funeral 
as a platform—should strip the Church of its First Amendment protection because it 
transformed its speech into a matter of private concern rather than public concern.49 
However, Roberts held that “[t]he fact that Westboro spoke in connection with a funeral 
… cannot by itself transform the nature of Westboro’s speech.”50 Not only was the 
Church’s message a matter of public concern, but Roberts also noted that the Church 
                                                
45 Bolger v. Young Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983) (holding that “[t]he level of discourse 
reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox”). But cf. 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (holding that “[t]he well-being of its children is of course 
a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate,” and that a statute requiring stores to restrict 
access of “sex materials” to children—though not adults—comprises such a subject). 
46 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). 
47 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011). 
48 Id. at 1219. 
49 Id. at 1217. 
50 Id. 
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made sure to abide by state and local requirements to picket only on public property more 
than 1,000 feet away from the funeral rather than immediately outside the funeral.51  
The lone dissenter in the case, Justice Samuel Alito, sympathized with Snyder’s 
“context” argument, arguing that Westboro’s speech was “part of a cold and calculated 
strategy to slash a stranger as a means of attracting public attention.”52 Moreover, Alito 
distinguished Snyder from Hustler v. Falwell,53 whose precedent of subjecting IIED 
claims to the New York Times54 actual malice standard formed the jurisprudential 
foundation for the majority’s reasoning. Hustler involved a public figure (the Rev. Jerry 
Falwell), while Alito contended that Snyder was clearly a private individual.55 “[T]he 
caricature [in Huslter] does not have the same potential to wound as a personal verbal 
assault on a vulnerable private figure,” Alito wrote.56 What is interesting about Alito’s 
dissent is his application of Kantian ethics to a legal analysis that favors Snyder and other 
private individuals caught in similar future situations.57 To Alito, the Westboro Baptist 
Church robbed Snyder of his dignity by treating him as a means to an end (the Church’s 
campaign) rather than an end in himself. To Alito, such an affront to individual dignity is 
a graver harm than the harm done to the public by punishing an organization for speaking 
on a matter of public concern, thereby potentially depriving that public of hearing the 
Church’s message due to a chilling effect from the threat of litigation. In other words, 
                                                
51 Id. at 1218. 
52 Id. at 1227 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
53 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
54 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
55 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1228 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
56 Id. 
57 KANT, I. (1785/2005). GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, Trans: J. Barrett (2005), 
available at http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/kant1785.pdf, at 29. 
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when speech has a broad audience and a specific one, and the speakers’ goal is to reach 
the broad audience at the expense of causing harm to the specific one, Alito would have 
no problem with the specific audience taking action against the speakers at the expense of 
the broader audience. To better understand the reasoning behind this argument, one must 
explore the nature of the potential harm that such speech could cause to a private 
individual such as Snyder. 
Feinberg and “Profound Offense” 
 
Issues of audience rights often involve a disconnect between the law’s deference 
to offensive speech and audiences’ willingness to stand idly by and “take it.” Feinberg 
explores this disconnect in his four-volume work The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 
particularly Volume II, titled Offense to Others.58 In this volume, Feinberg delves into the 
question of when certain actions—including both conduct and speech—are deserving of 
criminal punishment. When it comes to speech, Feinberg contends that only speech that 
“personally harasses” an individual can be subject to legal sanction; if not, the person 
should simply “leave the provocation behind,” which “is what the law should require of 
him, if he can do it without loss or hardship.”59 In other words, Feinberg agrees with the 
U.S. Supreme Court that the fighting words doctrine should be the line separating 
protected from unprotected speech.60  
Still, Feinberg wrestles with the conundrum of whether and how the law should 
treat speech that does not personally harass yet still causes a profound offense. An 
                                                
58 FEINBERG, supra note 31. 
59 Id. at 91. 
60 Id. See infra, notes 148-154. 
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offense is profound, according to Feinberg, when the thing that individuals “feel to be 
violated or affronted is something they hold precious (human dignity, solidarity with 
martyred kinsmen).”61 “Profound offense cannot be avoided by averting one’s eyes,” 
Feinberg argues, as the sheer knowledge that the speech is taking place is enough to 
cause profound offense.62 For Feinberg, hateful speech, such as the marching of Nazis in 
Skokie, Illinois, or cross burnings by the Ku Klux Klan, can cause profound offense. 
“The main distinguishing feature[] of the swastika and K.K.K. emblems is their 
deliberate association with actual historic atrocities—lynchings, tortures, mass killings 
committed to vindicate the alleged prerogatives of a master race,” he contends.63 The 
offense felt by Jews at the sight of—or even the imagined presence of—the swastika 
would consist of “a complex mental state, compounded of moral indignation and 
disapproval, resentment …, and perhaps some rage or despair.”64  
Although devising an objective test for determining the level of speech’s 
offensiveness may be impossible, Feinberg argues that there are six factors that 
contribute to offensiveness,65 five of which are germane to the present discussion.66 
These include: 1) the social value of the speech; 2) the extent to which the speech 
                                                
61 FEINBERG, at 60. 
62 Id. at 59. 
63 Id. at 93. 
64 Id. at 87. 
65 Id. at 44. Feinberg’s focus is on “conduct,” which, in his conception of the term, includes speech. To 
avoid the confusion of jurisprudential differences between conduct and speech, the discussion in this 
paragraph will focus only on Feinberg’s factors as they relate to speech. 
66 Feinberg’s first of the six factors, which he calls the “personal importance” of the offending action, is 
based on the tenuous logic that the more personally important the action is to the actor, the more 
objectively reasonable the action is. 
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expresses an opinion on social or political matters;67 3) whether individuals have 
alternative opportunities to express their message in a less offensive place or manner; 4) 
the extent to which the speech is motivated by malice or spite; and 5) whether speakers 
deliberately chose to convey their message in a location that would amplify the 
offensiveness of their message.68 Apart from the narrow doctrinal exceptions to First 
Amendment protection listed above, First Amendment jurisprudence does not entertain a 
calculus based on these five factors. Speech with minimal social value under Feinberg’s 
scheme receives the same protection as speech with much greater social value. 
Nevertheless, Feinberg’s factors remain valuable for the present analysis because they 
can be viewed as factors that lead to heckler’s veto scenarios, whether on street corners or 
in content governance. 
The First Amendment does not take away the realness of the harms (whether 
profound harm or mere offense) suffered by audiences who would wish to restrict the 
speech that caused them.69 Audiences are not going to roll over and willfully accept such 
harmful speech simply because the law protects it. In some instances in which the speech 
in question is expressed in public, audiences may react against the speakers with counter-
speech—which itself may even escalate into violence. Such scenarios pitting speakers’ 
                                                
67 FEINBERG, at 44. Here, Feinberg contends, “Expressions of opinion … must be presumed to have the 
highest social importance in virtue of the great social utility of free expression and discussion generally, as 
well as the vital personal interest most people have in being able to speak their minds fearlessly. No degree 
of offensiveness in the expressed opinion itself is sufficient to override the case for free expression, 
although the offensiveness of the manner of expression, as opposed to its substance, may have sufficient 
weight in some contexts.” See Feinberg’s argument on this point discussed supra note 31. 
68 Here it appears rather obvious that Feinberg is referring to the Skokie case. 
69 See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Hate Speech and Its Harms: A Communication Theory Perspective, 47 J. COMM. 
4 (1997); DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); MARI J. MATSUDA, ET AL., 
WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 74 
(1993). 
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rights against audience rights have their own doctrine with its own set of cases and 
theory: the heckler’s veto. 
The Heckler’s Veto: Jurisprudence and Practice 
 
Consider a scenario in which two groups with opposing viewpoints meet in a 
public forum in the United States. Here, several interests from each “stakeholder” group 
in the scenario potentially come into conflict. First, the group that initially sought access 
to the public forum wishes—indeed, it has the right—to speak its message.70 Second, the 
opposition group wishes—indeed, it too has the right—to speak a counter message,71 and 
thereby attempt to outcompete the initial group’s message in this microcosm of the 
marketplace of ideas. Neither the initial speakers nor their opposition want to have their 
right to speak trampled upon. However, it is not hard to conceive of a situation where the 
message of the initial group is so offensive to the opposition that it spurs the opposition to 
react not merely vociferously but violently to defend their honor or dignity from attack by 
the initial group’s message.72 Therefore, third, law enforcement officials must ensure that 
the clash of opposing messages does not escalate into a physical confrontation that could 
endanger lives—of the protestors, the counter-protestors, or innocent bystanders—or that 
could cause damage to surrounding property.73 These officials essentially must referee 
the competition of messages, making sure that each side’s First Amendment right to 
                                                
70 See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (holding that a city 
advisory board could not prevent the Ku Klux Klan from burning a cross in a public forum, either under the 
Establishment Clause, or under the Speech Clause (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
71 See, e.g., Marcavage v. City of Philadelphia, 778 F.Supp.2d 556 (E.D. Pa. 2012), (holding that a counter-
protestor has a First Amendment right to speak a message to counter another group, so long as the message 
does not infringe upon the rights of the original group). 
72 FEINBERG, supra note 61. 
73 See, e.g., Cottonreader v. Johnson, 252 F. Supp. 492, 497 (M.D. Ala. 1966). 
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speak is honored, while preventing either group from violating the rights of the other. 
Ultimately, these officials are left with a choice: stop the speech of the initial group to 
quell the potential violence, or protect the speakers of the initial group from their 
opposition and any violent reaction that may ensue. The theory and jurisprudence that 
surround this choice are the focus of this chapter. 
This section begins by examining six cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court 
that deal with speakers who confronted an audience that was hostile toward their 
message. These six cases are by no means an exhaustive sample of cases appearing 
before the Supreme Court that deal with hostile audiences. However, these cases 
sufficiently illustrate the principle of the heckler’s veto. Three of these cases preceded the 
Civil Rights Movement, with the other three occurring during the heart of the Civil 
Rights Movement.74 The speaker prevailed in all but one of the cases; however, that one 
case (Feiner v. New York75) represents bad law in the line of cases.76 The cases will be 
discussed briefly in chronological order to analyze the development of the heckler’s veto 
principle. Following this analysis, the close relationship of the heckler’s veto principle to 
both the Brandenburg incitement standard and the fighting words doctrine will be 
discussed. 
                                                
74 There is no agreed upon definition of when the “heart” of the Civil Rights Movement began, as the 
NAACP won significant legal victories as early as the first quarter of the 20th century. However, historian 
Jacquelyn Dowd Hall argues that the Movement “accelerated” in the 1950s and 1960s, no doubt due in 
great part to Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and the Montgomery bus boycott in 
1955. Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past, 91 J. 
AMER. HIST. 1233, 1244 (2005). See also ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 14 (1984). 
75 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 
76 See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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Formation of the Doctrine 
 
In 1940, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the first hostile audience 
case examined here: Cantwell v. Connecticut.77 Cantwell, a Jehovah’s Witness, was 
convicted of committing common law incitement to a breach of the peace.78 Cantwell and 
his two sons had stood on the corner of a public street that was known to be populated 
predominantly by Catholics and played a record that attacked Catholicism. At one point, 
Cantwell played the record for two passersby. The men, both Catholic, testified in the 
Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County that they “were tempted to strike 
Cantwell unless he went away.”79 The Connecticut State Supreme Court upheld 
Cantwell’s conviction, holding that Cantwell’s charge was not breach of the peace on his 
own part, but rather “invoking or inciting others to breach of the peace.”80 A unanimous 
U.S. Supreme Court overturned Cantwell’s conviction on the grounds that his speech did 
not create a “clear and present danger … to public safety, peace, or order[.]”81  
However, writing for the Court, Justice Owen Roberts paid great deference in 
dicta to states’ interests in protecting order by punishing speech acts that exceeded the 
clear and present danger standard. “One may … be guilty of the offense [of incitement to 
breach of the peace] if he commit acts or make statements likely to provoke violence and 
disturbance of good order, even though no such eventuality be intended,”82 he wrote. 
“The danger in these times from the coercive activities of those who in the delusion of 
                                                
77 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
78 Id. at 300. 
79 Id. at 303. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 308. 
82 Id. at 309. 
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racial or religious conceit would incite violence and breaches of the peace in order to 
deprive others of their equal right to the exercise of their liberties, is emphasized by 
events familiar to all. These and other transgressions of those limits the States 
appropriately may punish.”83 Two conclusions can be drawn from Roberts’s dicta. First, 
it does not give speakers the strong protection for messages of incitement that would later 
be solidified in Brandenburg. Thus, Cantwell leaves the door open for future convictions 
of speakers who incite a hostile audience to a violent reaction. On a similar note, it also 
acknowledges the difficulty that both law enforcement and courts would face in 
balancing the competing interests of protecting speech and maintaining order, as a bright-
line test for speech that would incite hostile reactions across any set of facts did not exist. 
Second, Roberts’s dicta is an acknowledgement that the Court was in the midst of a 
tumultuous period in which incendiary speech that proposed radical ideas was becoming 
the norm.84 
The Court next decided a hostile audience case nine years later in Terminiello v. 
Chicago.85 In this case, controversial priest Arthur Terminiello delivered a racist, anti-
Semitic and anti-communist speech at a Chicago auditorium. Terminiello’s mere 
presence at the auditorium led to a gathering of about 1,000 protestors, who picketed, 
cursed at Terminiello, threw bottles and stones at police, and threw stones and bricks 
                                                
83 Id. at 310. 
84 See KALVEN, supra note 11; G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of 
Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 299 (1996); Norman L. Rosenberg, Another 
History of Free Speech: The 1920s and the 1940s, 7 LAW & INEQ. 333 (1988). 
85 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
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through the auditorium windows.86 Like Cantwell, Terminiello was arrested and later 
convicted on charges of inciting disorderly conduct.87 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed 
Terminiello’s conviction in a 5-4 decision, holding that the city ordinance under which 
Terminiello was charged was unconstitutional. Justice Douglas wrote for the Court, 
“[Speech] may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, 
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even”—and here Douglas used the 
exact words of the ordinance used to charge Terminiello—“stirs people to anger.”88 
Douglas continued, “Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at 
prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for 
acceptance of an idea.”89 Douglas’s language in favor of protecting speech is noticeably 
stronger than Roberts’s from Cantwell. It acknowledges that the very potential of riling 
up a hostile audience is one of the key characteristics of speech worth protecting under 
the First Amendment.  
However, like Roberts, Douglas held that protection of provocative messages is 
not absolute. As Roberts did in Cantwell, Douglas held that states must prove that a 
speaker’s message is so provocative that it presents a clear and present danger—a fairly 
high, though still nebulous, standard—before they could punish the speaker.90 The 
relative ambiguity of the clear and present danger standard again left the door open for 
future courts to recognize a state’s interest in preventing speakers from inciting their 
                                                
86 Id. at 15. 
87 Id. at 3. 
88 Id. at 4. 
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hecklers to commit violence. Justice Jackson’s dissent shows just how wide open the 
Court left the door. Jackson’s chief problem with the majority’s decision in Terminiello 
was its naïveté. He agreed with the majority’s “generalized approbations of freedom of 
speech with which, in the abstract, no one will disagree.” But, he argued, “the local court 
that tried Terminiello was not indulging in theory.”91 Thus, Jackson continued, the 
majority “fixes its eyes on a conception of freedom of speech so rigid as to tolerate no 
concession to society’s need for public order.”92 He argued that the danger of such a 
national standard was that local communities that have expressed a strong interest in 
protecting order would fall into chaos, especially in urban areas.93 He interpreted 
Terminiello’s actions as “a local manifestation of a world-wide and standing conflict 
between two organized groups of revolutionary fanatics, each of which has imported to 
this country the strong-arm technique developed in the struggle by which their kind has 
devastated Europe.”94 Similarly, Chief Justice Vinson’s strong dissent in Terminiello is 
indicative of a broader conflict of ideologies confronting the Court during this time, a 
conflict deeply influenced by both the European wartime experience and the start of the 
Cold War and Red Scare.95 On one side was an interpretation of freedom of speech as 
quintessentially anti-totalitarian. This philosophy was based on Meiklejohn’s vision of 
freedom of expression as forming the essential link between liberty and democracy.96 On 
the other side was a real preoccupation with the potential of incendiary speech to lead to 
                                                
91 Id. at 13 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
92 Id. at 14 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
93 Id. at 23 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
94 Id. 
95 White, supra note 84, at 343; Rosenberg, supra note 84, at 360. 
96 White, supra note 84, at 331. 
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government overthrow and revolution.97 The clear and present danger standard allowed 
enough gray area for competing jurists to make cases in favor or either greater protection 
for or suppression of provocative speech, much to the lament of Meiklejohn.98  
Indeed, this conflict of ideologies was so intense that speakers did not always 
prevail in hostile audience cases. In the most notable example, Feiner v. New York,99 
Vinson’s dissenting arguments from Terminiello won the day. In that case, Feiner, a 
white college student, stood on a box at a public street corner in Syracuse, New York, 
and through a loudspeaker told a crowd of about 80 people, composed of both blacks and 
whites, that the mayor of Syracuse was “a champagne-sipping bum” who did “not speak 
for the negro people,” that “President Truman [was] a bum,” and that “negroes don’t have 
equal rights” and therefore “they should rise up in arms and fight for their rights.”100 The 
police testified at Feiner’s trial that they “were concerned with the effect of the crowd on 
both pedestrian and vehicular traffic,” because the “crowd was restless and there was 
some pushing, shoving and milling around.”101 The police also testified that an angry 
person in the crowd told them that if they did not get “that son-of-a-bitch” off the box, he 
would.102 After Feiner refused the officers’ third order to stop speaking, the police 
arrested him and charged him with disorderly conduct. The Supreme Court upheld 
Feiner’s conviction in a 6-3 decision. Writing for the majority, Vinson held that the Court 
must respect “the interest of the community in maintaining peace and order on its 
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streets,” and that the Court “cannot say that the preservation of that interest here 
encroaches on the constitutional rights of [Feiner].”103 Vinson gave special deference to 
law enforcement in his decision, writing, “It is one thing to say that the police cannot be 
used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, 
when as here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes 
incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace.”104 In a concurring 
opinion to Feiner, published in the record for the case Niemotko v. Maryland,105 which 
was heard the same day as Feiner, Justice Frankfurter appeared to strengthen the Court’s 
deference toward law enforcement. “It is not a constitutional principle that, in acting to 
preserve order, the police must proceed against the crowd, whatever its size and temper, 
and not against the speaker,” Frankfurter wrote.106  
The majority’s argument was met with sharp dissents from Justice Black, the 
notorious First Amendment absolutist, and Justice Douglas, author of the Terminiello 
decision. Black refuted Vinson’s argument that the police were in the right to arrest 
Feiner in the name of maintaining order. Rather, to maintain order, Black argued that 
“[the police’s] duty was to protect petitioner’s right to talk, even to the extent of arresting 
the man who threatened to interfere.”107 Echoing Black, Douglas wrote, “Police 
censorship has all the vices of the censorship from city halls.”108  
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The reason why Feiner contrasts so sharply with Terminiello may be as simple as 
who was sitting on the Court for each case.109 However, the aberrant status of Feiner may 
reflect a broader issue: the difficulty courts face in judging the actions of law 
enforcement officials when confronted with hostile-audience situations. These officials 
must make time-sensitive decisions on whether to silence speech based on subjective 
interpretations of the events playing out before them despite lofty constitutional 
principles that demand their restraint. This ideological struggle over the gulf between 
theory and practice will be illustrative when examining intermediaries’ position as 
arbiters of content when faced with pressure from individuals to remove offensive 
content. 
Three hostile audience cases from the Civil Rights era—Edwards v. South 
Carolina,110 Cox v. Louisiana,111 and Gregory v. Chicago112—moved the Court away 
from its Feiner decision and toward a stance of protecting speech in the face of hostile 
opposition. The relatively similar facts from all three cases can be summarized together. 
All three cases involved a group of African-Americans who marched on public property 
to protest segregation. In each case, the protestors confronted large crowds of angry 
                                                
109 The five Justices who comprised the majority in Terminiello were Douglas, Reed, Rutledge, Black, and 
Murphy. Murphy’s replacement, Tom C. Clark, essentially provided the swing vote in Feiner. Clark 
routinely voted in the same bloc as Vinson and Frankfurter, see MICHAL R. BELKNAP, THE VINSON 
COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 58 (2004). Justice Reed, who voted with the majority in 
Terminiello, switched his position and voted in the majority in Feiner. Reed’s switch could have been due 
to his strong friendship with Jackson and Frankfurter before his years on the Court, see John D. Fassett, The 
Buddha and the Bumblebee: The Saga of Stanley Reed and Felix Frankfurter, 35 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 166 
(2010). Thus, the fact that two cases with very similar sets of facts could be decided differently due to 
(what appears to be) simple voting patterns highlights the contentious nature of the ideological battle 
between free speech and public order in hostile audience cases at this time. 
110 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
111 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
112 394 U.S. 111 (1969). 
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whites. In each case, some of the African-American protestors were arrested and charged 
with violating disorderly conduct or breach of the peace statutes, with police officers 
testifying that they made the arrests because the crowds were growing restive and the 
protestors repeatedly disobeyed the officers’ orders to disperse. In each case, the African-
American protestors prevailed. In Cox, Justice Goldberg adopted Black and Douglas’ 
argument that the police’s duty was to maintain order by protecting the speakers, not 
appeasing the angry hecklers. “[The police] could have handled the crowd,” Goldberg 
wrote.113 Black expounded the argument from his Feiner dissent in his concurrence in 
Gregory: “[U]nder our democratic system of government, lawmaking is not entrusted to 
the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat.”114  
However, this lack of trust in the “moment-to-moment judgment” of police does 
not mean police must always stay inactive when faced with two competing groups. In 
another Civil Rights era case from Alabama, a federal judge enjoined police in 
Greenville, Alabama from failing to provide protection to African-American protesters; 
the police had refused to protect a group of picketing African-Americans from physical 
attacks by a mob of angry whites.115 This case can be considered a period piece; it is 
likely that the Greenville police willingly refrained from offering protection to the 
African-American protesters out of spite for the protesters’ message rather than out of 
reverence for extreme “survival-of-the-fittest” neutrality. In other words, such subjective 
cruelty is reasonably unlikely to occur today under similar circumstances. However, the 
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important takeaway from this case is that the status quo for police in hostile audience 
cases is to protect speakers from the hostile audience, rather than remaining completely 
neutral. 
The fact that these cases deal with issues of civil rights—and that two of them 
come from the South—should not be overlooked. Professor Harry Kalven argued that 
these cases left the Supreme Court with a dilemma: “require that in the South the police 
go down with the Negro speakers[,]” or “permit the South one gigantic hecklers’ 
veto[.]”116 He argued that the Court chose the former option because, for one, it did not 
want to succumb to the will of segregationists after not doing enough to curb 
McCarthyism in the 1950s.117 Indeed, Kalven argued that the Civil Rights Movement 
provided the impetus for the theoretical and doctrinal crystallization of the heckler’s veto 
principle from its contentious beginnings in Cantwell and Terminiello.118 Moreover, this 
historical context shows why defeating the heckler’s veto is so important: political speech 
that is essential for the social transformation of the country is imperiled if hecklers can so 
easily force its suppression. No matter how unpopular the speech, and regardless of 
whether the hecklers are expressing the will of the majority, the value of that speech 
merits affirmative steps to protect it. Only if the speech itself—not the actions of the 
hecklers reacting to the speech—crosses a legally defined threshold and directly causes 
physical harm can that speech be punished.  
 
                                                
116 KALVEN, supra note 11, at 141. 
117 Id. at 114. See also L. A. Powe, Jr., Brandenburg: Then and Now, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 69, 73 (2011). 
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Challenges within the Doctrine 
 
The heckler’s veto doctrine appears to be pretty cut-and-dried following its mid-
century formation and Civil-Rights-Era refinement. However, courts have been faced 
with challenging questions as to how the principles of the doctrine should be upheld in 
practice.  
Arguably the biggest challenge facing the heckler’s veto doctrine is the extent to 
which laws that regulate heckler’s veto scenarios are content-neutral. Police may restrict 
a speaker from speaking a message that could rile up a hostile audience if the speaker 
violates a generally applicable, content-neutral law. For example, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that police restricting speech from loudspeakers after 
residents complained about the noise did not amount to a heckler’s veto.119 The court 
held that the fact that the message contained Christian and anti-gay themes and was 
directed at residents of a predominantly homosexual district of San Francisco was 
immaterial because the police were acting only on the noise complaints, not any potential 
complaints about the content of the message.120 
Similarly, in Ovadal v. City of Madison,121 police stopped Ralph Ovadal from 
displaying anti-gay signs on an overpass over a busy highway because they believed the 
messages were distracting drivers by making them angry, thereby putting the drivers at 
greater risk of getting into an accident.122 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit held that the police had a legitimate interest in stopping the speech, and that the 
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ordinance cited to stop the speech was content-neutral.123 The court disagreed with 
Ovadal’s argument that the police were simply kowtowing to a heckler’s veto in the form 
of the angry drivers on the highway below his message, or that the ordinance in question 
vaguely gave police too much discretion to determine how much of a hazard his speech 
actually posed to traffic.124  
Although Ovadal did not prevail, his case did raise an important point: the 
content-neutrality of a law used to stop speakers in a heckler’s veto situation is not 
always clear. In Bible Believers v. Wayne County,125 officers from the Wayne County 
Sheriff’s Office threatened to issue citations for disorderly conduct to a group of 
Christians who were attempting to preach at the public Arab International Festival in 
Dearborn, Michigan. The group’s speech comprised shirts that read “Only Jesus Christ 
Can Save You From Sin and Hell,” as well as a severed pig’s head on a pike and 
invectives calling the Prophet Muhammad a pedophile.126 Several of the predominantly 
Muslim festival attendees, shouted angry responses at the Christian group, while some 
threw water bottles and trash at them, and one person physically pushed one of the group 
members to the ground.127 A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit held that the purpose of the threat of citations—to regulate the safety of festival 
attendees—was content-neutral, and therefore the threat of citations did not amount to a 
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heckler’s veto.128 The majority agreed with the district court’s use of Feiner to hold that 
the officers “were not powerless to prevent a breach of the peace in light of the 
imminence of greater disorder that Plaintiffs’ conduct created.”129 The majority held that 
the Bible Believers “intended to incite the crowd to turn violent,”130 and therefore the 
officers’ threats of citing the group for disorderly conduct unless it dispersed “was 
objectively necessary under the circumstances.”131 In dissent, Judge Eric L. Clay began 
by stating simply, “This is an easy case.”132 Clay contended that the officers here fell 
victim to the heckler’s veto, as the Bible Believers violated neither the incitement 
standard nor the fighting words doctrine, either of which would have stripped their 
speech of constitutional (and thereby police) protection. Clay warned that the majority’s 
holding that the Believers’ speech was, in fact, incitement speech was the beginning of a 
precipitous slippery slope: 
It does not take much to see why law enforcement is principally required 
to protect lawful speakers over and above lawbreakers. If a different rule 
prevailed, this would simply allow for a heckler’s veto under more 
extreme conditions. Indeed, hecklers would be incentivized to get really 
rowdy, because at that point the target of their ire could be silenced. More 
perniciously, a contrary rule would allow police to manufacture a situation 
to chill speech. Police officers could simply sit by as a crowd formed and 
became agitated. Once the crowd’s agitation became extreme, the police 
could swoop in and silence the speaker. The First Amendment does not 
contain this large a loophole.133 
 
                                                
128 Id. at 590. 
129 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
130 Id. (emphasis added). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 592 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
133 Id. at 595 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
   
148 
A rehearing of this case en banc was granted in October 2014, though a date for 
oral arguments has not been scheduled as of this writing. Among other issues, the court 
will address whether police could have used alternative means to handle potential 
violence (such as setting up a buffer zone between the speakers and the audience), as well 
as whether the officers should be entitled to qualified immunity for failing to utilize these 
alternative means and proceeding straight to stopping the speaker.134 
Police also must follow content-neutral laws whenever they have to restrict the 
ability of an audience to speak its counter-message. They especially must follow content-
neutral laws if the audience is not, in fact, hostile, but rather is seeking to peacefully 
convey a counter-message. Applying time-place-and-manner restrictions may become 
trickier when two competing groups have a right to speak in the same public place. In 
Startzell v. City of Philadelphia,135 police were confronted with two competing messages: 
that of Philly Pride, a gay-rights group that had a non-exclusive permit to hold their gay 
pride event OutFest on Philadelphia’s public streets; and that of Repent America, a 
Christian organization committed to preaching against homosexuality. Police allowed 
Repent America to preach on the same streets on which OutFest was being held, but they 
arrested the group’s leader, Michael Marcavage, when he refused a police order to move 
his group to the perimeter of the permitted area so as not to interfere with a musical 
performance at the festival or block access to vending booths.136 Two judges on a panel 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the police order to for the 
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group to move was a content-neutral restriction on the time, place or manner of the 
group’s speech, and therefore the police did not violate Marcavage’s First Amendment 
rights when they arrested him.137 The majority disagreed with Marcavage’s argument that 
the police were effectuating a heckler’s veto on him by, in effect, supporting the message 
of OutFest over that of his own group.138  
In a concurring opinion, Judge Walter K. Stapleton agreed that Repent America’s 
rights were not violated, but only because one of the group’s members had forfeited those 
rights be using fighting words against one of the OutFest members.139 Stapleton 
contended that the police only would have been able to restrict Repent America’s speech 
if fighting words had been used; otherwise such a restriction would have amounted to 
“favoritism shown to the OutFest supporters.”140 Even following content-neutral laws to 
restrict speech in a hostile-audience situation could not save the police from violating one 
of the group’s constitutional rights, according to Stapleton. Rather, police must let the 
two messages compete with one another until one group clearly forfeits its constitutional 
protections: “Police may not, consistent with the First Amendment, silence protected 
speech based solely on their judgment that it is interfering with competing protected 
speech.”141 
An exception to the heckler’s veto doctrine does not exist for speech that upsets 
an audience predominantly made up of minors. In Center for Bio-Ethics Reform v. Los 
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Angeles County,142 pro-life organization Center for Bio-Ethics Reform drove a van 
displaying enlarged photos of aborted fetuses around the perimeter of a Los Angeles 
junior high school. Fearing for the safety of some students who walked slowly across a 
busy street while staring at the van, the school’s assistant principal called the Los 
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. The officers stopped and detained the drivers of 
the van, and then asked them to leave the area, citing California Penal Code § 626.8(a).143 
That law prohibits “[a]ny person [from coming] upon any school ground, or street, 
sidewalk or public way adjacent thereto … whose presence or acts interfere with the 
peaceful conduct of the school or its pupils.”144 A unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the officers used the students’ reaction to the 
speech as the pretext for stopping the Center’s drivers and asking them to leave; in other 
words, the police were acting on a heckler’s veto.145 The court held that even though 
“[c]hildren may well be particularly susceptible to distraction or emotion in the face of 
controversial speech, and may not always be expected to react responsibly,” it would “be 
an unprecedented departure from bedrock First Amendment principles to allow the 
government to restrict speech based on the listener reaction simply because the listeners 
are children.”146 However, the court held that the officers were entitled to qualified 
immunity in this case because they did not reasonably know that the Center had a clearly 
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established First Amendment right to display its message within the presence of 
minors.147 
Between Fighting Words and Incitement 
 
Because the heckler’s veto principle deals with the potential of speech to lead 1) 
an audience that opposes the speech in question to 2) engage in violent acts, the principle 
must be analyzed in conjunction with two of the major First Amendment exceptions 
discussed in chapter 3: fighting words and incitement. The fighting words doctrine, from 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,148 involves words said in another person’s face that “by 
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”149 
The incitement standard, established in the 1969 case Brandenburg v. Ohio,150 provides 
that the State cannot punish “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except 
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action.”151  
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has seldom used the fighting words 
doctrine since Chaplinsky, the doctrine remains a potential exception to free speech 
within First Amendment jurisprudence.152 In order for the doctrine to be resurrected and 
applied to a heckler’s veto case today as the rationale for ruling against a speaker, the key 
characteristic distinguishing fighting words from speech that merely angers an audience 
must be met: the speaker’s speech must be uttered “face-to-face” with his or her 
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opponent. It seems very unlikely that a court would extend that rather clear definition of 
proximity to also encompass the distances between speakers and audience experienced in 
the cases discussed above.153 Meanwhile, Brandenburg, narrowly interpreted, deals with 
the power of speech to incite restive sympathizers of a speaker’s message to imminent 
lawless action. However, such an interpretation is not an argument against supplanting 
the clear and present danger standard in Terminiello with the updated incitement standard 
of Brandenburg. Indeed, the speech in the hostile audience cases is not worth less and the 
threat to public order is no more dire than in cases such as Brandenburg154 that involve a 
sympathetic audience. Therefore, cases such as Terminiello and Cantwell today likely 
would be judged according Brandenburg’s higher bar. However, as the following 
discussion of state disorderly conduct statutes will show, law enforcement officials 
continue to act subjectively when interpreting both imminent lawless action and their 
state’s definition of disorderly conduct when confronted with heated situations involving 
both words and actions of speakers and counter-speakers. 
State Disorderly Conduct Statutes 
 
All 50 states have a statute proscribing disorderly conduct or breach of the 
peace.155 These statutes are important to the present analysis because they highlight the 
potential difficulties that law enforcement faces in balancing the protection of extreme 
yet lawful speech and the maintaining of social order when confronted with restive, 
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heckling crowds. As proposed throughout this study, such difficulties will reappear in the 
analysis of how digital intermediaries deal with this balancing process when faced with 
their own instances of extreme speech and heckling crowds. State disorderly conduct 
statutes serve as another example of the potential difficulty of upholding lofty ideals of 
freedom of expression in the on-the-street context, which will aid the discussion of this 
difficulty in the context of content governance. 
Many of the statutes share important similarities. First, many of the laws are 
written in nearly identical language,156 which underscores a relatively high degree of 
uniformity among states in one of their chief weapons against public disorder. Some use 
verbs and nouns pertaining only to unlawful action or conduct, not speech.157 This 
separation of conduct and speech reflects Professor Emerson’s conception of the 
“fundamental distinction” between speech and conduct: the government is able to 
regulate the latter, but its power to suppress the former is “in most respects non-
existent.”158 Some statutes159 that do list certain types of speech as punishable disorderly 
conduct narrowly define that speech within categories for which the U.S. Supreme Court 
has already crafted exceptions: obscenity,160 fighting words,161 true threats,162 and 
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incitement to imminent lawless action.163 A handful of statutes explicitly state that the 
First Amendment protects speech from punishment under charges of disorderly conduct 
or breach of the peace provided that the speech does not cross the boundaries set by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.164  
Some of the state statutes could be interpreted as vague in the way they fail to 
separate vitriolic yet lawful speech from unlawful conduct. Florida’s breach of the peace 
statute prohibits “such acts as are of a nature to corrupt the public morals, or outrage the 
sense of public decency.”165 Several states prohibit using “profane” or “obscene” 
language within the presence or hearing of children.166 Texas prohibits the use of 
“abusive, indecent, profane, or vulgar language in a public place” in a way that tends to 
cause an immediate breach of the peace, without the requirement of children being 
present.167 Such language appears to show that state statutes tend to conflate the 
adjectives vulgar, profane, indecent and obscene in their quotidian use (as descriptors for 
curse words) with the proper legal uses of the terms indecent and obscene.  
Illinois’ disorderly conduct statute describes disorderly conduct as “any act [done] 
in such unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of 
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164 See CONN. STAT. § 53A-182; MASS. G.L. C. 272 § 53; ORS § 166.025 (OREGON). 
165 FL. STAT. TITLE XLVI, CH. 877.03. 
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the peace.”168 The Minnesota disorderly conduct statute forbids “offensive, obscene, or 
abusive language tending reasonably to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others.”169 
According to the Crimes against the Public Peace law of Nevada, “[e]very person who 
shall by word, sign or gesture willfully provoke, or attempt to provoke, another person to 
commit a breach of the peace shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”170 In New Jersey, “[a] 
person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense if, in a public place, and with 
purpose to offend the sensibilities of a hearer or in reckless disregard of the probability of 
so doing, he addresses unreasonably loud and offensively coarse or abusive language, 
given the circumstances of the person present and the setting of the utterance, to any 
person present.”171 The North Carolina disorderly conduct statute defines disorderly 
conduct as “any utterance, gesture, display or abusive language which is intended and 
plainly likely to provoke violent retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace.”172 
Briefly, this chapter must address the right of the hecklers to heckle, or to engage 
in acts of counter-speech against a speaker. As stated in the introduction, this right is one 
of the factors police must take into account when working to control a scene in which two 
groups are dueling with opposing messages. Just as police must assess when the initial 
speaker’s speech crosses the Brandenburg line and incites a hostile crowd to imminent 
lawless action, they must also judge when hecklers go too far and infringe upon the right 
of the initial speaker to speak. The California Supreme Court held in the 1970 case In re 
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Kay that “[a]udience activities, such as heckling, interrupting, harsh questioning, and 
booing, even though they may be impolite and discourteous, can nonetheless advance the 
goals of the First Amendment.”173 In that case, the court overturned the convictions of 
protestors who peacefully chanted and made noise during the speech of an unpopular 
congressman. The protestors had been convicted under a California law that forbade 
“willfully disturb[ing] or break[ing] up any [lawful] assembly or meeting.”174 The court 
held, “An unfavorable reception, such as that given Congressman [John V.] Tunney in 
the instant case, represents one important method by which an officeholder’s constituents 
can register disapproval of his conduct and seek redress of grievances.”175  
This case reflects the law of California, which is known to be an outlier in its 
willingness to proscribe what often appear to be lawful types of speech.176 However, it is 
not out of the question that the court’s reasoning could be applied in other states. Indeed, 
many of the statutes mentioned above have similar provisions prohibiting the willful 
disturbance of lawful assemblies. It appears that as long as speech is met with peaceful 
speech and nothing more—not fisticuffs or thrown rocks or bottles, not true threats or 
fighting words or incitement to imminent lawless action—then law enforcement should 
allow each side to compete against the other with words and other forms of expression. 
However, although he concedes that “heckling or other interruption of the speaker may 
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be part of the dialogue,” Professor Emerson does not hold heckling in high regard, 
likening it to “pure noise.”177 “[C]onduct that obstructs or seriously impedes the utterance 
of another, even though verbal in form, cannot be classified as expression,” he argues. “It 
has the same effect, in preventing or disrupting communication, as acts of physical force. 
Consequently it must be deemed action and is not covered by the First Amendment.”178  
The purpose of reviewing the statutes above is not to argue that some of them are 
unconstitutionally vague on their face. Indeed, when the U.S. Supreme Court strikes 
down one state law for not affording adequate protections for speech, it does not strike 
down every similar-looking law in the country. It is up to legislators to revise outdated 
and constitutionally questionable laws. Instead, a parallel can be drawn between, on the 
one hand, the conflicting opinions between Feiner and the other hostile audience cases, 
and, on the other hand, conflicting opinions on how to regulate disorderly speech based 
on police officers’ interpretations of state disorderly conduct statutes. Although 
Brandenburg now serves as the limit beyond which incitement speech becomes unlawful, 
one can argue that the imminent lawless action standard, as high a bar as it may be, 
remains a subjective standard, potentially even for the police who rely on vague statutory 
language for guidance on how to handle incitement-type situation.  
At least one federal district court has said that the vagueness of a disorderly 
conduct ordinance can exacerbate the likelihood that police will succumb to a heckler’s 
veto and punish speakers for rabblerousing. In Goldhamer v. Nagode,179 the U.S. District 
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Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that part of the language of Chicago’s 
disorderly conduct ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. The language at issue 
stipulated that a person is guilty of disorderly conduct if he or she fails to disperse 
following a police order when “three or more persons are committing acts of disorderly 
conduct in the immediate vicinity … [that] are likely to cause substantial harm or serious 
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.”180 The court held that the vagueness of this part of 
the statute could lead to arbitrary enforcement of the ordinance by police181—certainly, 
such arbitrary enforcement could be particularly problematic for heckler’s veto scenarios. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated this decision due to the 
speakers’ lack of standing to permanent injunction against the city ordinance in 
question.182 However, the concern over the potential of police to take advantage of vague 
language persists from Goldhamer, even if its precedent does not. 
A recent empirical study by a team of legal scholars and social scientists posited 
that “culturally motivated cognition … influence[d] individuals’ perceptions of facts 
essential to distinguishing “speech” from “conduct” for purposes of the First 
Amendment.”183 The study focuses specifically on what factors may lead people to form 
attitudes toward whether police should intervene to stop a protest from turning violent.184 
The authors argue that placing speech and conduct in distinctly separate categories was 
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an exercise in “sophism and ad hocery.”185 A 1982 study highlighted that even members 
of the ACLU showed remarkably high levels of intolerance toward certain types of 
controversial speech, such as speech advocating the overthrow of the government or 
racist speech.186 By combining these apparent natural attitudinal uncertainties toward 
incendiary speech, law enforcement’s interest in maintaining public order, and the 
relatively vague statutory language defining when speech is punishable, one can make the 
case that the veto power of today’s hecklers is not dead.187  
The Heckler’s Veto and First Amendment Theory 
 
The heckler’s veto case law can be interpreted as guaranteeing that “local 
government must take action to protect [a] speaker against a hostile crowd.”188 This 
doctrine is consistent with so-called affirmative theories of the First Amendment, which 
generally put forth the position that the government has a duty to foster and facilitate 
certain conditions through which citizens can exercise their First Amendment rights. As 
stated in chapter 2, Meiklejohn argues that the “point of ultimate interest” regarding the 
First Amendment’s function in facilitating self-government “is not the words of the 
speakers, but the minds of the hearers.”189 Affirmative theorists from the present-day 
“New Realist” school190 have interpreted Meiklejohn’s theory to allow for government 
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intervention whenever it can ensure that, as Meiklejohn puts it, “everything worth saying 
shall be said.”191 Affording speakers protection from hostile audiences while speaking in 
public is an example of such intervention, and the rationale behind such “government 
regulation of speech [is that it] actually might promote free speech, and should not be 
treated as an abridgement at all.”192  
Standing counter to affirmative First Amendment theory, the theory of the 
marketplace of ideas holds that the First Amendment is not a means to effective 
democratic governance, but to attaining truth.193 Autonomy theory holds that the primary 
purpose of the strong protections of the First Amendment is to honor individual 
autonomy and foster individuals’ personal growth.194 Although the former is 
consequentialist while the latter is not, these theories share the label of “negative” First 
Amendment theories due to their mistrust of government intervention over matters of free 
speech jurisprudence. 
Undaunted, affirmative First Amendment theorists point out that markets can and 
do fail without government regulation. They argue that markets for goods and services 
are imperfect, and the government must intervene to fix imperfections, such as the 
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formation of monopolies, lest the efficiency of the marketplace be undermined.195 The 
same imperfections, particularly the formation of monopolies on opinion or access to 
channels of communication, are found in the marketplace of ideas analogy, and therefore 
the government likewise should intervene to ameliorate those imperfections. Law 
professor Owen Fiss concedes that “[t]he state has no corner on virtue,” yet he believes 
that the state nevertheless can fulfill the function that markets alone fail to fulfill, which 
is to ensure that the “democratic needs of the electorate” are met.196 
One of the most common manifestations of affirmative First Amendment theory 
is public forum doctrine. Traditional public forums are places “in which the right to free 
speech receives its strongest protection.”197 Public forums exist in part because the vast 
majority of speakers does not have the resources to disseminate messages through 
mainstream print and broadcast media.198 Under public forum doctrine, public spaces 
such as parks, plazas and street corners are presumed open to speakers, and “the 
generosity and empathy with which such facilities are made available is an index of 
freedom.”199 Therefore, if the government is to properly reserve these spaces for use by 
speakers, it must protect the spaces to the greatest extent possible. This includes requiring 
police to shield the speakers from hostile audiences, as the case law discussed above has 
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shown.200 Such protection must occur regardless of the offensiveness of the speakers’ 
message, and also regardless of the potential costs stemming from the level of violence 
with which an angry audience may be perceived to react. A divided U.S. Supreme Court 
held in 1992 that requiring the speakers to absorb the costs of police protection would 
amount to an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.201 Justice Harry Blackmun wrote 
that despite the potentially heavy costs incurred by local law enforcement to protect 
speakers, “[s]peech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or 
banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.”202 
As noted at the introduction to this section, the heckler’s veto doctrine straddles 
affirmative and negative theories. The requirement that law enforcement must intervene 
to protect speakers from hostile audiences in public spaces is, by all intents and purposes, 
an example of the law following affirmative theory; the police are essentially preventing 
the speakers from being unlawfully forced out of the marketplace of ideas. Yet the 
dueling messages of speakers and counter-speakers represent a marketplace of ideas in 
microcosm. Law professor Ashutosh Bhagwat elaborates on the competing theories of the 
hostile audience cases, which he describes as cases of “dissident speech with a strong 
associational flavor.”203 “Dissident organizations invariably will face public hostility—
that is what makes them dissident—but … they play a critical role in self-governance by 
challenging established understandings and the predominance of the state,” Bhagwat 
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argues, concluding that “the hostile audience cases are best understood as preventing not 
a heckler’s veto against lone, unpopular speakers, but societal vetoes of unpopular 
associations.”204 Herein lies the conflict of theories. Left to the marketplace of ideas, the 
ideas of dissident groups may end up eradicated from the market. Indeed, the goal of 
hecklers is to do exactly that. However, as Bhagwat (not to mention Mill205) states, the 
value of dissident speech is that it tests the mettle of truth, or at least the conventional 
ideas that society takes to be true.206 The government therefore must protect such 
valuable speech by intervening on its behalf.  
Law professor Robert Post argues that by protecting such speech, the government 
is upholding the First Amendment value of fostering “a process of critical interaction” 
among individuals.207 This critical interaction is brought about not simply because the 
First Amendment protects speech, but rather because it “shield[s] speakers from the 
enforcement of community standards.”208 Post defines community here as “a social 
formation that inculcates norms into the very identities of its members,”209 and thus the 
First Amendment requires that government not choose which set of norms will dominate 
in society. Government must stay neutral, even if the norms being communicated are 
uncivil or have a propensity to cause hostile reactions from an audience. Post notes that 
this principle leads to what he calls the “paradox of public discourse”210 He writes, “To 
the extent that a constitutional commitment to critical interaction prevents the law from 
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articulating and sustaining a common respect for the civility rules that make possible the 
ideal of rational deliberation, public discourse corrodes the basis of its own existence.”211 
Nevertheless, Post argues that one of the fundamental purposes of the First Amendment 
is to ensure the “separation of public discourse from the domination of civility rules that 
define the identity of communities.”212 This principle—that government cannot enforce 
community norms in public discourse—is essential for ensuring a robust public discourse 
in which many diverse voices can debate and compete with one another. It is this 
principle that is under threat from content governance. The following section will address 
the restriction of speech by individuals pressuring digital intermediaries. The analysis 
will be focused at a broad level as defined by this concept: the potential threat to public 
discourse through the imposition of community values of civility on speakers of extreme 
messages. 
Transposing the Heckler’s Veto Doctrine 
 
Obviously, Internet application providers such as Google and Facebook are not 
the government. No one can enforce any right against digital intermediaries to have them 
refrain from removing speech from their platforms. However, as discussed in chapter 2, 
scholars recently have broached the question: how closely can digital intermediaries be 
analogized to government actors within the context of Internet communications?213 The 
analogy hinges on two related issues: the extent to which the Internet is (or is perceived 
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to be) a public forum; and the extent to which intermediaries have the power to control 
that forum. Law professor Dawn Nunziato argues that the distinction between state and 
non-state actors is “formalistic,” and she calls for a theory of freedom of speech that 
considers how any powerful societal entities (state or non-state) regulate the free flow of 
information and expression.214 Nunziato places some of the blame on a piece of federal 
legislation that has been hailed215 as a boon for free speech: Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act.216 Perhaps most significantly, Section 230 declares, “No 
provider … of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of any 
action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that 
the provider … considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally 
protected.”217 Nunziato argues that Section 230 gives companies that control Internet 
communications an incentive to chill speech, often at the behest of vociferous 
individuals, who protest the fact that these intermediaries would be hosting such speech 
in the first place.218 According to Nunziato’s logic, by affording greater First Amendment 
protection to interactive computer services and angry crowds, at the expense of 
individuals who use those services to create extreme or controversial UGC, Section 230 
grants the former two groups a big heckler’s veto over such speech.219  
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Of course, the hecklers on Facebook are not the same hecklers that Terminiello, 
Feiner and Cantwell faced. However, an argument can be made that Internet 
intermediaries offer the functional (even if not quite the legal) equivalent of what the 
government offers: public forums. Unlike a street corner or a park, the Internet is not 
under government control, and by definition it is not a public forum. However, the 
Internet has expanded the potential for individuals to disseminate messages, leading some 
scholars to argue that the Internet acts a de facto public forum—in other words, the 
Internet is a public forum based solely on its function.220 
Internet law scholar Jack Balkin gives credence to this argument by contending 
that digital technologies are changing the social conditions in which people speak.221 
Balkin further argues that the purpose of freedom of speech is to “promote a democratic 
culture,” which he defines, with a hint of Meiklejohnian theory, as “a culture in which 
individuals have a fair opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning-making that 
constitute them as individuals.”222 Balkin posits that the Internet has the potential to bring 
about an era in which all individuals can, in fact, have such a fair opportunity to 
participate in culture. However, the powerful private entities that manage the Internet—
which Balkin describes as “hybrids of content providers and conduits for the speech of 
others,”223 arguing that “the ‘publicness’ of digital communications networks is merely a 
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side effect of the use of private property by private actors”224—pose a threat to that 
potential.225 He therefore calls for “administrative and legislative regulation of 
technology” and “judicial creation and recognition of constitutional rights” to combat this 
threat.226  
Nunziato and Balkin follow in the tradition of scholars who do not agree with the 
bright-line distinction of the state action doctrine. Law professor Frank Michelman 
argues that “a categorical distinction between the dangers of private action and the 
dangers of state action [on speech] cannot deliver reliable answers.”227 Michelman 
criticized this “private-power/public-power” distinction in the context of regulation of 
pornography.228 He argued that a pornography ban that is the product of the democratic 
legislative process is no different, and may be even better, than a ban on such speech that 
comes from a boycott carried out via the “despotism of so-called private, social, or 
market power.”229 Barron was one of the first affirmative theorists to call for government 
to intervene against broadcasters by allowing individuals equal access to channels of 
broadcast communication. Barron argued that “nongoverning minorities in control of the 
means of communication should perhaps be inhibited from restraining free speech (by the 
denial of access to their media) even more than governing majorities are restrained by the 
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First Amendment.”230 All of these scholars take the purported effects of corporate control 
of media that political economy theorists in the field of mass communication studies have 
been decrying for decades231 and analyze them within the context of First Amendment 
theory and jurisprudence. 
These scholars’ arguments inevitably run up against irreconcilable differences 
over whose First Amendment rights should be given more weight: individuals or the 
private institutions that facilitate Internet communications. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
chosen the latter. In Miami Herald v. Tornillo,232 the Court held that a Florida statute 
requiring newspapers to publish responses from individuals who believed they were 
attacked in the newspapers amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint. Adopting a 
negative approach to First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court determined that such a 
statute constituted government control over the editorial process of a free press. Although 
the Court acknowledged that an ideal press was a responsible press that provided a forum 
for diverse viewpoints, it nonetheless held that “press responsibility is not mandated by 
the Constitution, and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated.”233 The Court’s 1997 
decision in Reno v. ACLU,234 which afforded Internet speech the same level of First 
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Amendment protection as newspapers, cemented the Court’s interpretation that First 
Amendment protection of media companies’ rights trumps any sort of protection of 
individuals’ rights against those companies to be able to speak. Nevertheless, the 
principle of the heckler’s veto may help today’s affirmative theorists make a clearer case 
for their cause, as the examples below illustrate.  
Hecklers and Suppression Online 
 
The following are examples of incidents of online suppression of speech that 
resemble heckler’s veto scenarios from traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. The 
examples can be separated into four categories: 1) individuals pressuring intermediaries 
to remove speech from their platforms; 2) a “rioters’ veto;” 3) trolling and abuse; and 4) 
online shaming. 
Individuals	  Pressuring	  Intermediaries	  
 
Facebook	  and	  Beheading	  Videos	  
 
In late April 2013, two videos depicting the beheading of three individuals, 
purportedly in Mexico, appeared on Facebook.235 The social networking site initially 
refused to remove the videos in spite of formal requests made by individual members and 
humanitarian organizations. Facebook said of one of the videos: 
People are sharing this video on Facebook to condemn it. Just as TV news 
programs often show upsetting images of atrocities, people can share 
upsetting videos on Facebook to raise awareness of actions or causes. 
While this video is shocking, our approach is designed to preserve 
people’s rights to describe, depict and comment on the world in which we 
live.236 
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However, after pressure from members and interest groups increased, Facebook 
decided to remove the videos, saying it would “evaluate [its] policy and approach to this 
type of content.”237 At the time, Facebook’s “Community Standards” page stated, “We 
understand that graphic imagery is a regular component of current events, but must 
balance the needs of a diverse community. Sharing any graphic content for sadistic 
pleasure is prohibited.”238 Facebook said in May 2013 that the videos did not meet its 
standards for graphic or gratuitous violence.239 In mid-October 2013, it allowed the 
videos to be viewed on its site, again saying that people should be able to watch the 
videos to condemn them, and adding that it was considering a policy of including a 
warning alongside the link to the video.240 
Facebook	  and	  Misogynist	  Pages	  
 
In another incident, also involving Facebook and taking place in early 2013, 
feminist organizations decried the existence of pages created on the social networking 
giant that glorified or made light of rape and domestic violence. Activist Soraya 
Chemaly, Jaclyn Friedman of the group Women, Action and the Media (WAM), and 
Laura Bates of the Everyday Sexism Project, published an open letter online on May 21, 
2013, demanding that Facebook not tolerate “speech that trivializes or glorifies violence 
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against girls and women.”241 The open letter stated that pages had titles such as “Fly 
Kicking Sluts in the Uterus” and “Violently Raping Your Friend Just for Laughs,” and 
images appeared on the network “of women beaten, bruised, tied up, drugged, and 
bleeding, with captions such as ‘This bitch didn’t know when to shut up’ and ‘Next time 
don’t get pregnant.’” The women asked Facebook users to contact companies whose ads 
appeared on pages with such speech. In April 2013, Bates took a screenshot of a page 
titled “Drop kicking sluts in the teeth” and tweeted it to the beauty company Dove, whose 
ad appeared next to the page. In late May, the activists persuaded advertisers such as 
Nissan UK, Jump magazine, Desire Books and 15 other companies to pull ads from the 
social network.  
Marne Levine, Facebook’s vice-president for global public policy at that time, 
responded to the activists’ demands in a May 28, 2013, blog post on the social network, 
promising that Facebook officials would “update the training for the teams that review 
and evaluate reports of hateful speech or harmful content on Facebook.”242 Levine wrote 
that Facebook would push for more accountability from “the creators of content that does 
not qualify as actionable hate speech but is cruel or insensitive by insisting that the 
authors stand behind the content they create.” For example, this requirement would mean 
that “the creator of any content containing cruel and insensitive humor include his or her 
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authentic identity for the content to remain on Facebook.” Levine did not promise that 




These incidents will be addressed again in chapter 5, which focuses specifically 
on Facebook’s balancing act between protecting freedom of speech and preventing harm. 
However, it is important to address some key points about these incidents and how they 
reflect heckler’s veto situations. First, these incidents involve some individuals imposing 
a certain set of community norms on the speech of other individuals.243 Of course, 
Facebook is not a state actor, and thus it can choose to require its users to follow 
whatever community norms the company desires. What is interesting here is that there 
are actually three sets of community norms involved in these incidents: the speakers,’ the 
complainers,’ and those of Facebook itself. The conflict in each incident was over which 
side could get Facebook to interpret that side’s norms as more compatible with the 
company’s own norms. The groups that posted the offensive speech in question did not 
speak up on their own behalf, despite the fact that their speech could be considered to 
have a political or social message (twisted though it may be). In other words, individuals 
who advocate for community norms that are less tolerant of offensive speech seem to 
have greater mobilization and greater leverage over Facebook than those who would 
publish more offensive speech. Again, this idea will be discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 5. 
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In early September 2012, a YouTube video with enigmatic origins titled 
“Innocence of Muslims” came to the attention of news media in Egypt. The video 
depicted the Islamic Prophet Muhammad as a war-hungry womanizer and pedophile. 
Although the creator was first reported to be a “Sam Bacile,” that name was revealed to 
be one of the many aliases for the real author: Nakoula Basseley Nakoula, a Coptic 
Christian living in California who harbored strong anti-Islamic beliefs.244 News media in 
Egypt broadcast the video with Arabic translations, and soon other broadcasters in the 
region were showing clips of the video.245 Protests flared up throughout the Muslim 
world. On September 11, 2012, gunmen in Benghazi, Libya, stormed the American 
consulate and killed four people, including the American ambassador to Libya, J. 
Christopher Stevens. At the time, the close proximity between the broadcasting of the 
video and the Benghazi attack led many (including the Obama administration) to believe 
that the video had been the impetus for the attack.246 Only later did the Obama 
administration admit that the attack on the consulate had been planned in advance, and 
any rage sparked by the inflammatory video was likely only a coincidence.247  
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On September 12, 2012, Google, the owner of YouTube, announced it was 
blocking the video from being viewed in several countries.248 Although the vast majority 
of these countries’ governments formally requested that Google take down the video due 
to its violation of those countries’ laws, Google notably removed the video from view in 
both Egypt and Libya without receiving a request to do so.249 In a widely published press 
release following the removals of the video, Google stated the following:  
We work hard to create a community everyone can enjoy and which also 
enables people to express different opinions. This can be a challenge 
because what’s OK in one country can be offensive elsewhere. This 
video—which is widely available on the Web—is clearly within our 
guidelines and so will stay on YouTube. However, we’ve restricted access 
to it in countries where it is illegal such as India and Indonesia as well as 
in Libya and Egypt, given the very sensitive situations in these two 
countries.250  
 
The company contended that its decision to remove the video was consistent with 
YouTube’s code of conduct on not permitting hate speech.251 YouTube defines hate 
speech as “speech which attacks or demeans a group based on race or ethnic origin, 
religion, disability, gender, age, veteran status, and sexual orientation/gender identity.”252 
The company further defines prohibited hate speech by stating the following: 
“Sometimes there is a fine line between what is and what is not considered hate speech. 
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For instance, it is generally okay to criticize a nation, but not okay to make insulting 
generalizations about people of a particular nationality.”253 
The “Innocence of Muslims” incident shares many characteristics with the 
heckler’s veto scenarios discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Members of a hostile 
audience seeks to silence speech that offends them by resorting to violent actions, and the 
arbiter of the speech (here, Google) seeks to mollify the situation be removing the speech 
in certain locations. The offensive speech in question carried with it a distinctly social 
(and certainly political) message, thereby pitting the cost of the speech’s offensiveness 
with its potential social benefit of contributing a social and political idea to the public 
discourse. Notwithstanding the fact that the video may have violated laws in some 
countries,254 it undoubtedly threw the norms of freedom of expression of the United 
States and much of the Muslim world into stark contrast. 
The “Innocence of Muslims” incident was not the first time speech created in the 
United States and published on the Internet caused outcry abroad. In 2000, a Frenchman 
sued Yahoo for facilitating an auction of Nazi memorabilia in France, where such goods 
are considered contraband.255 Yahoo removed the auction of these items in January 
2001.256 Yet the incident led Internet engineers to realize that the World Wide Web did 
not necessarily have to be the same across the entire planet; in fact, French Internet 
entrepreneur Cyril Houri proved that the Yahoo could have engineered a way to block the 
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Nazi memorabilia auction from being seen in virtually all of France.257 Professors Jack 
Goldsmith and Tim Wu extolled this technological solution to a speech problem as a way 
to avoid the messiness of trying to come up with a legal solution to the problem.258 This 
technological solution allows issues involving highly offensive speech, such as the 
“Innocence of Muslims” incident, to end in a more nuanced fashion: the offensive speech 
can be accessible in some places and inaccessible in others, rather than heckler’s veto 
scenarios such as in Cantwell or Terminiello where the only options are either allowing 
offensive speech or suppressing it. Plus, inaccessible in this situation does not necessarily 
mean completely inaccessible; individuals in countries such as Egypt or Indonesia 
probably may be able to use proxy servers or virtual private networks to access the video 
if they desired.259 This nuanced approach to dealing with this speech problem also allows 
Google to occupy a favorable middle ground, in which the company can claim to both be 
protecting free speech and practicing social responsibility by preventing harm in certain 
parts of the world (regardless of whether it is legally required to do so).  
Despite this nuanced approach to dealing with speech that cuts across global 
norms of freedom of expression, the conflict between these norms does not end. Rather, 
the debate is heating up over how zealously Americans should defend their First 
Amendment right to publish offensive speech in an era when that speech can deeply 
affect individuals who live across oceans and abide by very different cultural norms. Law 
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professor Noah Feldman argued in a guest column in Newsday that the global reach of 
Internet communication requires a reexamination of First Amendment jurisprudence.260 
Comparing the “Innocence of Muslims” incident to traditional hostile audience cases, 
Feldman contended: 
In principle, it should not be more difficult to predict the likelihood that an 
audience abroad will respond violently to a given statement than it should 
be to predict that a crowd gathered in front of the speaker will respond 
violently. At present, we rely on the informed judgment of law-
enforcement officers who are on the scene, watching both the speaker and 
the audience that is on the verge of exploding. It seems possible that law-
enforcement officers who were sufficiently well-informed about conditions 
elsewhere could make a similar judgment about a YouTube video.261 
 
Elsewhere, Anthea Butler, associate professor of religious studies at the 
University of Pennsylvania and a guest columnist for USA Today, wrote, “While the First 
Amendment right to free expression is important, it is also important to remember that 
other countries and cultures do not have to understand or respect our right.”262 Sarah 
Chayes, former general counsel to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued in a widely published 
Op-Ed that Nakoula’s video met Brandenburg’s “imminent lawless action” standard,263 
and therefore the state has the ability to force it offline.264 Each of these authors 
denounced the deadly protests that followed the airing of the video, and none went so far 
as to say the video justified violence. However, although Chayes was the only one to 
argue that the video amounted to unprotected speech, all three authors agree that speech 
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can no longer only be judged by one set of norms. Refraining from publishing speech 
deemed offensive by a foreign set of norms may be in Americans’ best interest. Taking 
Post’s perspective,265 this chilling of speech by threat of riot amounts to an imposition of 
community norms by one group over another, and therefore it most certainly resembles a 
heckler’s veto. 
Abuse,	  Trolling	  and	  Gamergate	  
 
A new kind of heckler’s veto has emerged online: trolling.266 Unlike the examples 
of heckler’s vetoes discussed so far—both in the physical and online worlds—this type of 
heckler’s veto is not one that seeks to force the tone of public discourse to a tamer, less 
offensive level. Rather, this type of heckler’s veto seeks to silence one voice or a 
particular set of voices in public discourse through upping the level of offensiveness to 
the point of abuse.267 Instead of silencing a speaker by pressuring a digital intermediary 
to remove his or her speech due to its alleged violation of community norms, trolls create 
their own set of highly amplified fringe norms and force them into the online public 
discourse. The abusive practice of trolling disproportionately affects voices that are not 
completely members of mainstream discourse, namely female and minority voices.268 
Although the mechanism of the trolling variety of the heckler’s veto is different from the 
more traditional variety, the end result is the same: the public discourse becomes less 
diverse and less robust. 
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One particularly illustrative example of this variety of heckler’s veto is the case of 
female video game developers and reporters being abused on social media 
(predominantly on Twitter) in a saga that came to be known as “Gamergate.” The Twitter 
hashtag #gamergate originated with several video game enthusiasts who used it to 
express outrage over allegations that video game developer Zoe Quinn was sleeping with 
a reporter who covered the industry.269 The hashtag then started being used alongside 
death and rape threats against Quinn.270 Then, Anita Sarkeesian, a feminist cultural critic 
who focuses on the video game industry, started receiving threats of death and rape on 
Twitter and had to cancel public speaking events due to bomb threats.271 
The argument that trolling and online abuse constitute a heckler’s veto borrows 
reasoning from critical legal theorists (including critical race theorists272 and feminist 
legal scholars273), as well as certain new realist theorists,274 who argue that hostile speech 
leads the targets of that speech to silence themselves for fear of more verbal or even 
physical reprisals. This silencing effect leads these scholars to argue that by allowing 
hostile speech, traditional First Amendment jurisprudence actually goes against the 
ultimate First Amendment value of promoting a diverse and robust public discourse. Of 
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course, this argument runs into trouble with traditional notions of First Amendment 
jurisprudence, due to its ultimate call for the law to prohibit hostile speech in the name of 
protecting the betterment of the overall public discourse. However, for the purposes of 
identifying trolling as a variety of heckler’s veto, the argument is spot-on accurate. 
Professor Mary Anne Franks acknowledges this connection. She argues that the online 
world in which abuse has become prevalent is “a world in which only certain individuals 
enjoy the mythic degree of liberty … touted by cyberspace idealists, while others 
experience a loss of liberty and a re-entrenchment of physical restraints already unequally 
imposed upon them in the offline world.”275 Similarly, Professor Danielle Citron argues 
that stopping online abuse “would secure the necessary preconditions for free expression 
for targeted individuals.”276 Just as state actors must protect speakers from hostile 
audiences in brick-and-mortar heckler’s veto scenarios out of an affirmative duty to 
preserve the robustness of the public discourse, intermediaries must protect speakers from 
abuse to preserve the diversity and robustness of the online public discourse. 
This argument arrives at a fundamental point: preventing abuse and protecting 
freedom of speech are not necessarily mutually exclusive goals. Indeed, working to 
prevent abuse may help further the goal of protecting freedom of expression, for at least 
two reasons. The first reason is the argument discussed in the preceding paragraph: 
victims of abuse may be more likely to enter the public discourse as the abuse subsides. 
Second, preventing abuse will help decouple abusive speech from other forms of extreme 
speech (namely those that do not target specific individuals), rather than these two types 
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of speech being conflated into one category of socially undesirable speech that 
individuals and intermediaries should work to eradicate. Chapter 3 showed that making 
this distinction is not always easy.277 No matter, it is incumbent upon individuals and 
digital intermediaries to understand why the distinction exists, recognize the distinction in 
online public discourse, and work to preserve the distinction.  
Shaming	  
 
A third variety of the heckler’s veto in the online context is the concept of online 
shaming. Online shaming occurs when an online record of an individual’s offensive or 
socially undesirable speech or actions is publicly pilloried and spread virally through a 
digital intermediary.278 Privacy scholar Daniel Solove argues that online shaming is a 
variety of a longstanding human practice of “norm policing,” whereby individuals 
publicly chastise others for their socially undesirable speech or actions in an attempt to 
get them to recognize social norms and ultimately alter their behavior.279 However, 
Solove argues that online shaming is much more worrisome because “[h]aving a 
permanent record of norm violations is upping the sanction to a whole new level.”280 
Online shaming is akin to a heckler’s veto because it stigmatizes socially undesirable 
speech to an extreme extent, often resulting in the speaker suffering other forms of social 
punishment. For example, Justine Sacco, then senior director for corporate 
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communications for the media firm IAC, sent the following tweet on December 20, 2013, 
before boarding a flight to South Africa: “Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get AIDS. Just 
kidding. I’m white!”281 The public outcry was so strong that not only was Sacco fired 
from her job, but she has had difficulty building her reputation back up to its pre-tweet 
level.282 In another example, a blog has been set up on the blogging service Tumblr called 
“Racists Getting Fired (and Getting Racists Fired).”283 The site is home to posts of 
screenshots taken by vigilantes (sometimes anonymous, sometimes not) of racist 
comments (or at least what they consider to be racist comments) posted by individuals 
online, along with personal information about the individuals.284 Sometimes the 
vigilantes contact the individuals’ places of work to alert their employers in an attempt to 
get the individuals fired.285 When the strategy works, they post about that as well.286 
Sometimes the individuals admit to their racist comments, while other times individuals 
claim that the posts about them are false and being carried out against them by others 
who have a grudge against them.287 
At first glance, one may see online shaming as the potential price one must be 
prepared to pay for having a public presence online. Just as a person can reap the benefits 
of having a more positive or thought-provoking tweet or YouTube video go viral, one 
should also be subject to the consequences of a tweet like Sacco’s. Indeed, Professor 
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Post’s theory of “reputation as property” would lend support to this idea.288 Also, one 
could make the argument that online shaming is simply the marketplace of ideas at work 
in an online environment: desirable speech is simply pushing undesirable speech out of 
the market.289 And who could blame any employer from firing someone after he or she 
found out about the employee’s latent potential for racist outbursts? However, online 
shaming should be recognized as a heckler’s veto for three reasons.  
First, the practice of online shaming risks ensnaring (and thereby potentially 
chilling) speech of social and political significance.290 For example, the second half of 
2014 and early months of 2015 saw racial tensions hit a boiling point after white police 
officers killed unarmed black civilians Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and Eric 
Garner in Staten Island, New York. Analysts documented distinctly polarized pro-police 
and pro-Brown/Garner camps on social media, and noted that many of the pro-police 
messages had racist overtones.291 Although one may disagree with the racist overtones, 
the message of the tweets had clear social and political significance,292 which should be 
encouraged in times of great social turmoil such as what the country is dealing with today 
with racial issues. The threat of being fired due to vigilante justice for expressing such an 
                                                
288 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. 
L. REV. 691, 694 (1986). Post theorizes that reputation, like one’s fortune, is built of the “fruit of one’s own 
endeavors.” It can be spent or invested to build up one’s fortune, which, in turn, can be invested back into 
one’s good reputation. But it can also be subject to ruin through poor investment. 
289 See, e.g., MILL, supra note 193. 
290 See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
267, 270 (1991) (“Any communication can potentially express the racist self, and thus no communication 
can ever be safe from … sanction”). 
291 Mike Wendling, #BBCtrending: Ferguson Exposes Twitter’s Racial and Social Divisions Analysed, 
BBC NEWS TRENDING BLOG (Dec. 4, 2014).  
292 One example of a tweet with both a social message and racist overtones was: “I would feel safer, any 
day, to encounter #DarrenWilson on the street, than to meet #MichaelBrown or half of those now 
protesting!” (Darren Wilson was the name of the police officer who shot Michael Brown.) Id. 
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opinion could lead to that opinion being chilled, and therefore the robustness of the 
online public discourse as a whole suffers. Second, shaming individuals may not address 
the root problems that spurred the undesirable speech (such as racism). Shaming may 
even exacerbate the problem by deepening the beliefs of the speakers that led them to 
make the comments in the first place.293  
The third reason shaming acts like a heckler’s veto comes from Bollinger’s 
tolerance theory.294 Chilling undesirable speech through shaming may harm society by 
not exposing individuals to the extreme ideas that would make them more aware of the 
true scope of public discourse. Law professor Jerry Kang argues that witnessing racist 
speech online may not only lead individuals to become more aware of the overt, hostile 
extent to which racism still exists in the United States, but also lead more moderate 
                                                
293 See, e.g., Karen P. Leith & Roy F. Baumeister, Empathy, Shame, Guilt, and Narratives of Interpersonal 
Conflicts: Guilt-prone People Are Better at Perspective Talking, 66 J. OF PERSONALITY 1, 2 (1998) 
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expression acts as a “safety valve” to allow those with extreme viewpoints a safe outlet for those 
viewpoints, while suppression “engender[s] hostility, resentment, fear and other divisive forces,” Thomas I. 
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 929 (1963).  
294 BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY, supra note 5. 
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voices to talk openly about racial issues in American society.295 Such a potential social 
benefit of tolerating extreme speech online leads Kang to argue that “[i]n the abstract, 
one cannot decide what is the greater threat: the private power of individuals making 
racist comments that flaunt social norms of equality, or the private power of virtual 
community hosts trying to enforce such norms.”296 
Assessment 
 
Each of the examples above points to the notion that a fine line separates the 
natural workings of the marketplace of ideas from the silencing of unpopular speech 
through an amplified enforcement of a particular set of social norms. Each example 
involves its own distinct set of social norms, as well as distinct definitions of what 
constitutes acceptable and unacceptable speech according to those norms. Yet each 
variety of the heckler’s veto threatens speech in its own way. In brick-and-mortar hostile 
audience scenarios, police must control (or at least attempt to control) a violent crowd 
rather than arrest the speaker. Intermediaries do not have the ability to send police to 
protect the targets of angry rioters because the targets have almost nothing to do with the 
speaker. Police have constitutional guidelines and a civic duty to direct them on when to 
protect speech and when to stop it. However, in spite of these standards, sometimes 
unclear state laws, the heat of the moment, or even the police’s personal whims lead 
some officers to choose the latter course of action over the former. Intermediaries set 
their own, vague standards, and deal with cases vis-à-vis those standards as they arise.  
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Here, Post offers some guidance. As stated earlier, Post argues that one of the 
fundamental purposes of the First Amendment is to prevent government from imposing 
community norms of civility on public discourse.297 Essentially, Post’s position is that it 
is better to have a robust yet uncivil public discourse that leads to critical engagement 
among individuals with disparate beliefs than to have a public discourse that is cleansed 
of extreme positions out of a concern for civility.298 The only difference between Post’s 
theory and content governance is the entity that is enforcing the community norms: state 
actors versus private actors. 
Bollinger’s tolerance theory can help bridge the conceptual gap between hostile 
audience scenarios involving state-actor referees and those involving digital 
intermediaries. As discussed in chapter 3, Bollinger’s theory deals specifically with 
instances of “extremist speech.”299 Bollinger criticizes both marketplace of ideas theory 
and affirmative First Amendment theory for their inability to adequately justify extremist 
speech, and he argues that if the value of such speech cannot be assessed in terms of how 
it contributes to truth or effective self-governance, then it should be assessed in terms of 
how it affects our character.300 Tolerating extreme speech, Bollinger argues, “is intended 
and designed to perform a self-reformation function for the general community,”301 a 
function that takes the form of citizens tempering their natural tendency to be intolerant 
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toward extremist messages. This function follows Mill’s302 assertion that “confrontation 
with falsehood” gives people “a ‘livelier’ sense of the truths they themselves already 
hold.”303 Bollinger does not focus so much on what is true as he does on the process 
citizens go through to examine the many possible “truths” around them. Within this 
process, government acts as a role model for citizens, facilitating the growth of their 
tolerance by not banning extremist speech.304  
Digital intermediaries give extremists a wide reach, thereby affording them the 
potential to cause harm with their words on a larger scale than with a physically localized 
event.305 This potential makes Bollinger’s theory more important than ever. Just as we 
tolerate Nazis marching through Skokie, Illinois,306 we must also tolerate “Innocence of 
Muslims” making its way around the Internet. The government can urge us to tolerate the 
former through First Amendment jurisprudence, but it has no formal power to make us 
tolerate the latter. The Nazis’ speech can be forced out of the marketplace of ideas using 
counter speech. Yet for Bollinger, the marketplace is not a place that ideas should be 
forced out of; as tolerant citizens, we should never force speech completely out of the 
marketplace because, although the Nazis’ speech may cause harm, such speech is integral 
to the process of our self-reformation. This perspective recognizes the calls for Facebook 
or Google to remove content as a phenomenon that looks less like a function of the 
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marketplace of ideas and more like what Bhagwat calls “societal vetoes of unpopular 
associations.”307  
To preserve the social benefit of some types of extreme speech and protect the 
victims of other, more directly harmful types, intermediaries need well-defined and 
uniform standards that distinguish these types of speech. The foundation for defining 
harmful speech should be the fighting words, incitement, and true threat exceptions to 
free speech as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court.308 Intermediaries’ calculations of 
whether some types of extreme speech should be considered incitement should not 
involve the speech’s tendency to indirectly provoke hostile audiences to action. Instead, 
intermediaries should have clear standards distinguishing UGC that is extreme or uncivil 
from UGC that directly abuses a specific person, such as through revenge porn, cyber-
bullying, trolling and cyber-harassment.  
Conclusion 
 
Mainstream online communication platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are 
becoming the locus of public discourse. What is said online has the potential to reach vast 
audiences and affect those audiences deeply. Hecklers no longer merely line the sidewalk 
across the police barricade from an incendiary speaker. Hecklers are also rioters who 
wreak havoc a world away from where a speaker uploads his or her inflammatory video 
to YouTube. Hecklers are the online crowds who petition Facebook to remove speech 
with which they disagree. Hecklers are the trolls who take to Twitter to intimidate women 
who speak up for a cause. Understanding how U.S. jurisprudence has treated hecklers 
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throughout the last half-century is important for understanding how to judge hecklers 
today in networked communication. After some time brewing in the 1940s, 1950s and 
1960s, the doctrine of the heckler’s veto came to stand for the principle that state actors 
have a duty to protect speakers from hostile audiences who would seek to either actually 
do harm to the speakers, or threaten to do harm and thereby force law enforcement to 
silence the speaker. The doctrine of the heckler’s veto teaches that individuals cannot 
take the easy way out with speech that they don’t like, disagree with, or find offensive. 
Individuals cannot succumb to simply following community norms. At the same time, 
society cannot allow norm policing and trolling to be amplified to such an extent that it 
chills potentially valuable speech. For the most part, the state does not police speech 
online; that task is left to individuals and intermediaries. The doctrine of the heckler’s 
veto has established the state’s position of showing tolerance toward and a duty to protect 
unpopular speech. Individuals and digital intermediaries should heed Bollinger’s theory 
of tolerance:309 follow the example of government and show tolerance when faced with 
the potential to silence unpopular speech online. 
This study of the changing norms of free speech in a context of greater 
intermediary and heckler control over speech is not an endorsement of the concept of 
“private censorship,” a term that generically defines the ability of powerful private 
institutions to prevent important messages from reaching the public. Several of the 
scholars cited here embrace the term,310 as do certain European scholars,311 and American 
                                                
309 BOLLINGER, supra note 5, at 110. 
310 Nunziato, supra note 214. 
311 Mac Síthigh, supra note 213.  
   
190 
proponents of the political economy school of studying mass media.312 The problem with 
“private censorship” is its semantic fallacy; by definition, only government can censor. 
Not only that, but loosely using the term “censorship” outside of its proper context is 
grossly offensive to those who must endure actual censorship at the hands of their 
government.313 Intermediary “control” or “governance” should be considered its own 
issue, without conceptual ties to “censorship.” Doing so will help the study of 
intermediary control retain legitimacy,314 thereby leading to theoretically and doctrinally 
sound approaches to deal with the issue in both legal and social scientific research. 
Popular condemnation of unpopular online speech, coupled with powerful 
intermediaries ready to answer to the demands of that popular condemnation, has more 
potential to quash speech than the marketplace of ideas should allow. Action must be 
taken to spare socially and politically valuable speech that is unpopular, extreme, or 
otherwise controversial from the whims of the heckling majority. For example, students 
should be taught about the nature of civil online discourse from a young age. In other 
words, “what free speech means in online communications” should be a topic that is 
taught as if it were part of a middle school civics course traditionally devoted to 
discussing free speech in public forums. Students should be taught what it means to be 
both a speaker sticking her or his neck out online, and part of the crowd that has the 
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power to silence the speaker through heckling. Citizens should have civic standards 
informing them when it is their responsibility to tolerate speech, and when they have the 
responsibility to mobilize the crowd to prevent harm.
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The purpose of this study is to explicate the concept of content governance: the 
control that digital communication intermediaries exercise over user-generated content 
(UGC). The particular focus of this explication is the governance of extreme UGC. Two 
key questions guide this explication: How and why do digital intermediaries respond to 
extreme UGC? What are the potential implications of their responses for public discourse 
in a system of networked communication?  
All digital intermediaries engage in varying degrees of content governance. For 
example, in late 2014, Twitter deactivated the accounts of several users who proclaimed 
to be members of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).1 This is an example 
of intermediaries removing content after users flagged it for violating the intermediaries’ 
community standards.2 As discussed in chapter 4, Google, the parent company of 
YouTube, removed the video “Innocence of Muslims” from view on the platform in 
several countries in September 2012.3 This episode was an example of an intermediary 
removing content because government actors demanded its removal through a legal 
                                                
1 Jillian C. York, Terrorists on Twitter, SLATE (June 25, 2014), available at 
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order,4 as well as an example of an intermediary removing content in certain countries on 
its own volition.5  
Content governance can vary in terms of the intermediary, the content in question 
and the reason for its removal. These variables make the total possible varieties of 
content governance too numerous to discuss in an entire dissertation, let alone one 
chapter. Therefore, this chapter will focus on how one specific digital intermediary—
Facebook—governs extreme UGC. The choice to examine Facebook’s content 
governance practices was made for several reasons. 
As of this writing, Facebook is the second-most popular site on the World Wide 
Web,6 with reportedly more than 1.39 billion active monthly users.7 Women (58% of 
users) use Facebook only slightly more than men (42%), thus highlighting the relative 
gender parity of the social network.8 In the United States, 71% of all adult Internet users 
were using Facebook in September 2014.9 The U.S. Facebook population also has a vast 
age range: in January 2014, 9.8 million users (5.4% of all users) were 13-17 years old, 42 
million (23.3%) were 18-24, 44 million (24.4%) were 25-34, 56 million (31.1%) were 35-
54, and 28 million (15.6%) were over the age of 55.10 U.S. Facebook users tend to vary 
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considerably in terms of political ideology.11 Facebook’s diversity extends well beyond 
the United States: as of March 2015, the company reports that 82.4% of its active users 
are outside the United States and Canada.12 The platform is also diverse in terms of its 
function and the types of content that can be published on the site. Individuals use 
Facebook for a variety of reasons, such as entertainment, keeping up-to-date on the lives 
of friends and family, keeping up-to-date with news and current events, becoming 
civically engaged, and receiving support from people in their network.13 Facebook is 
beginning to seriously challenge YouTube as the preferential site where users both 
upload and view videos.14  
This collection of statistics makes Facebook an excellent subject for an analysis of 
content governance. It is not a niche platform that only caters to one target audience or to 
facilitating the publication of one type of UGC, thereby making it “the closest thing we 
have to a universal communication platform.”15 Its popularity and ubiquity mean that any 
changes it makes to its community guidelines will have a far-reaching effect on the norms 
of online freedom of expression. Facebook’s users vary widely in terms of the social 
norms of freedom of expression that they come from, meaning that the social network 
faces the difficult task of seeking consensus among serious and potentially intractable 
                                                
11 See Timothy Macafee, Some of These Things Are Not Like the Others: Examining Motivations and 
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195 
differences in how users interpret the values and harms of certain types of speech.16 The 
potential for lines separating abusive speech, political speech, hate speech and speech 
promoting terrorism to get blurred among this diverse group of users means that 
Facebook “walks a delicate line when it tries to ban violent or offensive content without 
suppressing the free sharing of information that it says it wants to encourage.”17 This 
chapter seeks to examine where Facebook—the virtually universal communication 
platform—draws this delicate line. 
This chapter will review important changes that have been made to Facebook’s 
community standards throughout its 11-year history. This analysis will involve 
comparing and contrasting cached snapshots of Facebook’s community standards or 
terms of service pages18 as compiled by the Internet Archive’s “Wayback Machine.”19 
Two criteria will guide the analysis of these pages. First, the analysis will look for 
changes in policies over the course of 11 years. This analysis will require tracking which 
items get added to newer versions of the standards and subtracted from older versions, as 
well as noting if or how definitions of certain key terms (such as “hate speech”) change 
over time. Second, several benchmarks will be used to assess how Facebook’s 
community standards balance protection of individuals’ speech with prevention of harm. 
These benchmarks include legal tests for distinguishing protected from unprotected 
speech (discussed in chapters 3 and 4), as well as Facebook’s interests within the 
                                                
16 See Michael Zimmer, Facebook’s Censorship Problem, HUFFINGTON POST (June 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-zimmer/facebooks-censorship-prob_b_852001.html. 
17 Goel, supra note 15. 
18 According to the Internet Archive, infra, Facebook did not create a separate page outlining community 
standards until 2011. A “Code of Conduct” page existed from May 2007 until 2011. Before then, all 
stipulations for what constituted allowable versus unallowable content was contained in Facebook’s 
“Terms of Service” page. 
19 Wayback Machine, INTERNET ARCHIVE, available at http://archive.org/web/. 
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networked economy (discussed in chapter 2). Obviously, Facebook’s community 
standards need not be as protective of speech as First Amendment jurisprudence, and the 
purpose of the analysis is not to make such an obvious argument. Rather, the goal of 
assessing Facebook’s standards vis-à-vis legal standards is simply to understand which 
areas of speech Facebook protects or restricts more than others.  
Next, this chapter will review examples of Facebook either removing or not 
removing extreme UGC that appeared to contravene the social network’s community 
guidelines. The goal of this analysis is to give some empirical examples of how Facebook 
has governed UGC in accordance with its community standards. Methodologically 
speaking, these examples have much in common with cases in traditional First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Both sets of examples can be analyzed to illustrate broader 
principles of issues of freedom of expression. “Despite being a small sliver of overall 
activity, these events [of governing extreme speech on Facebook] have come to typify the 
dramatic struggles some users face” between protecting their ability to speak freely on 
Facebook and protecting themselves from harmful speech.20 Similarly, First Amendment 
cases heard at the federal appellate level are outlier cases that do not reflect the “normal” 
course of interaction among speakers and audiences in the United States, yet these 
extreme cases represent the vanguard that ensures the protection of all communicative 
interactions, normal or fringe.21 Therefore, the examples discussed herein are important 
because they create the contours of the constantly shifting norms of acceptable speech 
                                                
20 Luke Lancaster, Facebook Updates Standards to Explain What It Will Remove, CNET (Mar. 16, 2015), 
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among users on Facebook.22 
The chapter will conclude with a discussion on the broader implications of this 
analysis. Namely, this analysis can serve as an illustrative example of how norms of 
freedom of expression are being defined for networked communication via digital 
intermediaries. It also can shed light on the potential extent to which tolerance for 
extreme speech is changing in a networked communication environment. 
Evolution of Facebook’s Speech Codes and Community Standards 
 
Digital intermediaries like Facebook must balance protecting users from harm and 
protecting users’ ability to speak. They must distinguish between speech that causes 
actual harm from speech that merely offends. As clearly and transparently as possible, 
they must give definitions for each of these categories. They must determine when speech 
that contains a social or political message is worthy of protection and when it is liable for 
removal. They must walk a fine line between governing speech too strictly and too 
lightly, and they must explain their actions (or lack thereof) using strategic messages that 
simultaneously do not alienate champions of freedom of expression or advocates for 
stricter policing of harmful speech. They must justify how their standards allow some 
atrocious messages (such as the misogynist Facebook pages discussed in chapter 4) while 
they clamp down on arguably more innocuous and more socially valuable messages (such 
                                                
22 The analysis of examples of Facebook’s controversial content governance is separate from the analysis of 
Facebook’s terms of service and community standards because each analysis approaches content 
governance from a unique angle. The analysis of the evolution of Facebook’s speech codes highlights the 
ambiguity with which Facebook has crafted policies that purport to both promote speech and protect users 
from harm. Meanwhile, the analysis of examples of content governance points to the subjectivity involved 
in judging the appropriateness of certain types of speech, which itself stems from the ambiguity of 
Facebook’s speech codes.  
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as images of breastfeeding). Within this conflicted context, this study seeks to tackle the 
following research questions regarding Facebook’s practices of content governance: 
RQ1: How have Facebook’s community standards changed from the 
origins of the social network until the standards’ most recent 
update in March 2015? 
 
RQ2: What instances have there been of Facebook controversially 
removing or not removing extreme UGC that seemed to 
contravene Facebook’s community standards? 
 
Like any website offering a service of any kind, Facebook has a page listing its 
terms and conditions that users must abide by. These terms include common matters such 
as personal jurisdiction, limitations on liability, and indemnity.23 Facebook’s policy 
regarding the privacy of users’ data has received particular scrutiny among both 
journalists24 and scholars.25 The focus of this section, however, is on Facebook’s terms 
and conditions as they apply to the speech that users are allowed to publish on 
Facebook.26 This analysis is framed in terms of the chronological changes to Facebook’s 
policies—as opposed to, say, an analysis framed in terms of the changes to particular 
categories of speech—because the goal of this chapter is to show the evolutionary 
process of Facebook’s speech codes as a whole. This choice was made because such a 
process resembles the more protracted evolutionary process of First Amendment 
                                                
23 See, e.g., Sandra Braman & Stephanie Roberts, Advantage ISP: Terms of Service as Media Law, 5 NEW 
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jurisprudence in the United States since the 1930s. It is argued here that the nature of the 
evolutionary process, itself, will reveal Facebook’s attempts to balance its support for 
freedom of expression and protecting users from harmful speech. 
Methods 
 
To assess potential changes to Facebook’s community standards, this chapter 
examines cached copies of the pages that include Facebook’s policies toward users’ 
speech, as archived by the “Wayback Machine” of the Internet Archive project.27 
Assembling a body of cached pages requires one to enter a current URL into a search bar 
on the Wayback Machine’s site. The service then sends back a list of dates at which its 
“bots” had taken a “snapshot” of the page corresponding to the URL. These cached pages 
look and function like live webpages (i.e. they are not JPEG or PDF files of the pages). 
However, not all the links on these pages will lead to pages that were cached on the same 
date (i.e. clicking on a link in a cached page will only open onto that link’s page if the 
Wayback Machine also has a cached version of that page in its system).  
 
Figure 5-1: Wayback Machine snapshots of Facebook’s “Community Standards” page 
                                                
27 Supra note 19. 
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The process of collecting pages for this analysis began with entering the URL 
“https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards” (the current URL as of March 2015) 
into the Wayback Machine’s search bar. The results indicate that this site only has been 
saved in the Machine’s database after January 27, 2011 (see Figure 5-1: Wayback 
Machine snapshots of Facebook’s “Community Standards). This does not necessarily 
mean that this site did not exist before that date, but rather that the Wayback Machine 
only began saving it at that date, or that the URL did not exist prior to the date. However, 
it is a strong clue that a specific page for Facebook’s community standards did not exist 
before that date. Using this clue, the next URLs entered into the Machine were both 
“www.facebook.com” (the company’s current root URL) and “www.thefacebook.com” 
(the company’s original root URL). On the earliest possible versions of each of those 
sites, the link to the company’s terms and conditions was clicked on. This link was 
chosen because no other link on the company’s main page indicated that it contained 
anything about guidelines for users’ speech. The earliest working link for 
“www.thefacebook.com/terms.php” was June 13, 2004 (only a few months after the 
company was founded). The latest update for this URL was June 28, 2005. After this 
date, the company switched its root URL from “www.thefacebook.com” to 
“www.facebook.com.” Thus, the URL “https://www.facebook.com/terms.php” was 
entered into the Wayback Machine’s search bar, which returned nearly 3,000 cached 
snapshots of this page from November 26, 2005 to the time of this writing (March 2015). 
The analysis of the “terms of use” page from May 24, 2007, revealed when Facebook 
created its first separate “Content Code of Conduct” page to supplement its “terms of 
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use” page. According to the Wayback Machine, this URL existed from May 2007 to 
August 2010. (See Figure 5-2. The site reports that it took snapshots of the page 
containing this URL until February 2013, but all snapshots after August 2010 show this 
URL returned a “Page Not Found” message.) 
 
Figure 5-2: Wayback Machine snapshots of Facebook’s short-lived “Code of Conduct” page 
Combining the collection of cached pages from the URLs 
“https://www.thefacebook.com/terms.php,” “https://www.facebook.com/terms.php,” 
“http://www.facebook.com/codeofconduct.php,” and 
“https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards,” the method for collecting followed 
the following rationale. Links to snapshots of both sets of “Terms” pages were clicked on 
until a link showed a snapshot with an updated date (clearly visible on the top of the 
page). PDFs were made of each of these pages to facilitate the analysis (N = 14). Clicking 
through the links to snapshots of the “Code of Conduct” page revealed that this page was 
never updated during its entire lifespan28 (thus, N = 1). Unlike the “Terms of Use” and 
“Statement of Rights and Responsibilities” pages, the “Community Standards” page does 
not contain dates of official updates. Thus, the method of selecting cached pages from the 
                                                




Wayback Machine to analyze involved randomly selecting a one page roughly per year 
from the Machine’s timeline. The dates of cached pages analyzed here are: February 9, 
2011 (the original page); December 15, 2012; November 9, 2013; and February 8, 2015 
(n = 4) (see Appendix 2: Facebook’s Community Standards).29 Added to this collection 
was Facebook’s March 15, 2015, major update to its community standards, which was 
not yet available on the Wayback Machine at the time of writing.30  
The content analysis of these documents involved a close reading31 of the portions 
of the “terms and conditions” and “community standards” pages that involved users’ 
speech. This close reading involved comparing and contrasting the language used in the 
key sections being analyzed. Any language that was added, deleted, or changed within 
these sections was highlighted. The results and a discussion of this analysis are discussed 
in tandem below, in two separate sections: “Terms of Use/Rights and Responsibilities” 
and “Code of Conduct/Community Standards.” 
                                                
29 The element of randomness comes from the lack of knowledge of the exact date that the Wayback 
Machine will return when one clicks on its timeline feature. Only four pages were chosen based on an 
assumption that the pages would not change drastically. The analysis herein validates that assumption. 
30 It should be noted here that using the Wayback Machine as a means to capture changes to Facebook’s 
policies has its weaknesses. First, there is no guarantee that anyone actually saw any of the versions of 
these pages when they were live. In other words, the cached pages simply could be snapshots of a page that 
was only briefly published on Facebook’s servers. Second, it is possible that changes that Facebook made 
to its pages may never have been cached, meaning that important changes to the social network’s terms of 
use could be missing from the history according to the Wayback Machine. Despite these limitations, it is 
argued here that the Wayback Machine nevertheless gives researchers a sufficiently large and varied 
sample to accurately assess the changes to Facebook’s terms and conditions over the last 11 years. 
31 The term “close reading” is widely used in legal research to refer to a critical, qualitative textual analysis 
of legal language (e.g. from a case or statute) whose goal is to uncover broader contextual meaning beyond 
the plain language. In the field of mass communication, this method of analysis and its ultimate goal is no 
different than a qualitative analysis of texts such as images or news reporting. See, e.g., NORMAN 
FAIRCLOUGH, DISCOURSE AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1992); Elfriede Fürsich, In Defense of Textual Analysis, 
10 JOURNALISM STUDIES 238 (2009); GIOVANNA DELL’ORTO, THE HIDDEN POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
DREAM: WHY EUROPE’S SHAKEN CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES THREATENS THE FUTURE OF 
U.S. INFLUENCE (2008); THOMAS R. LINDLOF AND BRYAN C. TAYLOR, QUALITATIVE 
COMMUNICATION RESEARCH METHODS 246 (2011); William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, Media 
Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach, 95 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY, 





Terms	  of	  Use/Rights	  and	  Responsibilities	  
 
Together, the “Terms” and “Standards” pages follow a broad trend of moving 
from general rules to more specific rules over time. Facebook also appears to improve the 
organization of the information on these pages over time. The earliest “terms” page (titled 
“Terms of Use”) contains only basic guidelines regarding users’ speech. The site contains 
the broad stipulation: “You understand and agree that Thefacebook may review and 
delete any content, photos or profiles (collectively ‘Content’) that in the sole judgement 
[sic] of Thefacebook violate this Agreement of which might be offensive, illegal, or that 
might violate the rights, harm, or threaten the safety of Members.”32 Regarding the 
protection of users from harm, the terms state: “Although Thefacebook cannot monitor 
the conduct of its members off the Web site, it is also a violation of these rules to use any 
information obtained from the Service in order to harass, abuse, or harm another 
person.”33 Two observations can be made here. First, “TheFacebook” has sole discretion 
over what content violates its policies, and it is not sharing its reasoning behind that 
discretion with its users at this time. Second, TheFacebook claims no responsibility to 
adequately police the content that users publish; in the words of legal scholars Sandra 
Braman and Stephanie Roberts, it is exercising “control without responsibility.”34 One 
specific prohibition that the terms state is that users will not create any profiles “that 
purport to represent an animal, place, inanimate objects, fictional character, or real 
                                                
32 TheFacebook Terms of Use, INTERNET ARCHIVE (June 13, 2004), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20040613185924/http://www.thefacebook.com/terms.php. 
33 Id. 
34 Braman & Roberts, supra note 23, at 438. 
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individual who is not you.”35 This “real name” policy continues to the present day (at the 
time of this writing), and, as will be shown below in accounts of several examples, it 
continues to be a thorn in the side for several groups of users.36 
The “Terms of Use” update from June 28, 2005, contains the same language as 
the June 13, 2004 page regarding the company’s ability to review and delete content, but 
it now includes a specific section titled “Member Conduct.”37 In this section, Facebook 
states that it prohibits “libelous, defamatory or otherwise unlawful material.”38 Abuse 
continues to be an important phenomenon for Facebook to control, though the company 
continues to convey that it has sole discretion over defining when content violates its 
policies. It prohibits users from posting “any content that we deem to be harmful, 
threatening, abusive, harassing, vulgar, obscene, hateful, or racially, ethnically or 
otherwise objectionable.”39 It reiterates in a separate paragraph that users are not allowed 
to “intimidate or harass another” user.40  
An October 3, 2005, update to the “Terms of Use” page (with the company now 
called Facebook rather than TheFacebook) contained no changes to rules governing 
users’ speech, though this update coincides with Facebook’s decision to open its platform 
up to individuals over the age of 13, rather than 18.41 Age will become an important 
                                                
35 Id. 
36 See infra notes 134-137. 
37 TheFacebook Terms of Use, INTERNET ARCHIVE (June 28, 2005), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050630235618/http://www.thefacebook.com/terms.php. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. (emphasis added). 
40 Id. 




factor in how Facebook crafts its community standards.42 A February 27, 2006, update 
similarly contained no changes to rules governing users’ speech.43  
Facebook’s December 13, 2006, update adds several new provisions to the 
company’s speech rules.44 The list of Facebook’s prohibited content now includes “any 
content that we deem to be harmful, threatening, unlawful, defamatory, infringing, 
abusive, inflammatory, harassing, vulgar, obscene, fraudulent, invasive of privacy or 
publicity rights, hateful, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable.”45 The new 
terms also ban “content that would constitute, encourage or provide instructions for a 
criminal offense, violate the rights of any party, or that would otherwise create liability or 
violate any local, state, national or international law.”46 Three new observations can be 
made here. First, Facebook appears to acknowledge that the speech published on its 
platform can and does have major social and legal repercussions in the physical world.47 
Second, Facebook specifically singles out speech related to the category of “criminal 
activity” as a concern, yet it does not give more specific information on what such speech 
would look like. Third, Facebook combines elements of all three of Smolla’s categories 
of harm into one amalgamation of prohibited speech: physical, relational and reactive 
                                                
42 See Community Standards, FACEBOOK (Mar. 15, 2015), available at 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards (the standards state that Facebook “restrict[s] the display 
of nudity because some audiences within [its] global community may be sensitive to this type of content - 
particularly because of their cultural background or age”). 
43 Facebook Terms of Use, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Feb. 27, 2006), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060301120239/http://www.facebook.com/terms.php. 
44 Facebook Terms of Use, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Dec. 13, 2006), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070202024540/http://www.facebook.com/terms.php 
45 Id. (emphasis added). 
46 Id. 
47 See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 1367 (1996). 
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harms.48 The danger in lumping all of these harms together is that Facebook may cease to 
recognize the constitutional distinctions among these three harms and the level of 
protection that each should receive according to First Amendment jurisprudence. 
The terms also prohibit “content that, in the sole judgment of Company, is 
objectionable or which restricts or inhibits any other person from using or enjoying the 
Site, or which may expose Company or its Users to any harm or liability of any type.”49 
Like the prohibitions listed above, these terms make clear that Facebook is the ultimate 
arbiter when it comes to deciding between allowable and unallowable activity. Unlike the 
prohibitions listed above, the focus of these terms is much broader, encompassing issues 
of potential legal liability and the prevention of others’ use of Facebook as well as 
objectionable content. This provision serves as a vague catchall to back up the already 
vague terms and conditions pertaining to users’ speech. 
The November 15, 2007 update of the “Terms of Use” page adds one important 
stipulation from the May update: “FACEBOOK DOES NOT PRE-SCREEN OR 
APPROVE FACEBOOK PAGES.”50 Here, Facebook is reiterating its longtime policy of 
not having responsibility over the content users create. The September 23, 2008 update 
contains no changes to the rules governing user speech.51 
                                                
48 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 48 (1992) 
49 Id. (emphasis added). 
50 Facebook Terms of Use, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Nov. 15, 2007) (all-caps in original), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080102211804/http://www.facebook.com/terms.php. 




On May 1, 2009, the “Terms of Use” page becomes the “Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities” page.52 With this change in title, Facebook appears to be recognizing 
users’ communicative agency via its platform while establishing a partnership with users 
to help ensure the company and its community enjoy continued growth and prosperity 
through harmonious relations. Along with the change in title, the page includes major 
changes to the organization of its policies, as well as an attempt to convey those policies 
in simple, less legal-sounding language. Under the subhead “Safety,” the page states, 
“We [Facebook] do our best to keep Facebook safe, but we cannot guarantee it. We need 
your help to do that, which includes the following commitments.”53 Despite the attempt 
by the language to engage users as partners in maintaining the Facebook “community,” 
the list of prohibited content remains virtually unchanged. No official attempt is made to 
either expand or contract the types of speech that Facebook will allow. The page 
mandates that users “will not bully, intimidate or harass any user,” “will not post content 
that is hateful, threatening, pornographic, or that contains nudity or graphic or gratuitous 
violence,” and “will not use Facebook to do anything unlawful, misleading, malicious, or 
discriminatory.”54 The August 28, 2009 update adds: “You will not develop or operate a 
third-party application containing alcohol-related or other mature content (including 
advertisements) without appropriate age-based restrictions.”55 This particular update is a 
reflection of Facebook’s expansion into selling advertising, and it reveals a desire for 
                                                








commercial content posted on the site to comport with the social network’s community 
standards.56 
The December 21, 2009 update of the “Statement of Rights and Responsibilities” 
page includes two new provisions for Facebook pages.57 Pages “look similar to personal 
profiles,” and “are managed by people who have personal profiles,” but they are designed 
“for businesses, brands and organizations” to build a public presence among Facebook’s 
users.58 Regarding user governance of pages, the new guidelines state, “You may not 
establish terms beyond those set forth in this Statement to govern the posting of content 
by users on a Page you administer, except you may disclose they types of content you 
will remove from your Page and grounds for which you may ban a user from accessing 
the Page.”59 They continue, “You will restrict access to your Page in order to comply 
with all applicable laws. For example, if your Page includes content not suitable for 
minors, you will use your Page to block minors from accessing your Page.”60 Thus, 
Facebook is giving users greater control over the governance of the pages they create, 
while simultaneously stipulating that Facebook’s own speech guidelines are the ultimate 
source of authority on which users should base their governance practices. These 
provisions were moved to a separate “Page Terms” site in the April 22, 2010 “Statement 
                                                




57 Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Dec. 21, 2009), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20100402021418/http://www.facebook.com/terms.php. 
58 How Are Pages Different from Profiles? FACEBOOK HELP CENTER (2015), available at 
https://www.facebook.com/help/217671661585622. See also Tiffany Black, Facebook Profile vs. 
Facebook Page vs. Facebook Group, ABOUT TECH (n.d.), available at 
http://facebook.about.com/od/Basics/fr/Facebook-Profile-Vs-Facebook-Page-Vs-Facebook-Group.htm. 




of Rights and Responsibilities” update.61 The “Rights and Responsibilities” page’s rules 
governing users’ speech do not change from August 25, 2010,62 to January 30, 201563 
(the most recent update as of this writing). 
Code	  of	  Conduct/Community	  Standards	  
 
May	  2007	  –	  January	  2015	  
 
On May 24, 2007, Facebook first unveiled its “Code of Conduct,” which users 
could access via a link in the “Terms of Use” page.64 As stated above, this page was 
never updated during its entire lifespan.65 This new page (see Appendix 1: Content Code 
of Conduct) does not add anything new to the rules governing speech found in 
Facebook’s “Terms” or “Rights and Responsibilities” pages. Rather, the “Content Code 
of Conduct” page can be considered an effort to move the rules governing speech onto 
one page, separate from other terms and conditions. As stated above, according to the 
Wayback Machine, Facebook’s “Code of Conduct” page became its “Community 
Standards” page on or around January 27, 2011 (see Figure 5-1: Wayback Machine 
snapshots of Facebook’s “Community Standards” page, and Figure 5-2: Wayback 
Machine snapshots of Facebook’s short-lived “Code of Conduct” page).66 All changes to 
the “Community Standards” page are highlighted in the Appendix (see Appendix 2: 
                                                
61 Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Apr. 22, 2010), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20100602022403/http://www.facebook.com/terms.php. 
62 Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Aug. 25, 2010), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20100929171235/https://www.facebook.com/terms.php. 
63 Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Jan. 30, 2015), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20150301012017/https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms. 
64 Facebook Content Code of Conduct, INTERNET ARCHIVE (May 24, 2007). 
65 Supra note 28. 




Facebook’s Community Standards). The present analysis will discuss important trends in 
those changes. 
The first important change found in the Community Standards is how Facebook 
refers to itself: as a “global community”67 rather than a “social utility.”68 Thus, the pretext 
for these updated standards comes from the notion that Facebook is a place or an 
experience rather than simply a tool for communication. Second, the Community 
Standards organize problematic areas of speech by category: Threats; Promoting Self-
Harm; Bullying & Harassment; Hate Speech; Graphic Violence; Sex & Nudity; Theft, 
Vandalism, or Fraud; Identity & Privacy; Intellectual Property; and Phishing & Spam.69 
The types of speech that fall within these categories are not new to Facebook’s rules 
(they’re consistently found within the “Rights and Responsibilities” page), but their 
organization into specific categories conveys them with added seriousness and gives 
users the potential to better recognize these problematic types of speech. Third, Facebook 
includes instructions on how users can report abuse to the officials at the company. Here, 
Facebook conveys the caveat that not all offensive or disagreeable material will violate 
its Standards and therefore qualify for removal. Instead, Facebook states that it offers 
users tools to personally filter any content they find offensive.70 These personal filtering 
tools are beyond the scope of the present analysis. Many scholars have conducted 
research on whether tools such as these contribute to creating a so-called “echo chamber” 
in which individuals only encounter and engage with content that they agree with or that 
                                                
67 Facebook Community Standards, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Feb. 9, 2011), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20110209013433/https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards//. 





they do not find offensive.71 Their research poses interesting questions for how much 
such an echo chamber—to the extent that it exists—may affect individuals’ tolerance 
toward extreme speech. Although these questions must be set aside for future research, 
for the present analysis it is important to point out that Facebook is willing to give users a 
more insular experience on its platform in the event that its community standards alone 
are not enough to create a safe environment for these users. 
This basic organization of problematic speech does not change in future updates. 
Rather, updates add new categories of problematic speech, clarify certain categories with 
context or specific examples, or make categories more vague. The updated page cached 
on December 15, 2012,72 contains numerous updates to the original Standards (see 
Appendix 2: Facebook’s Community Standards). The page no longer refers to Facebook 
as a “global community,” but rather claims that the “conversation that happens on 
Facebook—and the opinions expressed here—mirror the diversity of the people using 
Facebook.”73 Under “Violence and Threats,” Facebook expands from simply prohibiting 
“credible threats” to banning any speech that could possibly result in “physical harm,” a 
“direct threat to public safety,” or the potential for “real-world violence” or “financial 
                                                
71 See, e.g., Elanor Colleoni, Alessandro Rozza & Adam Arvidsson, Echo Chamber or Public Sphere? 
Predicting Political Orientation and Measuring Political Homophily in Twitter Using Big Data, 64 J. 
COMM. 317, 328 (2014) (finding: “If we look at Twitter as a social medium we see higher levels of 
homophily and a more echo chamber-like structure of communication. But if we instead focus on Twitter 
as a news medium, looking at information diffusion regardless of social ties, we see lower levels of 
homophily and a more public sphere-like scenario.”); Jonathan Zittrain, The Fourth Quadrant, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2767, 2767 (2010) (arguing that social networking sites are platforms in which only 
certain content is “cultivate[d] and accelerate[d].” 





harm.”74 Although these provisions do not completely follow the true threat or incitement 
standards found in First Amendment jurisprudence (nor do they provide the same high 
level of protection for speech as these standards), they do convey the notion that physical 
harm resulting from speech is the worst possible harm and therefore such speech has the 
potential to be regulated.75 Under “Self-Harm,” Facebook notes that it will work 
specifically with “suicide prevention agencies around the world”76 rather than “the 
relevant authorities”77 to offer users help when the company becomes aware of suicidal 
content.  
Under “Hate Speech,” the policy says that Facebook will distinguish “between 
serious and humorous speech.”78 The fact that Facebook is recognizing this distinction 
seems to reveal a firmer commitment on the part of the social network to protect users’ 
speech, or at the very least offer somewhat clearer standards on what counts as protected 
versus unprotected in the category of hate speech. Interestingly, the update now defines 
hate speech as “attacks against others”79 rather than “singl[ing] out individuals.”80 This 
change potentially broadens the definition of hate speech to include attacks against 
groups of people, and it also distinguishes hate speech from personal abuse or bullying 
against a specific individual. Facebook may also be attempting to sound more sensitive in 
the very language of its terms, as the term “disease”—one of the conditions from the 
                                                
74 Id. 
75 See SMOLLA, supra note 48. 
76 Id. 
77 Facebook Community Standards, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Feb. 9, 2011). 
78 Facebook Community Standards, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Dec. 15, 2012). 
79 Id. 
80 Facebook Community Standards, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Feb. 9, 2011). 
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original standards denoting classes of individuals protected from hate speech—is changed 
to the more generic and neutral term “medical condition.”81 
The category “Graphic Violence” is given the more generic label “Graphic 
Content” in the December 2012 update, and the types of speech prohibited under this 
category are also expressed in more general terms. Instead of “[s]adistic displays of 
violence against people or animals, or depictions of sexual assault”82 being prohibited, 
“any graphic content [shared] for sadistic pleasure”83 is prohibited under the December 
update. Meanwhile, the “Nudity and Pornography” category is outlined in more specific 
terms. Instead of there being a “strict ‘no nudity or pornography’ policy,”84 Facebook 
now “aspires to respect people’s right to share content of personal importance, whether 
those are photos of a sculpture like Michelangelo’s David or family photos of a child 
breastfeeding.”85  
What is important about these changes to the policies governing the categories of 
hate speech, graphic content and nudity/pornography is that Facebook is choosing to 
focus on the intent of the speaker rather than simply the nature of the speech. On the one 
hand, this approach puts Facebook’s standards more in step with legal tests distinguishing 
protected from unprotected speech in First Amendment jurisprudence. For example, one 
interpretation of Justice O’Connor’s enunciation of the true threat test requires proof that 
a person accused of threatening someone actually intended the utterance to be 
                                                
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Facebook Community Standards, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Dec. 15, 2012). 
84 Facebook Community Standards, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Feb. 9, 2011). 
85 Facebook Community Standards, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Dec. 15, 2012). 
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threatening.86 Likewise, the test for obscenity requires the state to prove that the allegedly 
obscene speech has no “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”87 On the 
other hand, this approach gives no indication as to how intent will be determined, and it 
could reasonably be argued that “intent” under this approach would not be nearly as 
protective as the subjective intent standard from Virginia v. Black. It may more closely 
resemble the simple objective or “reasonable person” standard for true threats, which the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held was sufficient to prove a true threat in 
2013.88 The bottom line is that Facebook is still searching for that ideal point at which to 
balance protection of speech and prevention of harm. Although that point appears to be 
shifting more toward protection, the tremendous amount of gray area surrounding its 
standards keeps the scales tipped more toward prevention of harm. 
The updated page cached on November 9, 2013,89 contains an update only to 
Facebook’s policy on Graphic Content (see Appendix 2: Facebook’s Community 
Standards). This update retains key terms for delineating inappropriate content (e.g. 
depictions of violence shared for “sadistic effect or to celebrate or glorify violence), yet it 
also contains two caveats. In December 2012, the policies recognized that “graphic 
imagery is a regular component of current events.”90 The November 2013 update goes 
into greater detail, acknowledging that graphic content is sometimes shared to “raise 
awareness” about “human rights abuses or acts of terrorism.”91 Once again we see 
                                                
86 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (O’Connor, J., writing for the plurality). 
87 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
88 United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
89 Facebook Community Standards, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Nov. 9, 2013), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20131109125448/https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards. 
90 Facebook Community Standards, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Dec. 15, 2012). 
91 Facebook Community Standards, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Nov. 9, 2013). 
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Facebook putting emphasis on the speaker’s intent behind the speech, with the company 
acknowledging the power it affords its users to publish speech of profound social and 
political importance. But we also see an adaptation of Facebook’s focus on intent: it 
places the responsibility on users to “carefully [choose] the audience for the [graphic] 
content” and to “warn their audience about the nature of the content … so that their 
audience can make an informed choice about whether to [view] it.”92 In other words, 
users must make their intent transparent to both Facebook and other users, while 
Facebook is declaring that it should not be responsible for guessing the intent behind 
users’ speech. Meanwhile, the updated page cached on February 8, 2015,93 adds a 
category of problematic speech that has been seen before in Facebook’s “Terms” and 
“Rights and Responsibilities” pages: Regulated Goods (see Appendix 2: Facebook’s 
Community Standards) such as firearms, alcohol, tobacco, or adult products. This 
addition is not so much an update as a reiteration of a policy. 
March	  2015	  Update	  
 
On March 15, 2015, Facebook launched a completely redesigned version of its 
community standards94 (see Appendix 2: Facebook’s Community Standards). The most 
obvious update to the standards is the design of the page: instead of mere list of terms, the 
new site contains broad categories of goals (“Keeping You Safe,” “Encouraging 
Respectful Behavior,” “Keeping Your Account and Personal Information Secure,” and 
“Reporting Abuse”), each with its own set of subcategories that are accessed by clicking 
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93 Facebook Community Standards, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Feb. 8, 2015), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20150209145145/https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/. 




links in a sidebar next to the broad categories. For example, “Direct Threats,” “Self-
Injury,” and “Bullying and Harassment” are under “Keeping You Safe,” while “Nudity,” 
“Hate Speech,” and “Violence and Graphic Content” are under “Encouraging Respectful 
Behavior”95 (see Figure 5-3 and Figure 5-4). 
 
Figure 5-3: “Helping to Keep you Safe” 









 Figure 5-5: Opening to March 15, 2015 Update of Facebook’s Community Standards 
The new standards open by stating that Facebook is on a “mission … to give 
people the power to share and make the world more open and connected”96 (see Figure 
5-5). At the same time, Facebook “want[s] people to feel safe when using” the service.97 
These two goals frame each of the categories in the 2015 update. Virtually all of the core 
terms and definitions from past iterations of the standards have not changed, yet now they 
have specifications and contextual caveats added to them to highlight (as clearly as 





possible) the boundary between the speech that Facebook hopes to champion and that 
which it hopes to quash. The section on “Direct Threats” adds the provision that 
Facebook “may consider things like a person’s physical location or public visibility in 
determining whether a threat is credible.”98 This provision shows that Facebook’s focus 
on speakers’ intent is once again evolving, with the company declaring that it will assume 
some responsibility in determining the intent behind the speech by using the tools (i.e. 
data) that it readily has at its disposal.  
The category of “Dangerous Organizations” is amended to specifically include 
groups that engage in terrorist activity or organized criminal activity. Under this category, 
“supporting” or “condoning” such activities is forbidden, though Facebook “welcome[s] 
broad discussion and social commentary on these general subjects.”99 The standards do 
not go into any greater detail on this category. “Bullying and Harassment” is updated 
with several examples of what may constitute this infraction, such as shaming, degrading 
or blackmailing private individuals.100 A new prohibition specifically against the 
phenomenon of “revenge porn” is included.101 A new section titled “Attacks on Public 
Figures” has also been added. Here, the standards stipulate that credible threats and hate 
speech directed at public figures will be removed just as they would be if directed at 
private individuals, although Facebook does “permit open and critical discussion” of 
public figures.102 








The new guidelines also state that sometimes it is a user’s responsibility to make 
clear to Facebook and the Facebook community that its speech should be considered 
valuable. For example, under the update for the category of “Hate Speech,” Facebook 
includes an exception for when individuals share “someone else’s hate speech for the 
purpose of raising awareness or educating others about that hate speech. When this is the 
case, we expect people to clearly indicate their purpose, which helps us better understand 
why they shared that content.”103 This statement is perhaps the clearest declaration yet 
regarding Facebook’s focus on users’ intent. Users must not simply state a message, but 
rather they must provide any relevant context behind that message to ensure that it 
remains protected on Facebook’s platform. 
In the update for “Nudity,” the standards offer perhaps the most absolute 
provisions of all, although even these provisions come with a caveat. The standards state, 
“we always allow photos of women actively engaged in breastfeeding or showing breasts 
with post-mastectomy scarring. We also allow photographs of paintings, sculptures, and 
other art that depicts nude figures.”104 However, an earlier part of the same section reads, 
“our policies can sometimes be more blunt than we would like and restrict content shared 
for legitimate purposes. We are always working to get better at evaluating this content 
and enforcing our standards.”105 In other words, Facebook is urging its users to realize 
that its system of speech governance is not perfect, as much as Facebook wants it to be. 
Ideally, users will be forgiving and not take the rejection of their content personally as 






Facebook continues to find the ideal balance between protecting speech and preventing 
harm to users. 
One key strategy that Facebook appears to follow in its latest Community 
Standards is to portray state actors as the main enemies of freedom of expression. The 
standards read, “[W]e may have to remove or restrict access to content because it violates 
a law in a particular country, even though it doesn’t violate our Community 
Standards.”106 The standards then place Facebook on the side of individual users and 
against state actors by stating, “We challenge requests that appear to be unreasonable or 
overbroad. And if a country requests that we remove content because it is illegal in that 
country, we will not necessarily remove it from Facebook entirely, but may restrict 
access to it in the country where it is illegal.”107 Thus, Facebook occupies a relative 
position as a champion of protecting freedom of expression. Even if Facebook does 
remove users’ content in certain situations, it still is not as bad as government censors. 
But if government censors do put pressure on Facebook, the company must abide by their 
demands when legally required. Therefore, Facebook is portraying itself as just as much a 
victim of government censorship as the individuals whose content gets legally removed.  
The updated standards make clear that they only “outline Facebook’s expectations 
when it comes to what content is or is not acceptable in our community,” while 
“countries have local laws that prohibit some forms of content.”108 On its face, this 
statement conveys a rather obvious fact. However, it is important to point out the 
distinction made in this statement between “our community” and “countries.” In making 
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this distinction, Facebook is placing itself in an advantageous position when it comes to 
supporting freedom of expression online. On the one hand, Facebook is claiming to set 
itself apart from the world of “flesh and steel” that philosopher John Perry Barlow 
vilified in 1996.109 However, it is also acceding to reluctant participation in the legal 
regimes that inevitably do have control over online activity and speech, as legal scholars 
David Johnson and David Post averred.110 
Facebook’s position is that complying with government demands is better for 
speech in the long run. Mark Zuckerberg wrote in a March 15, 2015 post on Facebook’s 
company blog, “If we ignored a lawful government order and then we were blocked, … 
people’s voices would be muted, and whatever content the government believed was 
illegal would be blocked anyway.”111 Freedom of expression should not be considered a 
black-and-white issue, Zuckerberg argued; rather, “giving people a voice … is something 
that we must make incremental progress towards.”112  
Unsurprisingly, this philosophy reflects the evolution of Facebook’s rules 
governing UGC. It is a constant work in progress. It is an experiment that combines 
elements of First Amendment theory and jurisprudence (e.g. for threats and incitement), 
media ethics, corporate social responsibility, and harnessing user agency to both 
encourage good speech and discourage the bad. It is dependent on users’ intent and the 
context behind the speech. It will probably never be perfect, but that is ideal for 
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Facebook. It can keep adjusting its social norms in an ad hoc process, always claiming to 
be serving the goals of both promoting speech and preventing harm. 
Examples of Facebook’s Controversial Content Governance 
 
The March 15, 2015 update to Facebook’s Community Standards may have added 
clarification on where the line is drawn when it comes to certain categories of 
problematic UGC, including some rather bold assertions regarding photos of 
breastfeeding and artistic nudes.113 However, this latest update is far from black-and-
white, and questions still remain regarding the boundaries of certain speech. Almost 
certainly, Facebook will continue to remove UGC. To better understand the issues 
involved in these potential removals, this chapter will examine some controversial 
examples of Facebook removing UGC prior to the March 2015 Community Standards 
update. These examples serve as a historical guide to Facebook’s battle with updating its 
speech rules. They also highlight that Facebook’s governance of UGC is lacking in 
transparency. Each example will be discussed in turn below. After all of the facts have 
been recounted, they will be analyzed and discussed in conjunction with what has been 
discussed so far about Facebook’s evolving community standards. 
Examples 
 
• In February 2011, artists from Colorado and the New York Academy of Art who 
posted their nude or seminude artwork to Facebook later found that they had been 
removed.114 New York Academy of Art had their account blocked for a week after 
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several students’ work had been taken down.115 Although Facebook later apologized and 
reposted the works, the Academy took to its blog to criticize Facebook for being “the 
final arbiter—and online curator—of the artwork we share with the world.”116 Artist 
Richard T. Scott expressed why the removals were so concerning. “For figurative 
painters, Facebook has been a democratizing force, and it has been pivotal for my career” 
for getting works recognized by galleries, he said.117  
• In July 2012, the social network removed photos of the German painter Gerhard 
Richter’s painting called “Ema,” featuring a blurry nude female, from the page of the 
Paris-based Pompidou Center.118 Officials for the museum complained to Facebook, 
which restored the photos not long after.119 A French art blog, “Les Notes de Véculture,” 
called the incident “institutional puritanism.”120 The Washington Post reported on its blog 
“The Intersect” in March 2015 that a French schoolteacher was seeking to sue Facebook 
in France because the social network kept thwarting his attempts to post photos of 
Gustave Courbet’s painting “L’Origine du Monde,” which features an up-close depiction 
of female genitalia.121 
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 • Before Facebook’s most recent update to its community guidelines, women had 
reported that they had photos depicting breastfeeding removed from Facebook.122 In 
several cases, Facebook apologized to the women and reposted the photos.123 When the 
Huffington Post contacted Facebook about the removals, the social network sent the 
following statement: 
We agree that breastfeeding is natural and we are very glad to know that it 
is important for mothers, including the many mothers who work at 
Facebook, to share their experience with others on the site. The vast 
majority of breastfeeding photos are compliant with our Statement of 
Rights and Responsibilities and Facebook takes no action on such content. 
However, photos which contain a fully exposed breast, do violate our 
terms and may be removed if they are reported to us. These policies are 
based on the same standards that apply to television and print media. It is 
important to note that photos upon which we act are almost exclusively 
brought to our attention by other users who complain about them being 
shared on Facebook.124 
 
 • In May 2014 (once again, less than a year before Facebook revised its 
community standards), a North Carolina woman who posted a photo to Facebook of her 
bare chest after undergoing a double mastectomy had those photos removed for violating 
Facebook’s standards against nudity and pornography.125 The woman said she posted the 
photo as a way to offer support to other women with breast cancer.126 Facebook also 
removed photos posted by fashion photographer David Jay that were part of a project Jay 
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had created showing topless women who had undergone double mastectomies.127 Other 
women reported having photos of double mastectomies removed from Facebook, 
including a woman who posted a photo of her entire torso being tattooed following the 
surgery.128 As noted above, Facebook responded by changing its policy to allow double-
mastectomy photos as long as nipples could not be seen.129  
• In September 2014, Facebook removed a photo that a North Carolina man had 
posted of his two-month-old son lying in a hospital bed and hooked up to machines.130 
The man reportedly had posted the photo to raise awareness of his son’s heart condition 
and raise funds for the boy’s impending surgery.131 The man received a notice from 
Facebook saying that “scary, gory or sensational pictures” such as those of “vampires, 
zombies and dismembered bodies” are not allowed on the social network.132 Facebook 
later apologized for the removal and the message, restored the photo, and donated 
$10,000 worth of advertisements to help the family raise funds, according to the report.133 
• Some Native Americans have had difficulty getting Facebook to accept their 
legal names as “real” names under Facebook’s policy of users not going by nicknames or 
aliases.134 According to a March 2015 report from the BBC’s “Trending” technology 
news blog, a South Dakota man of the Oglala Lakota tribe named Lance Browneyes had 
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his name changed to Lance Brown on Facebook.135 Others such as Mike Raccoon Eyes 
Kinney and Lone Hill experienced similar problems.136 Similarly, numerous drag queens 
reportedly have not been allowed to create profiles using their stage names (which they 
may argue are the names associated with their true identity), although they have been 
allowed to create business-oriented Pages using their stage names.137 
• In November 2010, a Facebook page titled “Let’s show these poppy burning 
bastards how many people want them deported,” which called for the deportation of 
Muslims from the United Kingdom after Muslim protestors disrupted Remembrance Day 
events in London, was removed shortly after it was created.138 Facebook refused to 
comment on whether it had removed the page, or whether the page’s creator had deleted 
it, though a spokesperson for the social network released a statement saying that the 
company takes its community guidelines seriously and “react[s] quickly to reports of 
inappropriate content.”139 The page has since been restored, though the current version of 
the page (as of this writing) carries a disclaimer saying that it does not advocate for the 
deportation of all Muslims from the United Kingdom, only the ones who protested on 
Remembrance Day.140 
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• [Restated from Chapter 4]: In late April 2013, two videos depicting the 
beheading of three individuals, purportedly in Mexico, appeared on Facebook.141 The 
social networking site initially refused to remove the videos in spite of formal requests 
made by individual members and humanitarian organizations. Facebook said of one of 
the videos: 
People are sharing this video on Facebook to condemn it. Just as TV news 
programs often show upsetting images of atrocities, people can share 
upsetting videos on Facebook to raise awareness of actions or causes. 
While this video is shocking, our approach is designed to preserve 
people’s rights to describe, depict and comment on the world in which we 
live.142 
 
However, after pressure from members and interest groups increased, Facebook 
decided to remove the videos, saying it would “evaluate [its] policy and approach to this 
type of content.”143 At the time, Facebook’s “Community Standards” page stated, “We 
understand that graphic imagery is a regular component of current events, but must 
balance the needs of a diverse community. Sharing any graphic content for sadistic 
pleasure is prohibited,”144 (see Appendix 2: Facebook’s Community Standards). 
Facebook issued a statement in May 2013 saying that the videos did not meet its 
standards for graphic or gratuitous violence.145 In mid-October 2013, it allowed the 
videos to be viewed on its site, again saying that people should be able to watch the 
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videos to condemn them, and adding that it was considering a policy of including a 
warning alongside the link to the video.146 
• [Restated from Chapter 4]: In early 2013, feminist organizations decried the 
existence of pages created on the social networking giant that glorified or made light of 
rape and domestic violence. Activist Soraya Chemaly, Jaclyn Friedman of the group 
Women, Action and the Media (WAM), and Laura Bates of the Everyday Sexism Project, 
published an open letter online on May 21, 2013, demanding that Facebook not tolerate 
“speech that trivializes or glorifies violence against girls and women.”147 The open letter 
stated that pages had titles such as “Fly Kicking Sluts in the Uterus” and “Violently 
Raping Your Friend Just for Laughs,” and images appeared on the network “of women 
beaten, bruised, tied up, drugged, and bleeding, with captions such as ‘This bitch didn’t 
know when to shut up’ and ‘Next time don’t get pregnant.’” The women asked Facebook 
users to contact companies whose ads appeared on pages with such speech. In April 
2013, Bates took a screenshot of a page titled “Drop kicking sluts in the teeth” and 
tweeted it to the beauty company Dove, whose ad appeared next to the page. In late May, 
the activists persuaded advertisers such as Nissan UK, Jump magazine, and Desire Books 
and 15 other companies to pull ads from the social network.  
Marne Levine, Facebook’s vice-president for global public policy at that time, 
responded to the activists’ demands in a May 28, 2013, blog post on the social network, 
promising that Facebook officials would “update the training for the teams that review 
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and evaluate reports of hateful speech or harmful content on Facebook.”148 Levine wrote 
that Facebook would push for more accountability from “the creators of content that does 
not qualify as actionable hate speech but is cruel or insensitive by insisting that the 
authors stand behind the content they create.”149 For example, this requirement would 
mean that “the creator of any content containing cruel and insensitive humor include his 
or her authentic identity for the content to remain on Facebook.”150 Levine did not 
promise that Facebook would remove any of the pages.151 
Synthesis 
 
These examples do not constitute an exhaustive list of Facebook’s controversial 
governance of users’ speech. Nevertheless, these examples point to Facebook’s struggle 
with being both a platform that promotes free speech and facilitates social change, and 
that is a “safe” place for its hundreds of millions of users. These examples show that this 
struggle crosses categories of speech. Even a concept seemingly as benign as using a 
stage name or an abnormal-sounding name gets caught up (alongside beheading videos 
and nude sketches) in Facebook’s quest to serve its community at the perfect intersection 
of freedom and safety. The problem here is that when users publish content to Facebook, 
only to have it removed, Facebook—despite its apologies and promises to do better—
sends a message to these users: you are on the fringe of our community, and you may not 
even be welcome at all. As will be discussed below, the extent to which this message is a 
                                                








problem depends on the extent to which Facebook is considered an important—if not 
essential—community for the world to be a part of. 
Each of these types of speech at issue in the examples above is distinct. Nudity 
and glorifying terrorism (to pick just two examples) relay two distinct messages. In the 
legal world, each type of speech has its own set of parameters that define when state 
actors can proscribe it. These parameters do not exist in the world of content governance. 
Facebook can decide for itself what constitutes incitement to violence and what does not, 
without any obligation to define its criteria. The same goes for nudity: a fully nude sketch 
by an artist trying to make it big may be allowed while a seminude masterpiece may not 
be, or vice-versa; a titillating photo of a woman in a revealing swimsuit may be allowed, 
but a photo of a woman going topless to make a political statement may not be. In either 
case, Facebook is under no legal obligation to inform users about the criteria used to 
distinguish allowable from unacceptable (if specific criteria even exist). What nudity and 
glorifying terrorism do have in common is their potential to convey a message of social 
or political importance. This potential disappears when digital intermediaries remove 
images without due regard for that social or political importance. Facebook appears to be 
developing a system of giving speech its due regard by focusing on the intent of users 
who post controversial UGC. However, the examples recounted here—even though they 
occurred before Facebook’s March 15, 2015 update added some clarity to its community 
standards—show that important social or political motives behind the speech did not 
always save it from being removed from Facebook. Indeed, some of the most important 
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social and political motives were found in some of the most offensive and contentious of 
speech: the beheading videos.  
Two very powerful counterpoints can be made here that threaten to undermine the 
arguments made in this chapter, not to mention this entire dissertation. First, if speech 
gets removed from Facebook, Twitter or YouTube, what is to stop the speaker from 
publishing the speech elsewhere? For example, the website 4chan is notorious for 
allowing all sorts of UGC, especially UGC that would violate the community standards 
of Facebook, or another mainstream intermediary such as Twitter or YouTube.152 Would 
it not be preferable for some intermediaries to govern their UGC more strictly while 
others govern it more loosely? Indeed, how a site governs its UGC may be a 
characteristic that endears it to certain users while repelling others. Like Pepsi versus 
Coca-Cola, consumers will choose intermediaries based on taste. Those who like gore 
and smut can go to 4chan. Those who like a safer environment can go to Facebook. 
The response to this argument is two-fold. First, there is a clear distinction in 
scale between a mainstream intermediary such as Facebook (as of this writing the second 
most popular website on the World Wide Web, according to web analytics company 
Alexa)153 and 4chan (the 707th most popular website on the Web, as of this writing).154 
Under the notion of the “long tail” model of audience fragmentation on the Internet—
whereby audience “attention is clustered around a select few content options, followed by 
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a long tail, in which the remaining multitude of content options each attract very small 
audiences that in the aggregate can exceed the audience for the ‘hits’”155—this difference 
in scale is problematic for the public discourse. Depending on how far down the long tail 
4chan (or other such “fringe” intermediaries) resides, a potentially logarithmically larger 
audience would be shielded from extreme speech through Facebook’s content governance 
than the audience who sees it on 4chan. Second, this difference in scale creates gated 
communities in online space,156 creating an online version of the conflict between 
exercising speech rights in public forums and exercising them in hybrid private-public 
places such as shopping malls. One of the criticisms some legal scholars have made 
against shopping malls is that they have replaced the free speech free-for-all of public 
squares with privately run zones that wall out controversial and extreme speech.157 
According to this argument, as more and more people tend to frequent shopping malls 
over traditional public forums, the capacity for a speaker to reach a large audience with 
his or her message is diminished. Similarly, in the world where a distinction between 
Facebook and 4chan is encouraged, Facebook becomes the sterile mall and 4chan 
becomes the unfamiliar public square, used mainly by the fringe of society. As important 
public discourse on matters of social and political significance has ventured onto digital 
intermediaries,158 the diversity and robustness of that discourse depends on extreme 
voices being heard on mainstream intermediaries and not being banished to fringe sites. 
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The second powerful counterargument to the concern over content governance 
stems from this last point: how much of a social and political difference does speech on 
digital intermediaries really make in the world? Indeed, it is difficult to measure the 
impact that speech published on digital intermediaries—particularly mainstream ones—
has on a concept such as the robustness of public discourse. It is equally as difficult to 
measure the effect that the variable of robustness of public discourse has on outcomes 
such as political awareness or willingness to engage in a certain political behavior. In 
other words, one may be hard-pressed to argue that a robust public discourse even exists 
online. Therefore, why should digital intermediaries have any obligation to foster one, or 
even attempt to foster one? To better respond to this argument, this chapter must connect 
the issues of content governance to those of network (or net) neutrality. 
Connection to Net Neutrality Debate 
 
The examples of content governance recounted above are anecdotes. They are not 
necessarily indicative of a trend among digital intermediaries rampantly monitoring and 
removing UGC. Rather they are illustrative of the potential that intermediaries have to 
scrub undesirable content from their platforms. Although hard data indicating a clear 
trend (were they to exist) would be the ideal evidence for highlighting the potential 
threats content governance poses to online public discourse, citing anecdotal evidence to 
raise awareness of threats to free speech has relevant precedent. Proponents of net 
neutrality, including the FCC under the Obama administration, have used similar 
anecdotal evidence to successfully build their case for net neutrality.  




At its core, the issue over net neutrality has to do with whether Internet service 
providers (ISPs) should be allowed to control and differentiate the speed at which various 
Web applications are delivered to individual users.159 Proponents of net neutrality argue 
that ISPs must not be allowed to engage in such “network management” practices 
because ISPs could use them to give priority service to certain applications (such as those 
who could afford to pay for faster service, or the ISPs’ own applications) over others 
(competitors, those unable to afford faster service, or, potentially, those with political 
messages that the ISPs disfavor).160 
 In 2008, the FCC ordered broadband provider Comcast to cease engaging in 
network management practices that deliberately and discriminately slowed down the 
service provided by the peer-to-peer file-sharing site known as BitTorrent.161 A majority 
of the Commission saw Comcast’s practice as anti-competitive because it degraded the 
quality of service of Internet applications that rely on BitTorrent and that pose “a 
particular competitive threat to Comcast’s video-on-demand (‘VOD’) service.”162 The 
majority held that the fact that Comcast conducted this discriminatory practice secretly 
only “compounded the harm.”163 Comcast’s actions, the majority argued, highlighted that 
“the risk to the open nature of the Internet is particularly acute and the danger of network 
management practices being used to further anticompetitive ends is strong.”164 
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Meanwhile, Comcast argued that its management practices were necessary to ensure that 
bandwidth-hogging applications using BitTorrent (particularly the illicit ones that 
allowed illegal distribution of copyrighted works) did not interfere with customers’ 
quality of service.165  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held in Comcast Corp. v. FCC166 
that the FCC lacked authority under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to order 
Comcast to cease its network management practices. This ruling prompted the FCC to 
establish the Open Internet Order of 2010,167 in which the Commission claimed it did, in 
fact, have the necessary statutory authority to establish a regime of net neutrality that 
would prohibit the types of discriminatory network management practices addressed in In 
re Comcast. However, in Verizon v. FCC,168 decided in January 2014, a panel of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s Open Internet Order 
establishing net neutrality. Although the FCC lost the case, the defeat was not due to its 
use of anecdotal evidence, but rather to the improper way that the Commission used the 
1996 Telecommunications Act to claim authority over regulating the Internet as if it were 
a common-carrier technology, like the telephone.169 In fact, two judges on the three-judge 
panel held that “nothing in the record gives us any reason to doubt the Commission’s 
determination that broadband providers may be motivated to discriminate against and 
among” Internet application providers.170 In March 2015, the FCC officially reclassified 
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the Internet as a public utility, thereby allowing it to be regulated as a common carrier. In 
the In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet Order,171 the divided Commission 
justified its reclassification by yet again averring that Internet service providers have both 
the “incentive and ability” to discriminate traffic on its networks.172  
Content	  Governance	  and	  Network	  Management:	  Similarities	  and	  Differences	  
 
Put simply, the private governance that was the impetus for net neutrality to be 
enforced and the private governance of content identified in this chapter are not 
equivalent. This chapter is not arguing that a net neutrality regime should be set up for 
digital intermediaries. ISPs and the digital intermediaries that are the focus of this study 
are both conduits for the speech of others, but they are different kinds of conduits. ISPs, 
per the language of the FCC from its March 2015 Order, do not engage in expressive 
activities.173 Facebook, YouTube and Twitter do engage in expressive activities while 
simultaneously facilitating the activities of third parties. For example, they brand 
themselves, or they alter the design and graphics of their platforms. Because they engage 
in such expressive activities, digital intermediaries have a far stronger claim that their 
own First Amendment rights would be violated under a regulatory regime similar to net 
neutrality than ISPs do in their current predicament. Hence the position of this chapter. 
However, when viewed from the perspective of affirmative First Amendment 
theory, the difference between ISPs’ and platforms’ function as conduits does not appear 
quite so stark, even if their legal definition as conduits remains so. In its March 2015 
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order, the three-commissioner majority of the FCC held, “When engaged in broadband 
Internet access services, broadband providers are not speakers, but rather serve as 
conduits for the speech of others. The manner in which broadband providers operate their 
networks does not rise to the level of speech protected by the First Amendment.”174 The 
majority then cites Turner Broadcast Systems v. FCC175 to contend that its net neutrality 
policy “serve[s] First Amendment interests of the highest order, promoting ‘the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources’ and 
‘assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources’ by 
preserving an open Internet.”176 It later states that “the rules we adopt today ensure that 
the Internet promotes speech by ensuring a level playing field for a wide variety of 
speakers who might otherwise be disadvantaged.”177 In essence, the Commission is 
making the argument that one technology should be regulated so that a First Amendment 
interest (ensuring a robust public discourse) can flourish through the use of that 
technology.  
Using such an argument from affirmative First Amendment theory is easy for the 
FCC to do here, as ISPs are now considered common carriers that do not have expressive 
capabilities of their own. As stated above, it would be impossible to make the same 
argument in favor of a regulatory regime against digital intermediaries that curtail the 
speech of others. Yet that has never been the goal of this study. Rather, this study argues 
that digital intermediaries have the potential to threaten a robust online public discourse, 
                                                
174 Id. at 268. 
175 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
176 In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, supra note 171, at 268. 
177 Id. at 272. 
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in the same way that ISPs have the potential to threaten that discourse, according to the 
current FCC and other proponents of net neutrality. And, in the same way that the current 
FCC and proponents of net neutrality have done, this study argues that the principle of 
“incentive and ability,” based on theory and anecdotal evidence, is sufficient for showing 
that content governance exists and is a problem that individuals should be aware of.  
Thus, returning once again to the counterargument above on whether 
intermediaries should brand themselves based on the type of speech they allow, the issue 
is not the fear that the content that mainstream intermediaries remove will disappear 
completely from the Internet. Proponents of net neutrality would be hard pressed to argue 
that an edge provider that could not afford to pay for fast-lane service or that got 
deliberately blocked or had its service degraded by an ISP would disappear completely 
from the Internet. Their primary concern is that these sites would risk being left out of the 
mainstream Web, relegated to the fringes because no one dared wait the extra seconds for 
the site to load. The same concern is at the heart of content governance. Extreme speech 
is not at risk of disappearing from the entire Internet, just the mainstream Internet. 
Scholars and citizens alike need to decide whether that is a problem, and, if it is, how it 
should be handled.  
Discussion 
 
Facebook’s strategy essentially boils down to a choice between two ideologies of 
governing speech. The first—and this is the approach that Facebook had chosen prior to 
the update of its community guidelines—is a utilitarian approach to speech. The 
argument behind this approach goes like this: By following a policy of allowing more 
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speech that comes close to violating its community guidelines than allowing less such 
speech, Facebook runs the risk of alienating users who are offended by that speech. These 
users may then choose to leave Facebook. If a critical mass of users leaves Facebook, the 
company will subsequently lose advertising revenue, and may eventually be forced out of 
business. Thus, although some individuals may become upset because their content was 
removed from Facebook (whether that content in fact violated Facebook’s community 
guidelines or not), those removals are defensible out of a desire to preserve the social 
network’s broader function of increasing individuals’ communicative agency in the 
global public discourse.  
This utilitarian approach has a ring of affirmative First Amendment theory to it. 
Mark Zuckerberg said in a March 15, 2015 post on Facebook’s company blog that 
“threats of violence and bullying will be taken down” because they “are examples where 
one person exercising their [sic] voice may unfairly limit the voices of many others. 
Therefore, in the spirit of giving the most voice to the most people, we choose not to 
permit this content.”178 Of course, Zuckerberg’s position specifically refers to Facebook’s 
mission of encouraging more speech through preventing the types of abuse and 
harassment of users that would scare them away from using the social network as a 
platform for speaking. This mission is the same as the argument put forth in chapter 4 
that abuse of individuals on digital intermediaries is a form of heckler’s veto designed to 
suppress speech. The utilitarian approach to governing content shares the goal of 
promoting more speech at the expense of removing potentially offensive speech. 
However, Facebook’s utilitarian approach promotes more speech out of a concern for 
                                                
178 Zuckerberg, supra note 111. 
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preserving the viability of the platform. This rationale lacks the central concern for 
individual dignity that is at the core of the argument from promoting speech through 
preventing abuse. This concept will be discussed in chapter 6. 
The second ideological choice for governing content is tolerance. Tolerance is not 
synonymous with absolutism. Rather, according to Bollinger, tolerance involves an 
acknowledgement that the “real threat to liberty of speech … rests within the general 
population of citizens instead of officialdom alone.”179 The goal of tolerance is not for 
extreme speech to be accepted in society, but rather that society simply allows extreme 
speech into the public discourse. If a digital intermediary like Facebook is not going to 
allow certain extreme viewpoints into the public discourse it purports to host, then it is 
incumbent upon Facebook to explain its decision. 
Therefore, tolerance requires two things of Facebook. First, it requires a firm 
commitment to protecting freedom of expression. This commitment goes beyond good 
public relations and Community Standards that say Facebook encourages free speech 
until that speech violates vague rules. Such a commitment means Facebook must state 
that promoting freedom of expression is its primary duty, and all harms that it seeks to 
avoid from extreme speech will be judged by specific, unambiguous standards. Second, it 
requires transparency. Such a commitment means Facebook must go beyond caveats and 
disclaimers and pleas for patience and forgiveness if speech is wrongly removed. For all 
the greater detail paid to clarifying what constitutes hate speech or acceptable nudity, the 
updated community guidelines still lack transparency. The March 2015 Community 
                                                
179 LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN 
AMERICA 80 (1986). 
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Standards talk of “dedicated teams working around the world to review things,” and of 
some of these people being “the right person for review[ing]” certain categories of 
content.180 Yet users are in the dark about what exactly happens between when content is 
flagged and when a decision is made on whether or not the content should be removed. 
Who are the people who review the flagged content? How are they trained? How do 
some people become experts in one category over another? Is the fate of content in the 
hands of one person, several or many?181 In its “Facebook Principles,” Facebook lists 
“Transparent Process” as principle 9 out of 10, averring that “Facebook should publicly 
make available information about its purpose, plans, policies, and operations.”182 




Facebook faces an unending struggle to find the balance between creating a 
communicative service where people feel “safe”184 and promoting an arena of public 
                                                
180 Facebook Community Standards, FACEBOOK (Mar. 15, 2015). 
181 Journalist Adrian Chen has reported on the work of laborers responsible for reviewing flagged content 
for several unnamed digital intermediaries. Many of these laborers are based in the Philippines, due to a 
widespread knowledge of both English and U.S. cultural norms among Filipinos. The vast majority of their 
decisions involve more than just whether a photo of a breastfeeding mom shows too much nipple or 
whether a racist diatribe has a salvageable political message. Rather, these workers spend their days 
judging hardcore pornography, beheadings or other images of gore. The sheer volume and nature of flagged 
content may in fact necessitate that digital intermediaries employ hoards of day laborers that can stomach 
(even if barely) the job of reviewing that content. Adrian Chen, The Laborers Who Keep Dick Pics and 
Beheadings Out of Your Facebook Feed, WIRED (Oct. 21, 2014), available at 
http://www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation/. 
182 Facebook Principles, Facebook (Aug. 25, 2010), available at https://www.facebook.com/principles.php. 
183 To its credit, in early 2015 Facebook began releasing a so-called “Transparency Report,” which consists 
of data on requests by governments around the world for information on certain users and for allegedly 
illegal UGC to be removed. See Global Requests Report, FACEBOOK (2015), available at 
https://govtrequests.facebook.com/. However, this report does not contain information on users flagging 
other users over extreme content, and it does not contain information on the process of how Facebook 
makes decisions on content governance. 
184 Facebook Community Standards, FACEBOOK (Mar. 15, 2015). 
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discourse where people “make the world more open and connected” as they “share their 
stories, see the world through the eyes of others and connect with friends and causes.”185 
The line separating these two goals is constantly shifting. No matter how specific 
Facebook gets in trying to define that line, advocates for either goal will continue to put 
pressure on either side of the line. 
The purpose of this analysis is not to argue that Facebook should become more 
protective of freedom of expression than it currently is. Nor, for that matter, does this 
study contend that Facebook should follow the standards of First Amendment 
jurisprudence in crafting its community guidelines. Rather, the ultimate conclusion 
reached from this analysis is that what Facebook’s system of content governance lacks in 
absolute protection of speech should be made up for in transparency. The entire system of 
how Facebook governs UGC should be made clear to users. 
The true significance of this study lies in its potential broader implications for the 
norms of public discourse on digital platforms. The questions that arise from this analysis 
are: Does Facebook (or other digital intermediaries) offer a “parallel universe” to public 
discourse conducted in public forums governed by First Amendment jurisprudence? Is 
Facebook becoming the shopping mall to the public square, complete with a public 
discourse that has become vapid? Implied in this question is an assumption that the social 
and political significance of public discourse in each of these spheres is measurable, and 
that it is something that can wax and wane, either independently or in relation to one 
another. Traditionally, scholarship in mass communication law has maintained that 
greater protection of freedom of expression is ultimately the best policy for building a 




robust democratic society.186 That argument is fundamentally normative in nature; it is 
not based on empirical evidence, nor is it built to ever be open to falsifiability through 
empirical testing.187 Nevertheless, this analysis should encourage researchers from the 
fields of mass communication and mass communication law to assess the relationships 
between speech, Facebook, social norms and democracy. 
This analysis has an even broader implication: it can shed light on the potential 
extent to which tolerance for extreme speech is changing in a networked communication 
environment. Or, framed as a research question: Do the norms of expression on Facebook 
influence individuals’ tolerance toward extreme speech in other arenas, such as public 
forums or other media? If so, how? And to what extent? The concluding chapter to this 
dissertation will discuss some of the possibilities for future research on this topic.   
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The purpose of this study is to explicate the concept of content governance: the 
control that digital communication intermediaries exercise over user-generated content 
(UGC). The particular focus of this explication is the governance of extreme UGC. Two 
key questions guide this explication: How and why do digital communication 
intermediaries respond to extreme UGC? What are the potential implications of their 
responses for public discourse in a system of networked communication? 
This chapter analyzes and discusses the ethical obligations digital intermediaries 
have to monitor, remove or leave be potentially harmful content created by users. This 
angle of analysis is important because it frames the activities of digital intermediaries to 
govern UGC in terms of duties to competing interests, namely: promoting and protecting 
freedom of speech, enhancing individual agency, preventing harm, obeying laws, and 
making money.1 All of these duties cannot be served equally, and thus the purpose of this 
chapter is to examine the nature of these duties so that they can be measured against one 
another, and so that a normative ethical theory can be created that orders these duties in 
terms of their importance. 
 
 
                                                
1 These duties are loosely borrowed from Christians and Merrill’s 2009 collection of short essays analyzing 
major ethical theorists, which are organized around five ethical “loyalties”: to others, to self, to freedom, to 
authority, and to community. The duties listed in the paragraph above do not necessarily correspond exactly 
to Christians and Merrill’s loyalties. However, these loyalties are useful for conceiving of the multiple 
duties that intermediaries must juggle; see Josh Braun and Tarleton Gillespie, Hosting the Public 





Following attacks in early January 2015 by Islamist extremists that ended in the 
deaths of nine staff members at the Parisian satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo, 
as well as the deaths of four hostages at a kosher supermarket, three police officers and 
one bystander, European leaders released a statement on their strategy for fighting 
terrorism. One of the measures that the statement called for was for digital intermediaries 
to play a larger role in this fight. The relevant part of the statement read: 
We are concerned at the increasingly frequent use of the Internet to fuel 
hatred and violence and signal our determination to ensure that the 
Internet is not abused to this end, while safeguarding that it remains, in 
scrupulous observance of fundamental freedoms, a forum for free 
expression, in full respect of the law. With this in mind, the partnership of 
the major Internet providers is essential to create the conditions of a swift 
reporting of material that aims to incite hatred and terror and the condition 
of its removing, where appropriate/possible.2 
 
Such a call from public officials is not new. In a May 19, 2008 letter to Google 
CEO Eric Schmidt, Senator Joe Lieberman of Connecticut demanded that Google remove 
all “terrorist training” videos from YouTube. Propounding the belief that “Islamist 
terrorist organizations rely extensively on the Internet to attract supporters and advance 
their cause,” Lieberman argued that “[b]y taking action to curtail the use of YouTube to 
disseminate the goals and methods of those who wish to kill innocent civilians, Google 
will make a singularly important contribution to this important national effort.”3 In 
September 2008, Google removed some (though not all, or even most) of the videos that 
                                                
2 Joint Statement (Jan. 11, 2015), available at 
https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Kurzmeldungen/gemeinsame-
erklaerung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile 
3 Lieberman Calls on Google to Take Down Terrorist Content, U.S. SEN. COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND 




concerned Senator Lieberman. In a statement, a YouTube spokesperson said that because 
such videos incited violence, they violated YouTube’s terms of use. However, the 
YouTube official stated, “While we respect and understand his [Lieberman’s] views, 
YouTube encourages free speech and defends everyone's right to express unpopular 
points of view.”4 
These episodes pose a provocative question: Do digital communication 
intermediaries have an ethical duty to stanch the flow of content published by extremists 
or terrorists in the name of preventing the spread of their ideologies and the perpetration 
of harms caused in their name? Do digital intermediaries have a duty to prevent the 
spread of any type of harmful speech that travels through their platforms? These 
questions beg an even broader question: To whom or to what—aside from themselves—
do digital intermediaries have an ethical duty? This is an essential question in the context 
of content governance. The role that digital intermediaries play in both fostering and 
governing speech published on their platforms has received attention from legal 
scholars,5 critical-cultural communication scholars,6 and scholars in the field of Internet 
governance.7 Although some ethicists have called for intermediaries to become regular 
                                                
4 Peter Whoriskey, YouTube Bans Videos That Incite Violence, WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2008), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/11/AR2008091103447.html. 
5 See, e.g., Sandra Braman & Stephanie Roberts, Advantage ISP: Terms of Service as Media Law, 5 NEW 
MEDIA & SOC’Y 422 (2003); Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the 
First Amendment, 76 G.W. L. REV. 986 (2008); DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET 
NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE 36 (2009); Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School 
Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296 (2014). 
6 José van Dijck, Users like you? Theorizing agency in user-generated content, 31 MED. CULT. & SOC’Y 
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Paradox of Participatory Media, 14 TELEVISION & NEW MEDIA 91 (2013). 
7 LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2014); JACK GOLDSMITH AND 
TIMOTHY WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006); 




subjects of ethical analysis,8 so far this topic has not received attention from scholars of 
media ethics. This trend needs to change.  
Argument and Roadmap 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to construct an ethical framework that mainstream 
digital intermediaries should follow when faced with balancing the values of protecting 
individuals’ expression and preventing harm. This chapter argues that digital 
intermediaries should follow a hierarchy of duties when confronted with such speech. 
Because digital intermediaries play an essential role in allowing individuals to engage in 
a diverse, global public discourse on matters of social and political importance,9 their first 
duty should be to promoting freedom of expression and enhancing individual agency and 
autonomy. The duty of digital intermediaries to prevent harm should be subordinate to 
their duty to promote freedom of expression. This does not mean that digital 
intermediaries should not take harms seriously. Rather, they should follow a hierarchy 
when identifying and remedying harms, with abuse and harassment of specific 
individuals deemed the most harmful and deserving of policing by digital intermediaries, 
followed by direct and credible threats, incitement to reasonably foreseeable lawless 
action, and images of death and gore. The purpose of following such a hierarchy is to 
ensure that speech of social and political importance is tolerated in spite of the fact that 
                                                
8 Clifford G. Christians, Media Ethics on a Higher Order of Magnitude, 23 J. OF MASS MEDIA ETHICS 3 
(2008); Jay Black, An Informal Agenda for Media Ethicists, 23 J. OF MASS MEDIA ETHICS 28 (2008); 
Bernd C. Stahl, IT for a Better Future: How to Integrate Ethics, Politics and Innovation, 9 J. OF INFO., 
COMM. & ETHICS IN SOC’Y, 140 (2011). 
9 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS 
AND FREEDOM (2006); DENARDIS, supra note 7. 
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some may find the speech harmful or offensive, while speech of no political or social 
importance that concentrates its harm on specific individuals is eradicated.  
The chapter will begin with a discussion of the differences and similarities 
between news organizations and digital intermediaries as institutions subject to ethical 
analysis. The fundamental similarity between these two sets of institutions—their 
essential function for deliberative democracy—opens up digital intermediaries to ethical 
perspectives and theories traditionally used in analyses of news organizations. However, 
the obvious difference between the institutions—the fact that news organizations 
predominantly10 publish their own content while intermediaries facilitate third-party 
content—necessitates that the ethicality of digital intermediaries must be judged within 
its own unique set of principles. These ethical principles can be found in the philosophies 
on which laws on intermediary liability for third-party content are based. Therefore, the 
second section of the chapter will review scholarship and jurisprudence—both American 
and foreign—on the liability of digital intermediaries. In particular, this section will argue 
that conceptions of intermediary liability in the United States, the European Union, Brazil 
and India underscore a duty that mainstream digital intermediaries have to promoting 
individual freedom of expression and serving the democratic public discourse. These 
laws were chosen because of their salience: they represent the rules of the game for 
digital intermediaries seeking to serve billions of citizens of democratic polities. The final 
section of this chapter will apply this ethical framework to Facebook’s March 15, 2015 
                                                
10 Of course, news organizations do have to manage comments published on their websites by readers (see 
Braun & Gillespie, supra note 1), and they also collect UGC from other platforms to publish on their own 
sites (see Jane B. Singer, User-Generated Visibility: Secondary Gatekeeping in a Shared Media Space, 16 
NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 55 (2014)). 
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update of its community standards (discussed in chapter 5). The purpose of this 
comparison is to identify the common thing missing from these codes in their current 
state: a clear and unambiguous commitment to freedom of expression for their users. 
Platform Ethics Belongs in Media Ethics 
 
In several respects, the concept of “platform ethics” proposed in this chapter does 
not fit neatly into the field of media ethics. A comparison of digital intermediaries with 
the institutions that are traditionally the focus of media ethicists (news organizations) 
reveals conceptual incongruities between the two. However, despite these incongruities, 
both sets of institutions share the essential function of facilitating democratic public 
discourse, thereby opening up digital intermediaries to analysis using theories and 
perspectives from the field of media ethics. To truly appreciate this core similarity and 
thereby accept platform ethics as a part of the broader field of media ethics, one must first 
understand the main differences between the two sets of institutions.  
Differences 
 
First, the two institutions compared in this analysis differ in terms of their 
uniformity. The press can be conceived as a monolithic social institution, albeit made up 
of many diverse actors.11 Members of the press include public affairs reporters and 
celebrity gossip columnists, citizen journalists and foreign bureau chiefs, insightful op-ed 
writers and ranting bloggers, anyone with a smartphone and the entire network of CNN. 
Although each has his or her own perspective on the news of the day and style for how to 
deliver it, all pursue the same goal: collecting and relaying information of some modicum 
                                                
11 See generally, GENEVA OVERHOLSER AND KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, THE PRESS (2005); KATHLEEN 
HALL JAMIESON AND PAUL WALDMAN, THE PRESS EFFECT: POLITICIANS, JOURNALISTS, AND THE 
STORIES THAT SHAPE THE POLITICAL WORLD (2003). 
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of public concern to a particular audience.12 Ethical debates revolve around the “best” 
way for these actors to fulfill this goal, focusing predominantly on how to achieve the 
ideals of reporting truth and minimizing harm.13 Digital intermediaries, on the other hand, 
serve multiple functions in their capacity to facilitate individuals’ speech. They can 
facilitate the work of citizen journalists (e.g. YouTube hosting videos of a protest 
recorded on smartphones), or they can be a location for subjects of journalistic intrigue 
(e.g. a politician’s newsworthy Facebook message or an athlete’s controversial tweet). 
They can propel messages of revolution and hope just as easily as they can help the 
spread of messages of harassment and hate. An ethical framework for digital 
intermediaries must be broad enough to encompass all of these functions, yet nuanced 
enough to respect their unique differences.  
Second, on a related note, news organizations are made up of readily identifiable 
agents with potential ethical responsibility: reporters, editors, and perhaps executives or 
publishers.14 Meanwhile, digital intermediaries are not made up of such readily 
identifiable agents due to the simple fact that intermediaries are not responsible for their 
own content. Coders, executives, and staff responsible for managing user complaints 
about other users’ content are on the payrolls of digital intermediaries. However, 
someone sitting at a computer in San Francisco or the Philippines making snap decisions 
over whether UGC violates a platform’s community guidelines does not have the direct, 
                                                
12 Seth C. Lewis, The Tension Between Professional Control and Open Participation: Journalism and Its 
Boundaries, 15 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 836, 851 (2012); Christopher Meyers, et al., Professionalism, Not 
Professionals, 27 J. OF MASS MEDIA ETHICS 189, 195 (2012). 
13 Clifford G. Christians and Kaarle Nordenstreng, Social Responsibility Worldwide, 19 J. OF MASS MEDIA 
ETHICS 3 (2004). 
14 Ian Richards, Stakeholders Versus Shareholders: Journalism, Business, and Ethics, 19 J. OF MASS 
MEDIA ETHICS 119 (2004). 
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authorial control over content that a reporter, editor or publisher has. Nor, for that matter, 
does any executive of a digital intermediary. The responsibility for reviewing and 
removing harmful UGC is shared among multiple actors within the organization, each 
with different roles to play in the process. Ideally, each of these actors would be the 
subject of its own unique set of ethical precepts. However, at the present time, all of these 
actors fall under the umbrella of the corporate identities of these intermediaries. 
Therefore, referring to digital intermediaries as monolithic wholes is the best way to 
analyze the concept of ethical governance of UGC. This proposition is hardly unorthodox 
or revolutionary; borrowing from literature on corporate social responsibility, some 
media ethicists have argued that media corporations “have the competency to develop 
values that are not just aggregations of the values of individuals in the organization”15  
Third, although news organizations serve a group that is rather nebulous on its 
face (the “public,” or the news organization’s “audience”), in terms of media ethics this 
relationship is generally conceived as clear-cut and binary.16 In this binary model, the 
public benefits from “good” or accurate reporting by news organizations, and it loses out 
from “bad” or inaccurate reporting. The model works one way: the news organization 
produces the message, and the public is affected by it. Platforms, on the other hand, serve 
as a conduit between speakers and audiences. Sometimes, the interests of these speakers 
and audiences are in sync, while other times they conflict with one another.17 For 
example, if an intermediary removes a speaker’s message from its platform, it is harming 
                                                
15 G. Stuart Adam, Stephanie Craft and Elliot D. Cohen, Three Essays on Journalism and Virtue, 19 J. OF 
MASS MEDIA ETHICS 247, 261 (2004). 
16 Meyers, et al, supra note 12. 
17 Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of Platforms, 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 347 (2010). 
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the interest of that speaker. Whether the removed message harms the interests of the 
audience (or multiple audiences) depends on the nature of both the message and the 
audience(s). For instance, the removal of a racist post on Facebook may help the interests 
of an audience that despises racism, but it may—according to some First Amendment 
theorists18—harm the interests of society at large by not allowing exposure to a variety of 
messages, no matter how hateful. 
Fourth, on a related note, news organizations (at least private, non-state 
organizations) generally have an adversarial relationship with governments. Their ideal 
job is to act like a “watchdog,” constantly monitoring and checking government to ensure 
the public that it is not engaging in corrupt activities.19 Digital intermediaries, on the 
other hand, can be adversarial toward governments, but only in their capacity to facilitate 
the speech of individuals that is critical of government actors. Other times, digital 
intermediaries can be coopted into aiding governments’ agendas of security and public 
order. For example, the leak of classified documents by NSA contractor Edward 
Snowden exposed the NSA’s practice of submitting National Security Letters (NSLs) to 
companies such as Google and Facebook, ordering that they secretly divulge information 
on users.20 Such a practice resembles a “guard dog” function, whereby media are 
employed as protectors of prevailing power structures.21 In the context of media ethics, 
such a practice reveals the conflict of duties that digital intermediaries serve. As Braun 
                                                
18 LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN 
AMERICA (1986); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY 
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19 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977); 
George A. Donohue, Phillip J. Tichenor and Clarice N. Olien, A Guard Dog Perspective on the Role of 
Media, 45 J. OF COMM. 115 (1995). 
20 Balkin, supra note 5. 
21 Donohue, Tichenor and Olien, supra note 19, at 121; Adam, et al, supra note 15, at 273. 
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and Gillespie aptly put it, digital intermediaries “must toe the line between avoiding legal 
liability, keeping an eye on the economic bottom line, and some kind of commitment to 
protecting their users’ freedom of speech and the vibrancy of the public discourse they 
produce.”22 This chapter takes the position that these platforms must make the 
commitment to freedom of speech and the public discourse their priority over preventing 
harm as they seek to find the ideal balance between these two goals. Indeed, as will be 
shown below in the analysis on similarities between digital intermediaries and news 
organizations, protecting freedom of speech and maintaining a vibrant public discourse is 
the raison d’etre of digital intermediaries. 
Finally, the activity of these institutions that is subject to ethical scrutiny takes 
place within two distinct legal frameworks. The legal framework for U.S. news 
organizations is the First Amendment. Within this context, a relatively large gap exists 
between what news organizations are allowed to publish (legally speaking) and what they 
should or should not publish (ethically speaking).23 The extent and nature of this gap is 
the focus of much (if not most) of the scholarship within the field of media ethics 
pertaining to U.S. media. Digital intermediaries, on the other hand, operate within a legal 
framework that sets parameters on their liability for the third-party speech that they host. 
In the United States, that framework takes the shape of Section 230 of the 1996 
Communications Decency Act,24 which, as will be discussed below, gives extensive 
immunity to digital intermediaries from civil liability for third-party content. Meanwhile, 
                                                
22 Braun & Gillespie, supra note 1, at 385. 
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as will also be discussed below, other countries’ legal systems afford less protection. 
However, even within these regimes of less protection for intermediaries, one can 
identify legal philosophies that hold that individuals must take pride of place in an 
intermediary-driven system of networked communication. These legal philosophies are 
an essential source for the construction of platform ethics. 
Similarities 
 
As stated above, the main similarity between news organizations and digital 
intermediaries is that each institution, in its own way, facilitates an essential function for 
democratic deliberation. This institutional similarity is crucial for the analysis of this 
chapter. Some scholars contend that media ethics should focus on the ethical practices of 
media institutions, broadly conceived, rather than merely journalistic institutions.25 This 
perspective borrows from the work of political economy theorists26 to make the argument 
that greater concentration of power in the ownership of mass media plays a major role in 
the ethicality of the activities of these media.27 Of primary concern for this perspective is 
that corporate institutions, whose ultimate duty is to provide healthy returns to 
shareholders, “are short on the virtues of citizenship” necessary to understand media’s 
democratic function.28 
                                                
25 Nick Couldry, Why Media Ethics Still Matters, In GLOBAL MEDIA ETHICS: PROBLEMS AND 
PERSPECTIVES (Stephen J. A. Ward ed., 2013) 13-29. 
26 See ROBERT M. ENTMAN, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT CITIZENS: MEDIA AND THE DECAY OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS (1989); BEN BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY (2004); Daniel C. Hallin, Hegemony: The 
American News Media from Vietnam to El Salvador, A Study of Ideological Change and its Limits, in 
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: APPROACHES, STUDIES, ASSESSMENTS, (David L. Paletz ed., 1986); ROBERT 
MCCHESNEY, DIGITAL DISCONNECT: HOW CAPITALISM IS TURNING THE INTERNET AGAINST 
DEMOCRACY (2013). 
27 Adam, et al, supra note 15, at 255. 
28 Id. at 256. 
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Along those lines, some scholars borrow from the literature of business ethics to 
make the argument that media corporations not only can, but rather should be analyzed as 
moral agents. Ethicist Stephanie Craft, for example, contends that in conducting their 
general activities, businesses of any stripe “depend upon … a basic sense of 
community.”29 She writes, “Corporations … are part and parcel of the communities that 
created them, and the responsibilities that they bear are not the products of argument or 
implicit contracts but intrinsic to their very existence as social entities.”30 Having 
established that corporations in general can be conceived of as moral agents, Craft next 
argues that media corporations must necessarily be analyzed as moral agents because 
they “straddle two realms, business and public service, in ways that other corporations do 
not.”31 In fact, the Press Clause of the First Amendment, she contends, suggests that the 
Framers “thought of the press as an entity whose purpose was not solely or even 
predominantly profit generation, but public service.”32 
In other words, Craft is arguing that the essential function of media corporations 
to democracy naturally predisposes them to adhere to a duty to the communities they 
serve. It is probably naïve to think that these corporations actually consider this duty of 
primary importance, putting it above their duty to their shareholders. Nevertheless, at the 
very least, this duty has prudential value behind it. Economist Lawrence Souder argues 
that “[c]orporate-owned media … not only should be founded on sound media ethics; 
                                                
29 Id. at 259. 
30 Id. at 260. 
31 Id. at 262. 
32 Id. at 265. 
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they must be for their own good.”33 The following question remains: to whom should 
digital intermediaries keep an ethical duty that is at least co-extensive with their duty to 
their own bottom line? To speakers? To audiences that potentially could be harmed by 
speakers? To both? And if both, when would one duty trump the other? To answer these 
questions, this chapter turns to an examination of the issue of intermediary liability. 
Ethical Principles and Intermediary Liability 
 
With the potential for digital intermediaries to facilitate the spread of harmful 
messages of several different categories—including defamation, invasions of privacy, 
hate speech, threats, incitement to violence, personal harassment or abuse, and (though 
outside the analysis of this chapter) copyright infringement—debate has swirled globally 
around the extent to which intermediaries should be held liable for such facilitation. This 
section will show that the debate between those calling for greater protection for 
intermediaries and those calling for greater liability has been framed along the lines of 
concerns for freedom of expression, consumer protection and economic regulation. This 
section will give a brief overview and comparative analysis of the legal and philosophical 
foundations to the United States’ approach to intermediary liability and a common global 
approach to intermediary liability, exemplified by legal regimes in the European Union, 
Brazil and India. The purpose of this analysis is to extract a framework for platform 
ethics from the legal context of intermediary liability. In particular, the analysis in this 
section will show that both American and international intermediary liability regimes 
conceive of digital intermediaries as having a duty to serve their users and create a 
                                                
33 Lawrence Souder, A Free-market Model for Media Ethics: Adam Smith’s Looking Glass, 25 J. OF MASS 
MEDIA ETHICS 53, 54 (2010) (emphasis added). 
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vibrant public discourse (despite the fact that they have competing interpretations of how 
to uphold this duty). From this analysis, the argument will be made that platforms’ 
primary duty should be to protect the ability of users to speak freely and preserve this 
vibrant public discourse. 
U.S. Perspective 
 
The U.S. approach to intermediary liability is enshrined in Section 230 of the 
1996 Communications Decency Act (CDA).34 The law grants digital intermediaries 
immunity from civil liability for content published by third parties on its platforms, even 
when they are notified of the presence of the content or when they choose to take control 
over the content and remove it in a “Good Samaritan” act.35 Intermediaries are only 
obligated to remove content—under threat of criminal liability—that infringes on an 
author’s copyright or that violates criminal law (e.g., images of child abuse).36 Congress 
declared in the preamble to Section 230 that digital intermediaries deserve “a minimum 
of government regulation” because they “offer users a great degree of control over the 
information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future 
as technology develops.”37 It called the Internet a “forum for a true diversity of political 
discourse,”38 facilitated by digital intermediaries. It declared that its intent in passing the 
law was “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the 
                                                
34 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996). 
35 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
36 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1). 
37 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(2). 
38 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3). 
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Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.”39  
U.S. case law involving Section 230 extolls the benefits of the provision to the 
public discourse in spite of its side effect of allowing potentially harmful speech to 
flourish. In Zeran v. AOL, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated 
that Section 230, quite simply, was a “policy choice … not to deter harmful speech 
through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as 
intermediaries,” thereby “maintain[ing] the robust nature of Internet communication.”40 
In DiMeo v. Max, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania averred 
that “we should expect such [harmful] speech to occur in a medium in which citizens 
from all walks of life have a voice.”41 Such strong statutory protection for speech 
parallels—if not exceeds—the exceptional constitutional protection of freedom of 
expression found in the United States.42 
Non-U.S. Perspectives 
 
In contrast to Section 230, intermediary liability regimes in the European Union, 
Brazil and India—three powerful liberal-democratic geopolitical entities that together 
account for more than one billion Internet users43—impose less immunity to digital 
                                                
39 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). 
40 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
41 DiMeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 533 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
42 David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary 
Immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373 (2010). 
43 Internet Users per 100 People, THE WORLD BANK (2015), available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2. (The World Bank includes data on global Internet 
usage by country by percentage of total population. Therefore, Brazil’s 51.6% of the population using the 
Internet equates to roughly 104 million people, India’s 15% of the population using the Internet equates to 
roughly 190 million people, and the United States’ 84.2% of the population using the Internet equates to 
roughly 267 million people); Statistics, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, available at http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
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intermediaries in certain contexts. Namely, a “social theory of responsibility” in which 
“control capability [over content] implies co-responsibility” (morally, if not legally, 
speaking) distinguishes these regions from the United States.44  
European	  Model	  	  
 
The regime of intermediary liability in the European Union is based on Directive 
2000/31/EC (the so-called “e-Commerce Directive”).45 Recital 46 of the Directive states 
that digital intermediaries—here referred to as providers of an “information society 
service”—benefit from a limitation of liability if “upon obtaining actual knowledge or 
awareness of illegal activities [they] act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to 
the information concerned.”46 Recital 48 states that EU Member States may “apply duties 
of care” on digital intermediaries, “which can reasonably be expected from them and 
which are specified by national law, in order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal 
activities.”47 Various European courts have broadly interpreted “illegal activities” under 
this Directive to include content that causes economic harms (copyright or trademark 
infringement) as well as the types of content that are the focus of this chapter: those that 
cause relational or emotional harms,48 such as defamation, violation of privacy and hate 
                                                                                                                                            
D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx. (This site includes data on global Internet usage by region, estimating 
more than 460 million users in the European Union in 2014). Combined, the estimated number of Internet 
users from these two sources for these four polities comes to 1.021 billion. 
44 Tomas A. Lipinski, Elizabeth A. Buchanan, & Johannes J. Britz, Sticks and Stones and Words that 
Harm: Liability vs. Responsibility, Section 230 and Defamatory Speech in Cyberspace, 4 ETHICS & INFO. 
TECH. 143, 156 (2002). 
45 Directive 2000/31/EC. 
46 Directive 2000/31/EC (46). 
47 Directive 2000/31/EC (48). 
48 Smolla, supra note 18. 
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speech.49 Thus, a duty of care is established when the alleged victim of such harms 
appropriately notifies the digital intermediaries of the presence of the content in question 
on their platforms, thereby putting these companies on the legal hook for removing it. 
Meanwhile, Article 15(1) of the Directive prohibits Member States from “impos[ing] a 
general obligation on providers … to monitor the information which they transmit or 
store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal 
activity.”50 Therefore, European officials can only—as they did following the Charlie 
Hebdo attacks—call on digital intermediaries to follow a moral obligation to police 
harmful speech published on their platforms. 
The goal of the European model is to incentivize self-regulation by digital 
intermediaries by encouraging a proactive approach, whereby companies would actively 
screen user-generated content and remove the manifestly unlawful material before upset 
users have a chance to notify them and thus place them within the prospects of liability.51 
“Only when contents would be manifestly unlawful—so that intermediaries would not 
have to appreciate their lawfulness—would the latter be required to react and eventually 
take them down or restrict access to them.”52 As with Section 230, the philosophy behind 
the European approach to intermediary liability is that “private regulation is less 
                                                
49 Timothy Pinto, et al., Liability of Online Publishers for User Generated Content: A European 
Perspective, 27 COMM. LAWYER 5 (2010). 
50 Directive 2000/31/EC (Art. 15). 
51 Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon, Sometimes One Is Not Enough! Securing Freedom of Expression, Encouraging 
Private Regulation, or Subsidizing Internet Intermediaries or All Three at the Same Time: The Dilemma of 
Internet Intermediaries’ Liability, 7 J. OF INT’L COMMERCIAL L. & TECH. 154, 164 (2012). 
52 Id. at 162. 
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The Brazilian approach to intermediary liability is codified in the 2014 law known 
as the “Marco Civil da Internet.”54 Roughly translated as an “Internet Bill of Rights,” the 
statute establishes, among other things, that Brazilian citizens have a right to net 
neutrality and to the responsible collection, use and storage of their personal data by all 
Internet application providers. Articles 18 and 19 of the Marco Civil provide that digital 
intermediaries have immunity from civil liability for third-party content unless they fail 
to remove defamatory or racist content after receiving a valid court order asking them to 
do so.55 The Marco Civil also lists a special provision under Article 21 for the 
phenomenon of “revenge porn,” whereby intermediaries will be held criminally liable if 
they either purposefully host or fail to remove revenge porn photos on their platforms. 
                                                
53 Id. at 164. 
54 Lei No. 12.965 (April 23, 2014). 
55 One particular example of such a judicial move is illustrative. In September 2012, two videos appeared 
on YouTube alleging that Alcides Bernal, mayoral candidate for the city of Campo Grande in the Brazilian 
state of Mato Grosso do Sul, hated poor people, had unlawfully enriched himself, and had paid an ex-lover 
to abort a child he fathered, denied being the child’s father after he was born, and then beat the child after 
finally admitting that he was the father. The people who posted the videos remain anonymous. Bernal filed 
a lawsuit against Google Brazil—owner and operator of YouTube in Brazil—for publishing defamatory 
electoral propaganda against him in the run-up to an election, a violation of Article 243 of the Brazilian 
Electoral Code. Wanting to uphold the rules for conducting free and fair elections as painstakingly defined 
in the Electoral Code, Judge Flávio Saad Perón of the 35th Electoral Zone of the municipality of Campo 
Grande—a division of the Regional Electoral Court (“Tribunal Regional Eleitoral” or TRE) of the state of 
Mato Grosso do Sul—ordered that the video be taken down. The head of Google Brazil, Fabio José Silva 
Coelho, refused to obey the order, citing a commitment to upholding the values of free speech. Judge Saad 
then ordered Coelho placed under house arrest for disobeying a judge’s order—a violation of Article 347 of 
the Electoral Code—and ordered a 24-hour suspension of all Google and YouTube services in the state. 
The judge’s order attracted national and international media attention on the otherwise ordinary and 
relatively insignificant election. Google Brazil released a statement saying it was “appealing the decision 
that ordered the removal of the YouTube video because, in being a platform, Google is not responsible for 
the content posted on its site.” The company did not comment on Coelho’s arrest. However, on September 
26, 2012, Google removed the videos from YouTube. 
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The philosophical foundation to this approach to intermediary liability is based on the 
Brazilian Consumer Protection Code (CPC) of 1990,56 which lays out numerous rights of 
consumer protection. The philosophical thrust of the CPC is that consumers deserve 
protection from businesses because ultimately consumers are the reason businesses are in 
business to begin with; in other words, consumers deserve a substantial amount of legal 
power over the businesses that are profiting off of them.57 In the context of intermediary 
liability, the theory is that because online communication platforms profit off of users by 
commodifying both their content and their data, these platforms should ultimately 
respond to users when this venture turns harmful.58 
Indian	  Model	  
 
Section 79 of India’s Information Technology (IT) Act of 2000 (updated in 
2008)59 stipulates that intermediaries will not be held liable for third-party content except 
when it either materially contributes to the creation of the content, or if it receives actual 
knowledge that the content is unlawful. In 2011, the Indian government published the 
“Information Technology (Intermediary guidelines) Rules”60 in its official gazette to 
further define what might make third-party content unlawful. This includes content that 
“is grossly harmful, harassing, blasphemous defamatory, obscene, pornographic, 
paedophilic [sic], libelous, invasive of another’s privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically 
                                                
56 Lei No. 8.078 (Sept. 11, 1990). 
57 Guilherme M. Martins and João Vitor R. Longhi, Internet Service Providers’ Liability for Personal 
Damages on Social Networking Websites, 11 U.S.-CHINA L. REV. 286, 308 (2014). 
58 Id.  
59 Act No. 21 of 2000 (Information Technology Act) § 79. 
60 Notification, THE GAZETTE OF INDIA: EXTRAORDINARY, Part II § 3(i) (April 11, 2011). 
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objectionable, disparaging, relating or encouraging money laundering or gambling, or 
otherwise unlawful in any manner whatever.”61 
According to the 2011 guidelines, intermediaries must follow “due diligence” to 
remove unlawful material.62 The doctrine of due diligence comes from the realm of 
Indian business law and has many meanings, none of which has been clearly defined by a 
court or codified by a statute.63 However, for the purposes of understanding the Indian 
philosophy behind intermediary liability, the doctrine of due diligence essentially means 
that once a company becomes aware that it is profiting off of the unlawful practices of a 
business partner, it must see to it that those unlawful business activities end.64 To 
illustrate this principle, in 2008, the Delhi High Court in dicta condemned a website’s 
placing the maximization of profits over “[s]afeguard[ing] … prevailing moral values” in 
regard to its business model of profiting off of spreading links to obscene material.65 
Thus, the philosophy behind the Indian model of intermediary liability bares striking 
resemblance to that of the Brazilian model, whereby dutiful treatment of consumers 
determines the ethical and legal standards of business operations. 
Synthesis: Intermediary Liability and Platform Ethics 
 
The easy conclusion to draw from a comparison of Section 230 with the 
European, Brazilian and Indian approaches to intermediary liability is that Section 
provides much greater protection of speech than the other three.66 This easy distinction 
                                                
61 Notification § 3(2)(b). 
62 Notification § 3. 
63 Little & Co., Due Diligence, INT’L FINANCIAL L. REV., available at: 
<http://www.iflr.com/Article/2027418/Legal-due-diligence.html>. 
64 See, e.g., James Grandolfo, India, 44 THE INT’L LAWYER 663 (2010). 
65 Avnish Bajaj v. State, 150 DLT 279 (May 2008) (India). 
66 Pinto, et al, supra note 49. 
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comes from the fact that the foreign approaches involve notice-based liability, whereas 
notice does not trigger liability under Section 230.67 The more difficult conclusions are 
the normative ones: Should speech be protected at the expense of the harms it can cause 
from a lack of an incentive on the part of intermediaries to remove it? If so, does Section 
230 strike the best balance between promoting free speech and reducing the potential 
harms caused by it? Several U.S. scholars have answered these questions “yes” and “no,” 
respectively, calling for Section 230 to be amended to give victims of harmful speech the 
ability to seek damages from sites that intentionally traffic in such speech, particularly 
(though not limited to) sites that host revenge porn.68 On the other hand, legal scholars 
Sandra Braman and Stephanie Roberts argue that digital intermediaries, in hypocritical 
and self-contradictory fashion, “do not want to be content providers but do want to 
control all content,” effectively giving them “control without liability” under Section 
230.69 Similarly, legal scholars Rebecca Tushnet70 and Dawn Nunziato71 argue that 
Section 230 gives digital intermediaries too much of an incentive to control speech. The 
argument goes that if intermediaries are able, under Section 230, to proactively remove 
objectionable content without fear of liability, they will do so, to the detriment of 
                                                
67 Of course, under Section 230, notice-based liability does apply when interactive computer services host 
third-party images of child abuse or alleged infringements of copyrighted works (47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)). 
68 See, e.g., Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224 (2011); AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY 
AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN A FREE PRESS (2015); DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN 
CYBERSPACE (2015); Joshua N. Azriel, Social Networking as a Communications Weapon to Harm Victims: 
Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter Demonstrate a Need to Amend Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, 26 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF COMP. & INFO. L. 415 (2009). 
69 Braman and Roberts, supra note 5, at 438 (emphasis added). 
70 Tushnet, supra note 5. 
71 NUNZIATO, supra note 5. 
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individuals’ ability to speak freely on these platforms.72 Tushnet accuses this legal regime 
of simultaneously supporting freedom and suppression,73 and posits that “if we limit 
intermediary responsibility, … we should also limit intermediary power to control 
speech.”74  
In other words, digital intermediaries face a “tri-lemma” of sorts under the 
Section 230 regime: they can protect speech and be accused of not doing enough to 
prevent harm; they can remove harmful content at the request of individuals and be 
accused of not doing enough to protect speech, as well as spend significant resources to 
identify and remove the speech; or they can proactively remove objectionable speech and 
be accused of “private censorship.”75 To adequately balance these competing interests, 
intermediaries should follow a sound ethical theory. The European, Brazilian and Indian 
concepts of intermediary liability, when imputed into the U.S. philosophy on the subject, 
can be interpreted in a way that creates such an ethical theory.  
At their core, the European, Brazilian and Indian regimes conceive of individual 
citizens as the most important stakeholders in a networked economy that thrives on 
facilitating public discourse. This core principle is the “thin” normative framework upon 
which these regimes then build up a “thick”76 regime of intermediary liability, 
prescribing that citizens have rights against intermediaries for protecting them from the 
potentially harmful speech these platforms could host. The thin normative framework 
                                                
72 Id. at 2-3. 
73 Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1011. 
74 Id. at 1009. 
75 Id.; NUNZIATO, supra note 5. 
76 Edward H. Spence and Aaron Quinn, Information Ethics as a Guide for New Media, 23 J. OF MASS 
MEDIA ETHICS, 264 (2008). 
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upon which Section 230 is founded, as stated above, involves preserving the Internet as a 
“forum for a true diversity of political discourse.”77 Combining these thin normative 
frameworks, one arrives at the following conclusion: intermediaries have a primary duty 
to serve individual citizens to the extent that they use their platforms to create a vibrant 
public discourse. Therefore, digital intermediaries have a primary duty to preserve, 
promote and protect freedom of expression within the limits allowed them by law. 
The notion of maintaining a primary ethical duty to freedom of expression has its 
critics. In his analysis of the ethical reasons for the magazine Soldier of Fortune to not 
publish classified ads seeking murders-for-hire, ethicist Scott Tomlinson entertains the 
position that the magazine may have a duty to publish the unquestionably harmful ads 
based on a duty to protect the broader value of promoting freedom of expression.78 This 
duty follows the logic that only exercising the right to publish extreme speech will ensure 
that that right stays protected. However, Tomlinson concludes that refraining from 
publishing speech out of a moral concern for preventing harm to the targets of the speech 
“would not seriously impair free expression … because one instance of self-restraint 
would be extremely small and insignificant when compared to expression in general.”79 
Tomlinson also argues that such moral self-restraint may actually fulfill a duty to freedom 
“because harming others and acting socially irresponsible could prove to involve a high 
degree of harm to individuals in the short term and to the First Amendment in the long 
                                                
77 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3). 
78 Don E. Tomlinson, Where Morality and Law Diverge: Ethical Alternatives in the Soldier of Fortune 
Cases, 6 J. OF MASS MEDIA ETHICS 69 (1991). 
79 Id. at 77. 
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term.”80 Law professor Amy Gajda expands on this argument, positing that the U.S. legal 
culture affords too much protection for harmful speech, thereby inflating the value of 
such speech.81 She argues that just like any economic bubble, this “First Amendment 
bubble” will eventually collapse, to the detriment of those who would wish to express 
unpopular, offensive or extreme yet less harmful ideas.82  
This line of arguments is similar to contentions by critical legal theorists such as 
Charles Lawrence, who argues that the U.S. legal regime of exceptional protection of 
freedom of expression ultimately hurts the First Amendment value of creating an 
environment where many diverse ideas can flourish.83 This value is undermined, 
according to Lawrence, because the prevalence of hateful and harmful speech will deter 
participation in public discourse by the targets of that speech, who naturally feel 
threatened and unwelcome.84 Undoubtedly, speech can cause great harm. Traditional 
First Amendment theorists do not deny this fact, but they counter critical theorists such as 
Lawrence by arguing that any public benefit of hateful speech outweighs the potential 
harms it may cause. Ultimately, both groups lack the empirical evidence to back up their 
respective positions, thereby leaving to ethicists the question of how to “appropriately” 
wield the awesome powers of freedom of speech. Platform ethics changes the debate by 
focusing on how speakers should be allowed to wield their speech. The answer, this 
                                                
80 Id. 
81 GAJDA, supra note 68. 
82 Id.  





chapter proposes, is that digital intermediaries should have a primary duty to protect 
individuals’ ability to speak.  
This primary duty does not negate a duty to prevent harm caused by speech 
published on intermediaries’ platforms. Rather, the duty to promote individuals’ speech 
should be seen as co-extensive with the prevention of harm. By only removing content 
that is personally harassing, threatening or abusive to private individuals (but not to 
public figures) when notified of the presence of such content by users, digital 
intermediaries are promoting rather than stifling a robust public discourse. Figure 6-1 
organizes several categories of extreme and potentially harmful speech in a hierarchy 
determined by the political or social significance of the speech, and the potential of the 
speech to chill the speech of other users. Abuse and harassment of private individuals 
have the greatest potential to keep others (i.e. the targets of the speech) from speaking, 
due to the likelihood they will incur more abuse and harassment by speaking up.85 This 
type of speech also has little to no potential for political or social significance, due to the 
sheer fact that it involves a private individual. Therefore, digital intermediaries should 
move swiftly to remove such speech when users notify them of it. Meanwhile, the 
categories of extreme and potentially harmful speech at the top of the hierarchy have a 
greater tendency to implicate matters of public concern, due to the fact that they tend to 
deal with issues of political and social significance and involve entire groups of people 
rather than individuals. Concomitantly, they have a lesser potential for chilling the speech 
                                                




of individuals, due to the fact that identifiable individuals are not the direct targets of 
such speech. 
The objective of devising this hierarchy is simply to give digital intermediaries 
such as Facebook a set of guidelines for governing speech. There certainly may be 
instances where images of graphic content or incitement speech should be removed, but 
intermediaries should follow strict and transparent protocol for governing such speech. 
Meanwhile, cases of individual abuse and harassment should not be tolerated. Cases of 
speech involving nudity have deliberately not been included in this hierarchy, due to the 
uniquely wide range of messages that can be associated with nudity (from sexual 
pandering to political statements).  
 
Figure 6-1: Hierarchy of Harmful Speech 
Of course, the duty to follow various countries’ laws proscribing the hosting of 
certain types of speech is an obvious exception to upholding a duty to protecting freedom 
of speech and individual autonomy. Although following such laws may violate the rule of 
keeping a primary duty to freedom of speech, doing so nevertheless upholds a duty to 
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respect individual autonomy. To a greater or lesser extent, laws are an expression of the 
cultural ethos from which they were enacted86—ideally, they are the expression of the 
democratic will of the people that they affect. However difficult it may be, changing laws 
is still a function of public agency, either via democratic deliberation or through 
revolution. If someone in Pakistan wants that country’s law against blasphemy abolished, 
he or she can exercise his or her free will and lead others into the streets to protest and 
demand change, even if the likelihood of success is very low. Following DeNardis’s 
concepts of Internet governance, such an example would involve an intermediary simply 
following the laws it is required to follow to operate within a given country.87 It should 
not be held responsible for not standing up to laws that stifle speech that it did not pass 
and does not enforce. 
However, a digital intermediary should not prevent content from being viewed in 
a country whose laws do not prohibit the content. Such a move is bereft of any respect for 
individuals’ autonomous ability to consume the content and judge it on their own free 
will. Indeed, self-regulation through the following of ethical principles has the benefit of 
preventing state actors from imposing potentially more heavy-handed regulation. Self-
regulation may have other benefits as an alternative to state or legal regulation. Law 
professor Monroe Price and communication scholar Stefaan Verhulst argue that self-
regulation “has the apparent benefit of avoiding state intervention in sensitive areas of 
basic rights, such as freedom of speech and information, while offering standards for 
                                                
86 See, e.g., Alf Ross, Tû-Tû, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812 (1957). 
87 DENARDIS, supra note 7. 
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social responsibility, accountability, and user protection from offensive material.”88 
However, the authors caution that when it comes to matters of protecting freedom of 
expression, self-regulation can lead to “private censorship,” which “can be more coercive 
and sweeping than public censorship.”89 In fact, they argue, “[t]he dangers of 
constitutional violation are particularly strong where the self-regulatory entity is acting in 
response to government or as a means of preempting its intervention.”90 Although no 
legal constitutional violation of free speech rights may take place in such a scenario, the 
extralegal restriction of speech may have a stronger and more sweeping effect on the 
robustness of online public discourse than a legal (i.e. state-sponsored) restriction. Digital 
intermediaries should be conscious of their power to bring about such violations of 
individuals’ ability to speak freely, and they should do no more than laws require of them 
to remove harmful content. 
Applying Platform Ethics to Facebook’s Community Standards 
 
Chapter 5 traced the evolution of Facebook’s rules governing users’ speech, from 
their early days as a part of the company’s terms of use, to their current version: the 
March 2015 update to what are now called “Community Standards.” Two themes were 
identified in this evolutionary process. First, Facebook has sought to find the ideal 
balancing point between protecting the ability of its users to speak on its platforms and 
preventing potential harms to other users that that speech could cause. In this balancing 
act, Facebook has declared that it will judge content based on the intent of the users who 
post it, as well as on the context of the content. Decisions on whether speech is allowable 
                                                





will be made on a case-by-case basis, with flexible rules guiding both users and Facebook 
on how those decisions are made. Second, Facebook has maintained that it takes no 
responsibility for either the harms it fails to prevent or the speech that it removes from its 
platforms. It asks its users for patience as it attempts to find the ideal balance between the 
two goals—if one even exists. 
Community standards are important tools for guiding the ethical operations of 
digital intermediaries like Facebook. They “evolve according to changing norms. They 
influence the overall perception of what is appropriate in a society and, at the same time, 
are influenced by overall norms.”91 These standards “neither mirror public opinion nor 
necessarily lag or lead public opinion in terms of cultural norms,” but rather simply 
“represent a temporarily agreed upon set of standards which serves as a way-station or 
modus vivendi as new modes of information are distributed.”92 It probably “is not 
desirable for providers to be too precise or to have exceedingly strict standards to 
measure compliance,” as “[g]reater flexibility can make it easier to respond to changes in 
technology [and] modify expectations and outcomes.”93 Indeed, “the notion of harmful 
content—which is culturally diverse and subject to changing norms—is be[st] suited to 
self-regulation.”94  
The argument put forth in this chapter does not disagree that such flexibility has 
its advantages. The only difference that this chapter would seek to add to this self-
regulation regime is that platforms should make a commitment to protect speech first—to 
                                                
91 Id. at 43. 
92 Id. 




announce courageously to users that their default position will be to protect speech. 
Clearly, Facebook has not made such a commitment in its community standards. 
Although Facebook’s decision to judge speech based on the intent of the speaker and the 
context of the speech is admirable and a step in the right direction for protecting users’ 
speech on its platforms, its “we’re not perfect” message is not. Facebook must clearly 
state that its primary duty as a digital intermediary is to facilitate the speech of its users, 
due to all the benefits that speech brings to society. It then must open up its process of 
governing speech to its users so that they can hold Facebook accountable to upholding 
that duty. 
The purpose of this chapter was to build a set of ethical guidelines that maximizes 
respect for individual autonomy and protection of freedom of expression. The purpose of 
this chapter was not necessarily to argue that the policies and principles of these three 
mainstream intermediaries are misguided, or that there is a rampant trend going on of 
intermediaries removing unpopular or potentially harmful political speech that requires a 
revision in their policies. However, the sheer presence of such removals, combined with 
the imprecise language of the community guidelines of mainstream digital intermediaries 
such as Facebook, spells potential trouble for individuals’ speech on these platforms. 
Granted, it is hard to blame platforms for using squishy language when crafting their 
speech policies. As communication professor Tarleton Gillespie notes, such vague 
policies are part of an “effort to limit [intermediaries’] liability not only to … legal 
charges but also more broadly to cultural charges of being puerile, frivolous, debased, 
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etc.”95 Intermediaries seek to be “rewarded for facilitating expression but not liable for its 
excesses.”96 They want to have their cake and eat it too: promote speech and police 
extremes when they can. Such a strategy does a disservice to all individuals who depend 
on these platforms to participate in public discourse. 
In 1996, Internet philosopher John Perry Barlow argued in his manifesto “A 
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” that the Internet should be a realm free 
from the laws of the world of “flesh and steel.”97 As the Internet evolved and became 
popularized through the invention of the World Wide Web, Barlow’s extreme libertarian 
vision of the Internet became unrealistic.98 But the spirit of Barlow lives on in those who 
lament the commercialization and corporatizing of the Internet, particularly by a handful 
of powerful companies such as Google and Facebook. Law professor Jonathan Zittrain 
points out that the private powers that have come to dominate the Internet have 
simultaneously expanded and put boundaries around individuals’ online communicative 
agency.99 In such a context, law professors David Johnson and David Post argue, “The 
strongest claim to control [online] comes from the participants themselves.”100 Of course, 
Johnson and Post are referring to who should be able to claim sovereignty over 
cyberspace in the legal sense: individuals versus governments. Yet the same philosophy 
holds true in the ethical sense: individuals should have pride of place in the online public 
                                                
95 Gillespie, supra note 17, at 357. 
96 Id. at 356. 
97 JOHN PERRY BARLOW, A DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF CYBERSPACE (1996), available at 
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. 
98 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE, VER. 2.0 (2006); GOLDSMITH AND WU, supra note 7. 
99 Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 253 (2006); JONATHAN 
ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008). 
100 David R. Johnson and David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1367, 1375 (1996). 
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discourse. Thus, the mainstream digital intermediaries through which individuals 
communicate should, first and foremost, reinforce a commitment to facilitating 
individuals’ speech. Second, they should commit clearly to recognizing personal abuse as 
the most grievous of harms capable of occurring on their platforms, and they should fight 
such abuse as strongly as they protect all other forms of speech. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has highlighted the fact that digital intermediaries face several 
competing duties: to promote free speech, to prevent harm, to obey the law, and to make 
money. By reviewing relevant scholarship in the field of media ethics and the 
philosophies behind competing concepts of intermediaries’ legal liability for third-party 
content, the chapter concludes that digital intermediaries should place their duty to 
promoting free speech above their other duties. They must do so because both their 
business model and deliberative democracy depend on the vibrant public discourse that 
individuals have created by using their services. Their duty to prevent harm caused by 
speech published on their platforms should be coextensive with their duty to protecting 
speech. Thus, only speech that personally threatens, harasses or abuses private 
individuals should be removed from their platforms upon notification by users of the 
presence of such speech. Intermediaries also should only remove speech as obligated by 
countries’ laws—they should go no further.  
At its core, an ethics for platforms is all about accountability. Digital 
intermediaries should be held accountable for the enormous power they have to control 
the speech of individuals who depend on these platforms to participate in global public 
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discourse.101 This issue is common in the field of media ethics, where “[m]uch of the 
debate on media accountability has focused on efforts to neutralize the tension between 
journalistic autonomy and the need for a responsible press.”102 Ethicist Patrick Plaisance 
argues that “media accountability … is not a dilemma to be solved but a healthy tension 
to be managed. Although codes of ethics and correction boxes have their places, the 
media are accountable when they never stop seeking that uncomfortable balance with 
audience values.”103 Likewise, the concept of platform ethics proposed in this chapter 
will not solve the problems of harmful speech on digital intermediaries, nor will it sap the 
power of intermediaries and make them fully accountable to speakers. Rather, the hope of 
this theory is that it will protect speakers and the global public discourse by committing 
platforms to placing these values above all others. 
                                                
101 DENARDIS, supra note 7. 
102 Patrick L. Plaisance, The Concept of Media Accountability Reconsidered, 15 J. OF MASS MEDIA 








In an appearance on the March 11, 2015 episode of Comedy Central’s “The 
Nightly Show” devoted to the issue of banning words on college campuses,1 John Avlon, 
editor-in-chief of The Daily Beast, argued that individuals on social media are more 
concerned about being offended than about freedom of speech. “Social media is creating 
a mob mentality where people are all of a sudden acting as the police,” Avlon said, “and 
they’re going to pile on anyone that says anything that offends them.”2 Such a sanction, 
Avlon argued, “has the apparent velocity of force, … and what that’s doing is having a 
chilling effect on discourse.”3  
Avlon’s opinion is just that: opinion. However, it is an opinion that sits at the 
heart of this study. The First Amendment protects public discourse from government 
interference. But that same public discourse now faces potential threats from easily 
offended individuals and powerful private institutions (in the form of digital 
intermediaries) without the same First Amendment protection. This study has discussed 
and synthesized theories from several distinct schools of thought to give a theoretical 
shape to this phenomenon of “content governance.” This concluding chapter briefly will 
review three key points to take away from this study. It will also address the main 
strengths and weakness of the study, as well as briefly summarize the original 
                                                
1 Panel: Banning Words, COMEDY CENTRAL: THE NIGHTLY SHOW WITH LARRY WILMORE (March 11, 
2015), available at http://www.cc.com/video-clips/2nwm3v/the-nightly-show-panel---banning-words (at 
5:38 of video clip). Also available at John Avlon, The World Police & the Very Offended Internet Mob, 
The Daily Beast (March 12, 2015), available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/03/12/the-
word-police-the-very-offended-internet-mob.html. 
2 Id. (at 5:38 of video clip).  
3 Id. (at 5:55 of video clip). 
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contribution of this study to research in the field of mass communication law. Finally, 
and most importantly, the chapter will propose avenues of future research that the highly 
theoretical concepts from this study can inform. 
Brief Overview 
 
Three Key Takeaways 
 
1.	  Improve	  literacy	  on	  individuals’	  interactions	  with	  digital	  intermediaries	  
 
Digital intermediaries have afforded individuals the ability to publish messages 
within a global public discourse. Individuals can bypass major organizations to create and 
share content that is entertaining, banal, thought-provoking, politically charged, 
revolutionary or reactionary. Yet individuals can also use these tools to publish speech 
that causes varying degrees of harm, from mere offense to personal abuse or harassment 
to instigating physical harms to persons and property. Finally, individuals can persuade 
intermediaries to remove speech they find too extreme or harmful by flagging it. 
Intermediaries may opt to remove that speech if it violates the standards that they create 
for the “community” of users that they foster.  
Individuals must be cognizant of several characteristics of this system of 
communication. First, their communicative agency depends on the digital intermediaries 
who facilitate the networked platforms for communication. Under such a system of 
dependence, individuals must be aware of whether and to what extent digital 
intermediaries will manage the extreme speech that gets published on their platforms. 
Individuals also must understand both the values that extreme speech brings to society, as 
well as the limits demarcating when extreme speech becomes regulable harmful speech. 
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2.	  Build	  a	  culture	  of	  tolerance	  toward	  extreme	  speech	  
 
Understanding the values and limits of extreme speech involves building a culture 
of tolerance toward such speech. A culture of tolerance has two key attributes. First, 
tolerance requires individuals who may otherwise wish to exercise a “natural” tendency4 
to censor extreme speech through flagging it to refrain from doing so out of a desire to 
allow that speech the opportunity to compete in the marketplace of ideas.5 Second, 
tolerance is an active and educational process. Tolerance is not blind acceptance of all 
speech simply for acceptance’s sake. Tolerance involves accepting extreme speech out of 
a desire to improve one’s mental faculties through active engagement with speech that is 
extreme, offensive or disagreeable. As the power of individuals and private institutions to 
stifle speech increases relative to the power of state actors to do so, building a culture of 
tolerance has become crucially important for the vitality of public discourse. 
3.	  Encourage	  transparency	  in	  content	  governance	  
 
Digital intermediaries such as Facebook have continued to revise their community 
standards and rules for speech published on their platforms. Facebook’s community 
standards seek to strike a balance between promoting speech and preventing harm to 
users. Facebook also has the legal authority to declare itself immune from liability for 
any harm it fails to prevent or any speech it removes in the name of preventing harm. It 
certainly would not be too audacious of a generalization to say that other mainstream 
digital intermediaries (such as YouTube or Twitter) do the same with their standards. 
                                                
4 See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH 
IN AMERICA 92 (1986); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 8, 12 (1859/2001); Thomas I. Emerson, 
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 884 (1963); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 
FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 4 (1992). 
5 See generally MILL, supra. 
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However, a great deal of the process by which intermediaries govern users’ speech 
remains a mystery. Intermediaries depend on users’ speech for their economic livelihood 
as much as individuals depend on intermediaries to participate in the public discourse. 
Therefore, intermediaries should make a clear commitment to protecting users’ ability to 
speak on their platforms, which requires intermediaries to abide by an ethical duty to 
make their content governance process more transparent for their users. 
Original Contribution to Scholarship 
 
The theories and doctrines regarding freedom of expression discussed throughout 
this study are not, in and of themselves, original. What is original is how they have been 
synthesized and applied to the study of governance of extreme speech in networked 
communication. The perspective that this study takes—that more speech is better than 
less and that the goals of the First Amendment are ultimately beneficial to democratic 
deliberation in society—is not, in and of itself, original. What is original is how this 
perspective responds to scholars who call for digital intermediaries to play a greater role 
in protecting individuals from harmful speech.6 Although there is a place for such content 
governance, this study cautions that it is a remedy whose impact on public discourse must 
be understood. This study also contributes original research to the field of mass 
communication ethics by arguing that field must embrace theoretical approaches to 
understanding and assessing the roles that digital intermediaries play in public discourse. 
Finally, the empirical analysis of the evolution of Facebook’s rules governing users’ 
                                                
6 See, e.g., AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN 
A FREE PRESS (2015); DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2015); Mary Anne 




speech is an original contribution to the field of mass communication and mass 
communication law. The social network’s community standards are public knowledge, 
and major updates to them have garnered significant press attention. However, this study 
assesses those standards in terms of their evolution over Facebook’s 11-year history, and 
in terms of their ability to successfully strike the balance between protecting speech and 
preventing harm.  
Strengths and Weaknesses 
 
The main strength of the research in this study is its ability to synthesize 
arguments from a wide and otherwise disconnected body of scholarship. The theories and 
jurisprudence of the First Amendment are too often the subject of an isolated body of 
scholarship. This isolation risks making these subjects the unapproachable province of 
elite thinkers and jurists, when in fact they belong (or are ideally conceived to belong) to 
the masses, equally and without exception. Calling upon the values of First Amendment 
theory and jurisprudence to analyze the norms of networked communication facilitated 
by digital intermediaries is an attempt to bring these values closer to the hoi polloi who 
communicate via these platforms.  
The principal weakness of the research in this study is its abstractness. The 
theories and conclusions that this study puts forth are normative. To varying degrees, 
they rely conjectures and potentialities. They discuss a trend (content governance) that is 
indeed happening, yet they cannot say to what extent this trend is happening, and they 
cannot quantify the social harms of that trend. The root of this weakness lies in the choice 
to apply normative First Amendment theories to the study of content governance. This 
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abstractness also shows its flaws in the task of transposing First Amendment theories and 
values onto private actors. First Amendment analyses are generally black-and-white: they 
are framed as speaker versus a state actor. The problem with transposing First 
Amendment analyses onto private actors is that private actors come in all shades of gray.  
However, these weaknesses are sources of strength for future research based on 
the conclusions arrived at in this study. Namely, the abstract conclusions from this study 
are ripe for more concrete and nuanced conceptualization through empirical analysis. The 
following section will address the future research agenda spawned from this study. It will 
give special attention to the paradigmatic traditions upon which this agenda will be based. 




This study opens the door for many new research questions. To what extent is 
content governance perceived as so powerful a control over speech that it rivals the evils 
associated with state censorship of speech? To what extent are individuals likely to take 
action against speech they find offensive or harmful by flagging it? What does “freedom 
of expression” even mean today, a time when individuals, state actors and digital 
intermediaries have varying degrees of agency within and control over the public 
discourse?  
Answering these questions requires a research agenda that employs various types 
of social scientific and empirical analyses to complement traditional, documentary legal 
research. However, to truly understand the benefit of such a multi-method research 
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agenda, one must first understand the complementary relationship between legal research 
and research in mass communication.  
The Legacy of Mass Communication Law in the Social Sciences 
 
Mass communication law is crucial to the field of mass communication as a 
whole. The ultimate goal of the field of mass communication law is to further an 
understanding about freedom of expression in its many forms.7 In their seminal 1981 
chapter on legal research methods in mass communication, mass communication 
professors Don Gillmor and Everette Dennis declared that legal research in mass 
communication can achieve this goal by fulfilling one of five purposes: clarifying and 
explaining the law through analysis of procedure, precedent and doctrine; reforming old 
laws and creating new ones; providing a better understanding of how law operates in 
society; analyzing the political and social processes that shape law; and furnishing 
materials for legal education.8 Researchers can utilize one of two methods to accomplish 
these ends, according to Gillmor and Dennis: “traditional legal research,” involving 
exhaustive examination of cases and statutes; and “empirical and behavioral legal 
research, which employs the methods of social science while recognizing the unique 
circumstances and problems of law.”9 Each method operates by different rules and often 
pursues distinct outcomes. For example, unlike with social scientific research, 
scholarship employing the traditional method does not always pursue “knowledge for the 
sake of knowledge,” but rather “an applied knowledge in keeping with the lawyer’s 
                                                
7 Donald M. Gillmor and Everette E. Dennis, Legal Research in Mass Communication, in RESEARCH 
METHODS IN MASS COMMUNICATION (Guido H. Stempel, III & Bruce H. Westley eds., 1981) 341. 
8 Id. at 328-9. 
9 Id. at 321. 
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adversarial purpose” of winning a case.10 Either method can be called upon, so long as 
the method is appropriate for answering the research question set before it.11 
In 1986, the journal Communications and the Law published a special issue 
examining exactly what the relationship between research in mass communication law 
and research in the much broader field of mass communication should look like, and 
what sorts of research questions and corresponding methods could come out of this 
relationship. Overall, the issue called for an expansion in the use of multiple methods, 
both to increase the robustness of the field and to “diminish disciplinary isolation—both 
within and without the field of mass communication.”12 Dennis, himself, opened the issue 
with a call for media law scholars to “use other approaches to foster understanding of 
freedom of expression” beyond traditional legal research.13 He warned that the traditional 
paradigm of legal research, involving (then, as now) “[n]arrow, adversarial studies or 
those that are no more than amicus briefs for media defendants in libel cases,” will “do 
little to assure a rigorous analysis of complex rights in conflict.”14 For Professor F. 
Dennis Hale, this call meant giving greater attention to the third of Gillmor and Dennis’s 
five purposes,15 and meeting the “need for empirical research that measures the impact of 
the law of freedom of expression” on society.16 Hale suggests studies that “measure the 
                                                
10 Id. at 331. 
11 Id. at 333. 
12 Robert E. Drechsel, Mass Communication of the Law: Toward Theoretical Understanding of Journalists’ 
Interacton with Judicial Sources, 8 COMM. & L. 23, 33-34 (1986). 
13 Everette E. Dennis, Frontiers in Communication Law Research, 8 COMM. & L. 3, 6 (1986). 
14 Id. at 10. 
15 Gillmore and Dennis, supra note 8. 




quantity and quality of specific legal activities in state and federal courts,”17 assess the 
impact of administrative policies such as the now-defunct Fairness Doctrine on news 
content,18 and measure the public opinion of legal doctrines19 as furthering this mission. 
Professor David Pritchard charged researchers with employing social scientific theories, 
rather than the traditional normative theories of legal scholarship, to build “an 
understanding of how law actually works.”20 Professor Robert Drechsel, for his part, 
called on mass communication law scholars to “treat ‘communication’ as less an 
adjective than a noun—to expand the research agenda well beyond traditional scholarship 
on the principles, rules, and procedures of law that affect communication and to give 
more attention to the communication of law.”21  
Professors Jeremy Cohen and Timothy Gleason have conceived of a relationship 
between legal and mass communication research in which the First Amendment is 
considered a “paradigm.”22 Their main argument is that “a close familiarity with the 
disciplines of communication and law” enhances “a thorough understanding of the 
concept and practice of freedom of expression.”23 Similar to Gillmor and Dennis, Cohen 
and Gleason call for a research agenda that examines the relationship between law and 
mass communication.24 Under the exceptional protections of the First Amendment, such 
an agenda may involve as much the study of the effects of extreme and potentially 
                                                
17 Id. at 42-43. 
18 Id. at 45. 
19 Id. at 48. 
20 David Pritchard, A New Paradigm for Legal Research in Mass Communication, 8 COMM. & L. 51, 56 
(1986). 
21 Drechsel, supra note 12, at 23. 
22 JEREMY COHEN AND TIMOTHY GLEASON, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN COMMUNICATION AND LAW, 13, 110 
(1990). 
23 Id. at 18 (original emphasis). 
24 Id. at 133. 
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harmful speech on society, as well as how certain actors respond to various guidelines 
and exceptions the law does impose (e.g. how common law privileges for media 
defendants in libel suits affect the frequency and outcome of libel suits against the press). 
However, the authors maintain that the end goal of such research need not and should not 
be the effectuation of change in First Amendment doctrine in this country.25 Rather, the 
goal is to better understand the system in place so that the goals of normative theories of 
freedom of expression (the pursuit of truth, the realization of individual autonomy, 
training a tolerant mind) can be realized.   
Today, scholars continue to echo Gillmor and Dennis’s call for incorporating 
social scientific methods into research in mass communication law.26 However, other 
legal scholars maintain that this endeavor will not bear fruit, as legal theories (and the 
doctrines that stem from those theories) are fundamentally normative and philosophical 
in nature, whereas social scientific theories are fundamentally empirical and falsifiable in 
nature.27 In other words, legal theories are not testable in and of themselves, and 
transposing them into social scientific theories would strip them of their essential nature. 
Not only that, but the two paradigms pursue radically different goals. Research in mass 
communication law focuses on issues—such as libel, censorship and invasion of 
privacy—that are important because they attack the very heart of the legal tradition, not 
                                                
25 Id. at 98. 
26 See generally AMY REYNOLDS AND BROOKE BARNETT, COMMUNICATION AND LAW: 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO RESEARCH (2006). 
27 See Matthew D. Bunker and David K. Perry, Standing at the Crossroads: Social Science, Human Agency 
and Free Speech Law, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1 (2004). 
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because they happen frequently.28 In contrast, social scientists seek to reveal correlations 
and effects across a broad, generalizable population.29  
These scholars are correct in their assessment of the rules and goals of the theories 
and methods of each paradigm.30 However, the debate should not be over whether 
empirical theories and methods can be applied to legal research, but rather when they can 
be applied appropriately. For example, empirical studies that show a high correlation 
between an unpopular type of speech and the harm it is purported to lead to should not be 
invoked to make the argument that First Amendment jurisprudence should be revised and 
the unpopular speech made illegal (i.e. purpose number two of Gillmor and Dennis’s 
five31). Such a practice violates the rules for what counts as a valid argument for 
restricting speech within First Amendment jurisprudence.32 As Professor Jeremy Cohen 
puts it, “the object is to understand the application of the law as it is rather than to 
provide a rationale for what the law could or should be.”33 Not to mention, as Professor 
Clay Calvert and his coauthors point out, a regime of free speech jurisprudence where 
decisions of which speech to proscribe and which to allow come down to the results of 
                                                
28 COHEN AND GLEASON, supra note 22, at 13. 
29 Id. 
30 Id.; Anthony L. Fargo, Social Science Research in Judges’ First Amendment Decisions, in REYNOLDS 
AND BARNETT, supra note 26, at 35. 
31 Gillmore and Dennis, supra note 8. 
32 State regulations of speech on the basis of content must pass the strict scrutiny standard of judicial 
review, whereby the state “must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest 
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end,” Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 
U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 




scientific studies would be undesirable due to its reliance on imperfect, falsifiable and 
perhaps even manipulable conclusions.34  
By the same token, citing normative legal theory to argue for the protection of 
extreme speech for the greater good of democratic society and public discourse will not 
wash away the empirically measurable harm that such speech can cause. The negative 
aspects of the U.S. free speech environment should lead researchers to figure out how 
people can best live within that environment, rather than how the environment can be 
torn down to make way for a new one. In other words, scholars can and should use social 
scientific methods to further Gillmor and Dennis’s goal of studying the effects such a 
legal regime has on society. Such research could involve determining “whether 
something does or does not happen because of the law,”35 such as whether the presence 
of state shield laws leads to more investigative reporting in those states.36 Or, it could 
involve, as Professor Hale suggested, measuring public opinion of various aspects of U.S. 
media law. 
Research on Freedom of Expression and Tolerance 
 
One area of research that has been instrumental in the pursuit of understanding 
law from a social scientific perspective is the study of public attitudes toward the many 
extreme types of speech allowed under First Amendment jurisprudence. This body of 
research has reached a virtually uniform conclusion: “Although the notion of free speech 
                                                
34 See generally, Clay Calvert, Kara Carnley, Brittany Link and Linda Riedmann, Conversion Therapy and 
Free Speech: A Doctrinal and Theoretical First Amendment Analysis, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
525 (2014). 
35 Cohen, supra note 33, at 16. 
36 See, e.g., Vince Blasi, The Newsman’s Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229 (1971); 
Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative Proposal Limiting the 
Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources and Informaton, 20 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 92 (2002). 
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is nearly irresistible to many people, certain specific examples of how other people may 
choose to enjoy that right may cause alarm and provoke intolerance among various 
segments of the public.”37 This conclusion is rather obvious; of course people are going 
to take issue with speech they disagree with or find offensive. What is more interesting is 
the assessment of the strength of individuals’ intolerance: the extent to which they would 
be willing to see their lack of support for speech turn into some form of censorship of that 
speech.  
Much of the research on attitudes toward speech (documented extensively in the 
2004 work by mass communication professor Julie Andsager and colleagues)38 focuses 
on individuals’ support for legal sanctions against such forms of extreme speech as 
extremist political messages, pornography or other sexually charged speech, racism or 
sexism, and speech that could be damaging to national security. In other words, when the 
law is the exclusive remedy available to individuals to silence unpopular speech, the issue 
can be framed via the following question: “why are … individuals—regardless of their 
backgrounds—willing to sacrifice bits and pieces of their expressive rights, especially 
when each encroachment sets a precedent for further regulation?”39 
Early	  Work	  
 
Historical context is important to research on attitudes toward speech. Generally, 
this research has focused on the extreme, unpopular and highly charged speech of its 
time. Samuel Stouffer conducted one of the first major investigations on public attitudes 
                                                
37 JULIE L. ANDSAGER, ROBERT O. WYATT AND ERNEST MARTIN, FREE EXPRESSION IN 5 DEMOCRATIC 
PUBLICS: SUPPORT FOR INDIVIDUAL AND MEDIA RIGHTS 78 (2004) (emphasis added). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 62. 
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toward speech in 1955. At that point in American legal history, the U.S. Supreme Court 
had begun relatively recently to expand the protections of the First Amendment to 
preclude state governments (not just the federal government) from passing laws that 
punished speech in the name of protecting law and order.40 That era in American political 
history also witnessed the beginning of the Cold War and the rise of McCarthyism and 
the “Red Scare,” which tested citizens’ tolerance for the exercise of individual liberties to 
express communist messages.41 Stouffer measured individuals’ tolerance toward what 
was considered to be the most harmful type of speech of his time: communist speech.42 
He concluded that community elites and those with higher levels of education tended to 
be more tolerant of communist speech than those who were poorer or had lower levels of 
education.43 However, Stouffer’s work was later criticized for not adequately measuring 
individuals’ perception of exactly how harmful communist speech was to society.44 
The 1960s and 1970s saw a great expansion of First Amendment protections to 
many types of extreme speech, such as public display of curse words,45 the KKK,46 the 
American Nazi Party,47 defamatory speech,48 and publications potentially damaging to 
national security.49 That era also saw the Supreme Court put some of the first major limits 
                                                
40 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, FN 4 (1938) 
41 ANDSAGER, WYATT AND MARTIN, supra note 37, at 23. 
42 SAMUEL A. STOUFFER, COMMUNISM, CONFORMITY, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1955). 
43 Id. 
44 See JOHN L. SULLIVAN, JAMES PIERESON AND GEORGE E. MARCUS, POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1982). 
45 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
46 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
47 National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); Collin v. Smith, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). 
48 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
49 New York Times v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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on freedom of expression: obscenity or hardcore pornography;50 incitement to imminent 
lawless action;51 indecent speech on broadcast media;52 and that burning a draft card was 
illegal because, despite its expressive qualities, it constituted destruction of government 
property.53 This formidable period in First Amendment jurisprudence led scholars in the 
early 1980s to assess public opinion toward expression that fell within these protected 
and unprotected categories. In 1982, political scientists James Gibson and Richard 
Bingham published a study that measured support among ACLU and Common Cause 
members for the rights of controversial groups to engage in controversial speech acts.54 
The authors concluded that tolerance for speech varied depending on the group speaking 
and the message of that group.55 That same year, philosophy professor John Immerwahr 
and legal researcher John Doble published a study that measured attitudes among both 
the public and journalists toward various controversial speech scenarios to determine the 
limits of public tolerance toward individuals or the press exercising their First 
Amendment rights.56 They concluded that there is a great deal of disagreement among 
ordinary citizens and media elites over whether certain types of harmful speech should be 
allowed in society, with the former more likely to favor greater restriction of such types 
of speech than the latter.57 Particularly, both of these studies show that public opinion 
was higher for speech with a strong political message (such as communist speech) than 
                                                
50 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
51 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973). 
52 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
53 U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
54 James L. Gibson and Richard D. Bingham, On the Conceptualization and Measurement of Political 
Tolerance, 76 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 603 (1982). 
55 Id. at 617. 
56 John Immerwahr and John Doble, Public Attitudes toward Freedom of the Press, 46 PUBLIC OPINION Q. 
177 (1982). 
57 Id. at 185. 
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for speech with a more divisive and hateful (even if political) message (such as Nazis 
marching in Skokie). 
Andsager and colleagues measured attitudes toward freedom of expression at the 
turn of the millennium, following a decade (the 1990s) that began with the Supreme 
Court upholding First Amendment protection for burning the American flag58 and 
lampooning public officials with outrageous satire,59 while striking down laws 
prohibiting cross burning60 and punishing newspapers for publishing the name of a rape 
victim.61 The decade also witnessed the growth of the so-called “PC” (“political 
correctness”) movement, led by public universities’ (failed) attempts to implement codes 
proscribing “hate speech,”62 which later morphed into a movement that sought to socially 
condemn any forms of language used as a weapon “by the powerful to deny the interests 
of the oppressed.”63 Andsager and her colleagues compared attitudes toward freedom of 
expression among individuals in the United States, Russia, Hong Kong and Israel,64 
reaching several conclusions. First, somewhat obviously, “political, harmful, offensive, 
or routine,” but the “exact components of these factors … vary from culture to culture.”65 
Of particular interest among their U.S. study was their conclusion that individuals’ 
“willingness to protect individual free speech rights seem[ed] paramount, with media 
                                                
58 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
59 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
60 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
61 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
62 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Universities, Racist Speech and Democracy in America: An Essay for the 
ACLU, 27 Harv. C.R.-C-L. L. Rev 339 (1992); SMOLLA, supra note 4. 
63 Anthony Zurcher, A Political Correctness War that Never Really Ended, BBC NEWS ECHO CHAMBERS 
(Jan. 30, 2015). See also ANDSAGER, WYATT AND MARTIN, supra note 37, at 64. 
64 The researchers surveyed both Arabs and Jews in Israel, hence giving the book its title: “5 Democratic 
Publics.” 
65 ANDSAGER, WYATT AND MARTIN, supra note 37, at 249. 
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rights scoring a somewhat distant second.”66 The authors attributed this gap to “the 
abstract nature of threats to personal security for most Americans.”67 Support for freedom 
of expression tended to be highest among relatively more affluent and educated males 
(and, in the United States, white males), leading the authors to propose the following 
theory: “people who are most secure within society are most likely to support expressive 
rights.”68  
Tolerance	  and	  Censorial	  Behavior	  
 
The studies cited above have indicated that support exists among certain groups of 
individuals to have certain types of unpopular or extreme speech legally proscribed under 
certain circumstances. However, Professor Jennifer Lambe has pointed out that there is a 
conceptual distinction between public opinion, tolerance and attitude toward certain types 
of speech and the willingness of people to censor that speech.69 In other words, certain 
types of speech may be unpopular, but people still may believe that such speech should 
be allowed to exist in society. Thus, Lambe created the Willingness to Censor (WTC) 
scale to assess whether and how individuals would want certain types of speech to be 
regulated. The scale consists of a survey with 49 questions, each corresponding to a 
combination of one of seven types of extreme or harmful speech (hate speech, 
pornography, controversial political speech, abortion speech, commercial speech, 
defamation, speech that violates privacy) expressed via one of seven different media.70 
                                                
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 251. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
68 ANDSAGER, WYATT AND MARTIN, supra note 37, at 258. 
69 Jennifer L. Lambe, Dimensions of Censorship: Reconceptualizing Public Willingness to Censor, 7 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 187 (2002). 
70 Id. at 222. 
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Participants are asked to what extent they would agree with the following responses by 
the government to harmful speech in a given medium: a law banning the speech; 
requiring that the speech be expressed only at certain times or in certain manners; no 
response; active support for the speech. Lambe then examined which potential 
demographic factors could be associated with willingness to censor in each of the 49 
examples. In several studies published since, she concluded that multiple factors, such as 
age, political ideology and gender, predict willingness to censor particular messages in 
particular circumstances.71 
Lambe’s work is novel for its attempt at distinguishing attitude (public disdain 
toward speech) from behavior (actively taking steps to act on that disdain and censor the 
speech). It is also novel in its adoption of actual scenarios involving harmful speech and 
potential government responses to that speech into its instrument of measurement. 
However, one criticism of Lambe’s work posed here is that it seems to assume that 
individuals are sufficiently familiar with the actual government responses to give 
accurate responses regarding their favorability toward each response. Thus, Lambe’s 
participants may in fact be using her scale as a proxy simply to express their opinions 
toward the speech. 
Tolerance, Censorial Behavior and Content Governance: A Research Agenda 
 
Lambe’s research involves individuals’ support for censorship options available 
only to government actors. However, Lambe’s work could prove valuable when applied 
to a context in which individuals have the ability to stifle unpopular speech with 
                                                
71 Jennifer L. Lambe, The Structure of Censorship Attitudes, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 485 (2008); Jennifer 
L. Lambe and Jason B. Reineke, Public Attitudes about Government Involvement in Expressive 
Controversies, 59 J. COMM. 225 (2009). 
  
296 
relatively greater ease and prospects for success than attempting to invoke the law to 
achieve the same goal. Namely, Lambe’s WTC scale could be adapted to measure the 
likelihood that individuals would seek to have a digital intermediary remove unpopular 
speech from its platform, engage in a campaign to have advertisers boycott a platform 
that hosts the speech, engage in a campaign to publicly shame the speaker of the 
unpopular message, or rally an online crowd against the message. Such a study ultimately 
could get at the heart of all the preceding studies of attitudes toward speech, the notion 
that “[t]he force of public opinion may be as effective as laws, if not more so, in limiting 
expression.”72 This notion reflects the focus of the multi-method research agenda 
proposed in this chapter: the issue of how the definition and values of freedom of 
expression are changing in a world where more people have greater communicative 
agency than ever before, and where digital intermediaries have become the arbiters of 
individuals’ communicative activity.  
Building upon Lambe’s work, I propose to measure individuals’ support for the 
extralegal methods of managing extreme UGC discussed throughout this study. I also 
propose to measure individuals’ willingness to engage in a censorial behavior (such as 
speaking out against the content offline or online, or flagging73 the content to force the 
platform to remove it). This study, therefore, would seek to assess individuals’ agency to 
censor and deference to content governance.  
Based on the doctrinally grounded definitions of the limits and the social value of 
extreme speech discussed in this study, the research must now move into its second 
                                                
72 ANDSAGER, WYATT AND MARTIN, supra note 37, at 6. 
73 Crawford and Gillespie, supra note 6. 
  
297 
phase: developing an instrument to measure agency to censor and deference to content 
governance. Guided by the “exploratory model” of mixed-method research,74 this phase 
of the research will begin by conducting focus groups. Ideally, the focus groups will 
facilitate complimentary and argumentative interactions among individuals in which a 
common and recognizable vocabulary can be developed for the subject of content 
governance.75 Using the responses from the focus groups, instruments will be devised for 
two quantitative analyses that will be conducted in sequential stages. First, the researcher 
will use Q method to “unmask deeply held opinions in such a manner that people who 
respond … in specific ways can begin to be grouped into factors or types defined 
according to similarities and differences in the attitudes, motives, and wants they 
report.”76 The Q method study will involve giving participants roughly 30 statements that 
they will have to arrange from most agreeable to least agreeable. Examples of such 
statements may include: 
•  Individuals have a duty to police extreme speech on digital intermediaries. 
 
• Individuals have a right to say whatever they want on digital intermediaries. 
 
•  Digital intermediaries have a duty to prevent harm caused by speech published 
on their platforms. 
 
• Digital intermediaries have a duty to promote the freedom of expression of users 
on their platforms. 
 
                                                
74 JOHN W. CRESWELL AND VICKI L. PLANO CLARK, DESIGNING AND CONDUCTING MIXED METHODS 
RESEARCH 76 (2007) (arguing that the goal of the focus groups is to ensure strong reliability and construct 
validity when developing the instruments for the quantitative stages of the study). 
75 THOMAS R. LINDLOF AND BRYAN C. TAYLOR, QUALITATIVE COMMUNICATION RESEARCH METHODS 
3RD ED., 183 (2011). 
76 Bryan H. Reber, Fritz Cropp and Glen T. Cameron, Mythic Battles: Examining the Lawyer-Public 
Relations Counselor Dynamic, 13 J. PUBLIC RELATIONS RES. 187, 192 (2001). 
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Second, I will use survey methodology to measure attitudes toward harmful UGC 
and assess willingness to engage in or endorse censorial behavior of such content, 
following Lambe’s research on willingness to censor.77 This method is effective because 
it translates complex legal abstractions into constructs that are comprehensible to a lay 
audience without also sacrificing the essential legal character of the constructs.78 In that 
same spirit, questions will seek to probe how potential survey participants comprehend 
harmful UGC, with the goal being construction of survey questions that indeed reflect 
plausible real-life scenarios as closely as possible. Based on analysis of participant 
comprehension of key terms, the best scale to use to measure attitudes toward the stimuli 
also can be assessed (3-, 5-, and 7-point scales have all been used in previous studies). 
The third phase of the research will be to test the survey on a convenience sample, 
most likely made up of undergraduate students. Once the reliability of the instrument has 
been assured through pilot study, the project will move to its fourth phase, which will be 
to administer the survey to a sample with demographic variability that is more 
representative of the general population. Possibilities for attaining such a sample include 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk or Knowledge Networks’ KnowledgePanel.  
The ultimate goal of this research is to give empirical structure to the abstract 
concepts of content governance discussed in this study. Now that individuals have the 
ability to act on what several big-name legal theorists long have called a natural 
                                                




proclivity to censor,79 it is imperative that social scientific research identifies whether and 
to what extent this proclivity exists. The very health of public discourse is at stake. 
The Future of Content Governance: Concluding Thoughts 
 
 The analyses and discussions in this study are a slice in time. Whether a year or 
10 years from now, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube almost certainly will be completely 
different than on the day this study was successfully defended. These intermediaries may 
no longer even exist, folding due to a MySpace-esque fate of lack of popularity. New 
intermediaries may take their place. As the communicative landscape changes, so too will 
the norms of communication in that landscape. Studying these changes means shooting at 
a moving target. However, the conclusions from this study and the research agenda that 
will grow from it ideally will provide a reference point from which to shoot. 
 Scholars of mass communication law have long had a duty to guide speakers and 
audiences through our chaotic world of extreme, offensive and potentially harmful 
speech. When angry crowds call for the censorship of such speech or the punishment of 
its speakers, it is our duty to facilitate a dialogue among all parties affected by the speech. 
We must have the courage to defend the right of the speaker to offend, the acumen to 
distinguish mere offense from greater harm, and the humanity to clearly explain our 
position to a lay audience. We also must have the sensitivity to understand the pain that 
speech can inflict upon certain social groups, and we must have the skill to ensure that 
their voice is fairly represented in the dialogue without allowing that voice to become a 
heckler’s veto against the speech. Most importantly, we must encourage an active and 
                                                
79 Supra note 4. 
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mindful tolerance of extreme speech based on an understanding of why allowing such 
speech to have a place in public discourse is ultimately valuable for society.  
 In the end, the concern of this study is the health and robustness of public 
discourse. This is a subject at the core of research in both mass communication law and 
mass communication in general. It is a subject upon which rests the integrity of 
deliberative democracy. As law professor Robert Post writes, 
[M]ore is at stake in the regulation of public discourse than the simple 
question of laissez faire. Quite beyond values of individual human liberty 
and personal self-realization lies the significance of the collective virtue of 
self-government. Traditional First Amendment doctrine, with its quaint 
focus on autonomy and the indeterminacy of national identity, is one of 
the last remaining areas of constitutional law to engage seriously the 
project of self-determination. If we discard that project as childish myth, 
so do we also discard our commitment to democracy, at least as our 
constitutional tradition has so far understood democracy.80 
                                                
80 ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 288-9 (1995). 
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Appendix 1: Content Code of Conduct (Corresponding to Chapter 5) 
 
(May 24, 2007)  
Source: Wayback Machine 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070515003455/http://www.facebook.com/codeofconduct.php 
 
Facebook is a social utility that connects people with friends and others who work, study and live 
around them. People use Facebook to keep up with friends, to share links, to share photos and 
videos of themselves and their friends, and to learn more about the people they meet. We want 
Facebook to be a place where people respect the rights and feelings of others, including third 
party intellectual property rights. Therefore, we have established certain rules for using Facebook 
and for posting messages, photos, video and other content ("Content") on Facebook, which rules 
are set forth in our Terms of Use and in this User Code of Conduct. WHEN YOU USE FACEBOOK, 
YOU ARE AGREEING TO ABIDE BY THE USER CODE OF CONDUCT AND THE OTHER RULES SET 
FORTH IN OUR TERMS OF USE. FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THIS CODE OF CONDUCT AND THE TERMS 
OF USE MAY RESULT, AMONG OTHER THINGS, IN TERMINATION OF YOUR ACCOUNT AND THE 
DELETION OF CONTENT THAT YOU HAVE POSTED ON FACEBOOK, WITH OR WITHOUT NOTICE, AS 
DETERMINED BY FACEBOOK IN ITS SOLE DISCRETION. Please refer to our Terms of Use for more 









While we believe users should be able to express themselves and their point of view, certain kinds 
of speech simply do not belong in a community like Facebook. Therefore, you may not post or 
share Content that: 
 
• is obscene, pornographic or sexually explicit 
• depicts graphic or gratuitous violence 
• makes threats of any kind or that intimidates, harasses, or bullies anyone 
• is derogatory, demeaning, malicious, defamatory, abusive, offensive or hateful 
 
Unlawful or Harmful Content or Conduct 
 
Although as an online service provider, we are not responsible for the conduct of our users, we 
want Facebook to be a safe place on the internet. Therefore, in using Facebook, you may not: 
 
• violate any local, state, national or international law or post any Content that would 
encourage or provide instructions for a criminal offense 
• impersonate any person or entity or otherwise misrepresent yourself, your age or your 
affiliation with any person or entity 
• use Facebook to send or make available any unsolicited or unauthorized advertising, 
solicitations, promotional materials, "junk mail," "spam," "chain letters," "pyramid schemes," 
or any other form of solicitation 
• post or share any personally identifiable or private information of any third party 
• solicit passwords or personal information from anyone, including those under 18 
• use information or content you obtained on the Facebook website or service in any manner 
not authorized by the Facebook Code of Conduct or Terms of Use 
• post any material that contains software viruses or any other computer code, files or 
programs designed to interrupt, destroy or limit the functionality of any computer software 
or hardware or telecommunications equipment 
• register for more than one account or use or attempt to use another's account, service or 
system without authorization or create a false identity on the Service or the Site 
• engage in any predatory or stalking conduct 
 
This Content Code of Conduct is subject to change at any time at Facebook's sole discretion. 
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Appendix 2: Facebook’s Community Standards (Corresponding to 
Chapter 5) 
 
Facebook Community Standards 
(Feb. 9, 2011) 
Source: Wayback Machine 
http://web.archive.org/web/20110209013433/https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards// 
 
Facebook is a global community where millions of people connect with each other. Each of these people 
represents unique opinions, ideals, and cultural values. Out of consideration for this diversity, we work to 
foster an environment where everyone can openly discuss issues and express their views, while respecting the 
rights of others. When millions of people get together to share things that are important to them, sometimes 
these discussions and posts include controversial topics and content. We believe this online dialog mirrors the 
exchange of ideas and opinions that happens throughout people's lives offline, in conversations at home, at 
work, in cafes, and in classrooms. As a trusted community of friends, family, coworkers, and classmates, 
Facebook is largely self-regulated. People who use Facebook can and do report content that they find 
questionable or offensive. To balance the needs and interests of a global community we ask everyone to 
respect the following content standards: 
 
Threats We want our members to feel safe on the site. Any credible threats to harm others will be removed. 
We may also remove support for violent organizations. 
 
Promoting Self-Harm Facebook is not a place for self-destructive behavior. To that end we don't allow the 
promotion of suicide, "cutting," eating disorders, or illegal drug use. We take threats of suicide very seriously 
and will contact the relevant authorities when we become aware of them. 
 
Bullying & Harassment As a community, we place a high value on respecting each other, and take reports of 
harassment very seriously. We take action when private individuals are bullied or persistently contacted 
against their wishes. While we encourage you to make meaningful new connections, please keep in mind that 
contacting strangers or people you've never met in person can be a form of harassment. 
 
Hate Speech Facebook does not tolerate hate speech. Please grant each other mutual respect when you 
communicate here. While we encourage the discussion of ideas, institutions, events, and practices, it is a 
serious violation of our terms to single out individuals based on race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex, 
gender, sexual orientation, disability, or disease. 
 
Graphic Violence While we are a platform for sharing events that take place in your life and around the world, 
any inappropriately graphic content will be removed when found on the site. Sadistic displays of violence 
against people or animals, or depictions of sexual assault, are prohibited. 
 
Sex & Nudity We have a strict "no nudity or pornography" policy. Any content that is inappropriately sexual 
will be removed. Before posting questionable content, be mindful of the consequences for you and your 
environment. 
 
Theft, Vandalism, or Fraud We are trying to make the world a more open, connected, and ultimately better 
place. Organizing acts that harm others through theft, vandalism, or fraud is a violation of our terms. 
 
Identity & Privacy Facebook is a community where real people connect and share using their real identities. 
When you represent yourself accurately on Facebook you are helping to build trust and safety for everyone. 
Claiming to be someone else, creating multiple accounts, or falsely representing an organization undermines 
this trust and violates our terms. Please also refrain from publishing other people's personal information. 
 
Intellectual Property Before sharing content on Facebook, please be sure you have the right to do so. We ask 
that you respect copyrights, trademarks, and other legal rights. 
 
Phishing & Spam We take the safety of our members seriously and work to prevent attempts to compromise 
their privacy or security. We also ask that you respect our members by not contacting them for commercial 
purposes without their consent. 
 
Reporting Abuse 
If you see something on Facebook that you believe violates our terms, you can report it to us. Please keep in 
mind that reporting a person, organization, or piece of content doesn't guarantee its removal from the site. 
Because of the diversity of our community, it's possible that something could be disagreeable or disturbing to 
you without meeting the criteria for being removed or blocked. For this reason, we also offer personal controls 
over what you see, such as the ability to hide or quietly cut ties with people, Pages, or applications that offend 





Facebook Community Standards 
(Dec. 15, 2012) 
Source: Wayback Machine 
http://web.archive.org/web/20121215024155/http://www.facebook.com/communitystandards 
 
[**NOTE: Red text denotes changes from original (Feb. 9, 2011) standards] 
 
Facebook gives people around the world the power to publish their own stories, see the world through the 
eyes of many other people, and connect and share wherever they go. The conversation that happens on 
Facebook – and the opinions expressed here – mirror the diversity of the people using Facebook. 
 
To balance the needs and interests of a global population, Facebook protects expression that meets the 
community standards outlined on this page. 
 
Please review these standards. They will help you understand what type of expression is acceptable, and what 
type of content may be reported and removed. 
 
Violence and Threats Safety is Facebook's top priority. We remove content and may escalate to law 
enforcement when we perceive a genuine risk of physical harm, or a direct threat to public safety. You may not 
credibly threaten others, or organize acts of real-world violence. Organizations with a record of terrorist or 
violent criminal activity are not allowed to maintain a presence on our site. We also prohibit promoting, 
planning or celebrating any of your actions if they have, or could, result in financial harm to others, including 
theft and vandalism. 
 
Self-Harm Facebook takes threats of self-harm very seriously. We remove any promotion or encouragement 
of self-mutilation, eating disorders or hard drug abuse. We also work with suicide prevention agencies around 
the world to provide assistance for people in distress. 
 
Bullying and Harassment Facebook does not tolerate bullying or harassment. We allow users to speak freely 
on matters and people of public interest, but take action on all reports of abusive behavior directed at private 
individuals. Repeatedly targeting other users with unwanted friend requests or messages is a form of 
harassment. 
 
Hate Speech Facebook does not permit hate speech, but distinguishes between serious and humorous 
speech. While we encourage you to challenge ideas, institutions, events, and practices, we do not permit 
individuals or groups to attack others based on their race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex, gender, 
sexual orientation, disability or medical condition. 
 
Graphic Content People use Facebook to share events through photos and videos. We understand that 
graphic imagery is a regular component of current events, but must balance the needs of a diverse 
community. Sharing any graphic content for sadistic pleasure is prohibited. 
 
Nudity and Pornography Facebook has a strict policy against the sharing of pornographic content and any 
explicitly sexual content where a minor is involved. We also impose limitations on the display of nudity. We 
aspire to respect people’s right to share content of personal importance, whether those are photos of a 
sculpture like Michelangelo's David or family photos of a child breastfeeding. 
 
Identity and Privacy On Facebook people connect using their real names and identities. We ask that you 
refrain from publishing the personal information of others without their consent. Claiming to be another 
person, creating a false presence for an organization, or creating multiple accounts undermines community 
and violates Facebook’s terms. 
 
Intellectual Property Before sharing content on Facebook, please be sure you have the right to do so. We ask 
that you respect copyrights, trademarks, and other legal rights. 
 
Phishing and Spam We take the safety of our members seriously and work to prevent attempts to 
compromise their privacy or security. We also ask that you respect our members by not contacting them for 
commercial purposes without their consent. 
 
Security We take the safety of our members seriously and work to prevent attempts to compromise their 
privacy or security, including those that use fraud or deception. Additionally, we ask that you respect our 







If you see something on Facebook that you believe violates our terms, you should report it to us. Please keep 
in mind that reporting a piece of content does not guarantee that it will be removed from the site. 
 
Because of the diversity of our community, it's possible that something could be disagreeable or disturbing to 
you without meeting the criteria for being removed or blocked. For this reason, we also offer personal controls 
over what you see, such as the ability to hide or quietly cut ties with people, Pages, or applications that offend 
you. 
 
Facebook Community Standards 
(Nov. 9, 2013) 
Source: Wayback Machine 
http://web.archive.org/web/20131109125448/https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards 
 
[The Nov. 9, 2013, standards are the same as the Dec. 15, 2012, standards, except for the following update]: 
 
Graphic Content Facebook has long been a place where people turn to share their experiences and raise 
awareness about issues important to them. 
 
Sometimes, those experiences and issues involve graphic content that is of public interest or concern, such as 
human rights abuses or acts of terrorism. In many instances, when people share this type of content, it is to 
condemn it. However, graphic images shared for sadistic effect or to celebrate or glorify violence have no 
place on our site. When people share any content, we expect that they will share in a responsible manner. That 
includes choosing carefully the audience for the content. For graphic videos, people should warn their 
audience about the nature of the content in the video so that their audience can make an informed choice 




Facebook Community Standards 
(Feb. 8, 2015) 




[The Feb. 8, 2015, standards are the same as the Nov. 9, 2013, standards, except for the following update]: 
 
Regulated Goods: It is not permitted to complete transactions involving regulated goods on our 
platform. If you post an offer involving firearms, alcohol, tobacco, or adult products, we expect 
you to make sure you’re following all applicable laws and consider carefully the audience for that 
content. If you are using a Page to connect with your customers and other audiences, you need to 




Community Standards [completely revised] 




Our mission is to give people the power to share and make the world more open and connected. 
Every day, people come to Facebook to share their stories, see the world through the eyes of 
others and connect with friends and causes. The conversations that happen on Facebook reflect 
the diversity of a community of more than one billion people.  
 
We want people to feel safe when using Facebook. For that reason, we've developed a set of 
Community Standards, outlined below. These policies will help you understand what type of 
sharing is allowed on Facebook, and what type of content may be reported to us and removed. 
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Because of the diversity of our global community, please keep in mind that something that may be 
disagreeable or disturbing to you may not violate our Community Standards. 
 
Keeping You Safe 
 
Overview: We remove content, disable accounts, and work with law enforcement when we 
believe there is a genuine risk of physical harm or direct threats to public safety. Learn more 
about how Facebook handles abusive content. [Links to categories below via sidebar] 
 
Direct Threats: How we help people who feel threatened by others on Facebook. We carefully 
review reports of threatening language to identify serious threats of harm to public and personal 
safety. We remove credible threats of physical harm to individuals. We also remove specific 
threats of theft, vandalism, or other financial harm. We may consider things like a person's 
physical location or public visibility in determining whether a threat is credible. We may assume 
credibility of any threats to people living in violent and unstable regions. 
 
Self-Injury: How we work to help prevent self-injury and suicide. 
 
We don’t allow the promotion of self-injury or suicide. We work with organizations around the 
world to provide assistance for people in distress. We prohibit content that promotes or 
encourages suicide or any other type of self-injury, including self-mutilation and eating 
disorders. We don't consider body modification to be self-injury. We also remove any content 
that identifies victims or survivors of self-injury or suicide and targets them for attack, either 
seriously or humorously. People can, however, share information about self-injury and suicide 
that does not promote these things. 
 
Dangerous Organizations: What types of organizations we prohibit on Facebook. 
 
We don’t allow any organizations that are engaged in the following to have a presence on 
Facebook: Terrorist activity, or Organized criminal activity. 
 
We also remove content that expresses support for groups that are involved in the violent or 
criminal behavior mentioned above. Supporting or praising leaders of those same organizations, 
or condoning their violent activities, is not allowed. We welcome broad discussion and social 
commentary on these general subjects, but ask that people show sensitivity towards victims of 
violence and discrimination. 
 
Bullying and Harassment: How we respond to bullying and harassment. 
 
We don’t tolerate bullying or harassment. We allow you to speak freely on matters and people of 
public interest, but remove content that appears to purposefully target private individuals with 
the intention of degrading or shaming them. This content includes, but is not limited to:  
 
• Pages that identify and shame private individuals, 
• Images altered to degrade private individuals, 
• Photos or videos of physical bullying posted to shame the victim, 
• Sharing personal information to blackmail or harass people, and 
• Repeatedly targeting other people with unwanted friend requests 
 or messages. 
 
We define private individuals as people who have neither gained news attention nor the interest 
of the public, by way of their actions or public profession. 
 
Attacks on Public Figures: What protection public figures receive on Facebook. 
 
We permit open and critical discussion of people who are featured in the news or have a large 
public audience based on their profession or chosen activities. We remove credible threats to 
public figures, as well as hate speech directed at them – just as we do for private individuals. 
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Criminal Activity: How we handle reports of criminal activity on Facebook. 
 
We prohibit the use of Facebook to facilitate or organize criminal activity that causes physical 
harm to people, businesses or animals, or financial damage to people or businesses. We work 
with law enforcement when we believe there is a genuine risk of physical harm or direct threats 
to public safety.  
 
We also prohibit you from celebrating any crimes you’ve committed. We do, however, allow 
people to debate or advocate for the legality of criminal activities, as well as address them in a 
humorous or satirical way. 
 
Sexual Violence and Exploitation: How we fight sexual violence and exploitation on Facebook. 
 
We remove content that threatens or promotes sexual violence or exploitation. This includes the 
sexual exploitation of minors, and sexual assault. To protect victims and survivors, we also 
remove photographs or videos depicting incidents of sexual violence and images shared in 
revenge or without permissions from the people in the images.  
 
Our definition of sexual exploitation includes solicitation of sexual material, any sexual content 
involving minors, threats to share intimate images, and offers of sexual services. Where 
appropriate, we refer this content to law enforcement. Offers of sexual services include 




We prohibit any attempts by unauthorized dealers to purchase, sell, or trade prescription drugs 
and marijuana. If you post an offer to purchase or sell firearms, alcohol, tobacco, or adult 
products, we expect you to comply with all applicable laws and carefully consider the audience 
for that content. We do not allow you to use Facebook's payment tools to sell or purchase 
regulated goods on our platform. 
 
Encouraging Respectful Behavior 
 
Overview: People use Facebook to share their experiences and to raise awareness about issues 
that are important to them. This means that you may encounter opinions that are different from 
yours, which we believe can lead to important conversations about difficult topics. To help 
balance the needs, safety, and interests of a diverse community, however, we may remove certain 
kinds of sensitive content or limit the audience that sees it. Learn more about how we do that 
here. [Links to categories below via sidebar] 
 
Nudity: People sometimes share content containing nudity for reasons like awareness campaigns 
or artistic projects. We restrict the display of nudity because some audiences within our global 
community may be sensitive to this type of content - particularly because of their cultural 
background or age. In order to treat people fairly and respond to reports quickly, it is essential 
that we have policies in place that our global teams can apply uniformly and easily when 
reviewing content. As a result, our policies can sometimes be more blunt than we would like and 
restrict content shared for legitimate purposes. We are always working to get better at evaluating 
this content and enforcing our standards. 
  
We remove photographs of people displaying genitals or focusing in on fully exposed buttocks. 
We also restrict some images of female breasts if they include the nipple, but we always allow 
photos of women actively engaged in breastfeeding or showing breasts with post-mastectomy 
scarring. We also allow photographs of paintings, sculptures, and other art that depicts nude 
figures. Restrictions on the display of both nudity and sexual activity also apply to digitally 
created content unless the content is posted for educational, humorous, or satirical purposes. 
Explicit images of sexual intercourse are prohibited. Descriptions of sexual acts that go into vivid 




Hate Speech: Facebook removes hate speech, which includes content that directly attacks people 
based on their: Race; Ethnicity; National origin; Religious affiliation; Sexual orientation; Sex, 
gender, or gender identity; or Serious disabilities or diseases. 
 
Organizations and people dedicated to promoting hatred against these protected groups are not 
allowed a presence on Facebook. As with all of our standards, we rely on our community to 
report this content to us.  
 
People can use Facebook to challenge ideas, institutions, and practices. Such discussion can 
promote debate and greater understanding. Sometimes people share content containing 
someone else's hate speech for the purpose of raising awareness or educating others about that 
hate speech. When this is the case, we expect people to clearly indicate their purpose, which 
helps us better understand why they shared that content.  
 
We allow humor, satire, or social commentary related to these topics, and we believe that when 
people use their authentic identity, they are more responsible when they share this kind of 
commentary. For that reason, we ask that Page owners associate their name and Facebook Profile 
with any content that is insensitive, even if that content does not violate our policies. As always, 
we urge people to be conscious of their audience when sharing this type of content.  
 
While we work hard to remove hate speech, we also give you tools to avoid distasteful or 
offensive content. Learn more about the tools we offer to control what you see. You can also use 
Facebook to speak up and educate the community around you. Counter-speech in the form of 
accurate information and alternative viewpoints can help create a safer and more respectful 
environment. 
 
Violence and Graphic Content: Facebook has long been a place where people share their 
experiences and raise awareness about important issues. Sometimes, those experiences and 
issues involve violence and graphic images of public interest or concern, such as human rights 
abuses or acts of terrorism. In many instances, when people share this type of content, they are 
condemning it or raising awareness about it. We remove graphic images when they are shared for 
sadistic pleasure or to celebrate or glorify violence.  
 
When people share anything on Facebook, we expect that they will share it responsibly, including 
carefully choosing who will see that content. We also ask that people warn their audience about 
what they are about to see if it includes graphic violence. 
 




Using Your Authentic Identity: How Facebook’s real name requirement creates a safer 
environment. 
 
People connect on Facebook using their authentic identities. When people stand behind their 
opinions and actions with their authentic name and reputation, our community is more 
accountable. If we discover that you have multiple personal profiles, we may ask you to close the 
additional profiles. We also remove any profiles that impersonate other people.  
 
If you want to create a presence on Facebook for your pet, organization, favorite movie, games 
character, or another purpose, please create a Page instead of a Facebook Profile. Pages can help 











Our global community is growing every day and we strive to welcome people to an environment 
free from abusive content. To do this, we rely on people like you. If you see something on 
Facebook that you believe violates our terms, please report it to us. We have dedicated teams 
working around the world to review things you report to help make sure Facebook remains safe.  
 
Governments also sometimes ask us to remove content that violates local laws, but does not 
violate our Community Standards. If after careful legal review, we find that the content is illegal 
under local law, then we may make it unavailable only in the relevant country or territory.  
 
Please keep the following in mind:  
 
•  We may take action any time something violates the Community 
 Standards outlined here. 
•  We may ask Page owners to associate their name and Facebook Profile with a Page that 
contains cruel and insensitive content, even if that content does not violate our policies. 
•  Reporting something doesn't guarantee that it will be removed because it may not violate our 
policies. 
•  Our content reviewers will look to you for information about why a post may violate our 
policies. If you report content, please tell us why the content should be removed (e.g., is it 
nudity or hate speech?) so that we can send it to the right person for review. 
•  Our review decisions may occasionally change after receiving additional context about specific 
posts or after seeing new, violating content appearing on a Page or Facebook Profile. 
•  The number of reports does not impact whether something will be removed. We never remove 
content simply because it has been reported a number of times. 
•  The consequences for violating our Community Standards vary depending on the severity of 
the violation and the person's history on Facebook. For instance, we may warn someone for a 
first violation, but if we continue to see further violations we may restrict a person's ability to 
post on Facebook or ban the person from Facebook. 
 
Not all disagreeable or disturbing content violates our Community Standards. For this reason, we 
offer you the ability to customize and control what you see by unfollowing, blocking, and hiding 
the posts, people, Pages, and applications you don’t want to see – and we encourage you to use 
these controls to better personalize your experience. Learn more. People also often resolve issues 
they have about a piece of content by simply reaching out to the person who posted it. We’ve 
created tools for you to communicate directly with other people when you’re unhappy with posts, 
photos, or other content you see on Facebook. 
 
